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LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD 
 Ellen Spencer Mussey and Emma Gillett founded both 
the Washington College of Law (“WCL”) and D.C.’s Women’s 
Bar Association (“WBA”) at a time when women did not re-
ceive full and equal participation in society, a time when women 
were not allowed to participate on a jury, practice law, or even 
vote in elections.  Over a hundred years later, a lot of progress 
has been done, but our society has yet to create total equality; as 
Hillary Clinton stated in her concession speech for the Democ-
ratic nomination, “[a]lthough we weren’t able to shatter that 
highest, hardest glass ceiling this time, it’s got 18 million cracks 
in it.” 
 
By challenging oppressive norms and educating our 
community on diversity and the law, The Modern American 
continues to chip away at the glass ceiling.  In recognition of 
these continuing struggles, we proudly dedicate this issue to 
women in the law.  To celebrate the legacy of our founders and 
honor our shared history, our magazine hosted a Women’s Bar 
Association event on October 16th, 2008, and welcomed the 
WBA’s historic archives to the law school’s Pence Law Library.   
 
This issue features the winning essay of a joint WBA-
TMA writing competition, as well as an article describing the 
shared history of the WBA and WCL, and interviews with nota-
ble women in the legal profession.   
 
This issue also presents an array of topics such as the 
death penalty and its racial undertones, the rights of transgen-
dered individuals, the rights of parents to teach hate speech to 
their children, and the rights of Native American communities, 
to name a few. 
  
 We have a lot to look forward to in 2009.  On April 
2009, The Modern American’s Fourth Annual Symposium will 
gather renowned scholars, who will address the separation of 
church and state and the regulation of morality as it affects 
cross-cultural relations in our community.  Additionally, we will 
welcome a new Executive Board.  And, beginning with this is-
sue, our publication will be printed in an environmentally 
friendly manner.  Finally, subscribers will now be able to access 
The Modern American through V.lex, LexisNexis, and the 
Westlaw database. 
 
 In closing, we hope our issue inspires you to continue 
fostering the discourse on diversity and embracing everyday 
change in your community. 
 
Sincerely,  
 
 
 The Executive Board 
     The Modern American 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine a biracial, heterosexual, female Buddhist, new 
to Los Angeles and looking for a place to live.  Short of money, 
she notes the following roommate-wanted ads: 
 
1. We are three Christian females… We have weekly 
bible studies and bi-weekly times of fellowship.1 
2. The person applying for the room MUST be a 
 BLACK GAY MALE.2 
3. This is a Christian home and we are looking for a 
Christian female to rent a downstairs room.3 
 
She is unwelcome in at least two of the apartments, but 
each ad is presumptively illegal.  Fair housing laws prohibit dis-
crimination based on religion, race, sex and, in some jurisdic-
tions, sexual orientation.4  The federal Fair Housing Act 
(“FHA”) and many state statutes and municipal ordinances ex-
empt “Mrs. Murphy”5 landlords, who rent out rooms or apart-
ments in smaller buildings where they reside.  These landlords 
can usually discriminate when selecting tenants, so long as they 
do not advertise preferences or state discriminatory reasons for 
rejecting applicants.6  In most states, these exemptions apply to 
roommate-seekers, but some jurisdictions are more restrictive.7  
Further, the Supreme Court has held that the Civil Rights Act of 
18668 prohibits racial discrimination and many forms of national 
origin discrimination in housing,9 and several lower courts have 
concluded that the FHA does not preclude claims under the 1866 
Act.10  Thus, both Mrs. Murphy landlords and roommate seekers 
could be held liable for refusing to rent to people who are pro-
tected under the 1866 Act. 
Today, people seeking roommates outnumber classic 
Mrs. Murphy landlords,11 but, despite the distinct compatibility 
concerns involved, fair housing laws do not acknowledge this 
group as a separate category.  Whereas boarding house owners 
may impose rules upon tenants,12 compatibility is particularly 
important to roommates as their conflicts are typically resolved 
through discussion and compromise.  Many landlords who enjoy 
the Mrs. Murphy exemptions merely rent out separate apart-
ments in buildings where they also reside.  In this article, I ex-
plore whether fair housing laws violate the intimate association, 
privacy, and free speech rights of people seeking roommates to 
share their kitchens, bathrooms, and other common living areas.  
I examine three types of laws: prohibitions on using discrimina-
tory criteria when selecting a roommate, prohibitions on placing 
discriminatory advertisements, and prohibitions on making dis-
criminatory statements when interviewing potential candidates.  
In Part II, I describe several adjudications in the room-
mate context, including cases brought against Internet sites that 
provide forums and matching services for roommate seekers.   In 
Part III, I examine laws that bar discriminatory selection and 
conclude that federal intimate association and privacy rights, as 
well as privacy rights granted by the California constitution, are 
violated if individuals do not have a completely free choice in 
selecting a roommate.  In Part IV, I analyze advertising restric-
tions from both an intimate associate and privacy perspective 
and under the commercial speech doctrine.  I determine that, 
although such restrictions survive intimate association and pri-
vacy challenges, only restrictions on discriminatory ads related 
to race, ethnicity or national origin survive a free speech chal-
lenge.  In Part V, I explain why prohibitions on discriminatory 
statements are even more problematic, violating free speech, 
privacy and intimate association rights.  I conclude that, while it 
is wise policy to allow roommate seekers greater leeway in ad-
vertising some preferences, restrictions on ads expressing prefer-
ences related to race, national origin and ethnicity are not only 
constitutional, they are likely to advance the goals of the Fair 
Housing Act.  
 
 
II. THE ADJUDICATION OF ROOMMATE  
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
 
 Agency commissioners, and state and federal judges, 
have adjudicated cases brought by rebuffed roommate appli-
cants.   A brief survey of a few such cases provides context for 
the constitutional rights discussion that follows.13  
 
1. PROHIBITIONS ON DISCRIMINATORY ROOMMATE  
SELECTION AND STATEMENTS  
 
 In Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. 
Larrick,14 two Caucasian women were seeking a third roommate 
“to share their unit and help pay the rent.”15 During a phone con-
versation, one of the women told a bi-racial applicant that her 
other roommate did not want to live with a black person.  The 
roommate seekers were found liable16 for discriminating on the 
basis of race and for making racially discriminatory statements.  
None of the exceptions to California’s Fair Housing code ap-
plied to the respondents because more than one roomer or 
boarder lived in the dwelling.17   
In Marya v. Slakey,18 an applicant sued the owner of a 
six-bedroom house after a co-tenant discriminated against her.  
The tenants executed a single lease and advertised and filled 
vacancies after one-on-one interviews.  Decisions on which can-
didate to select had to be unanimous, and all tenants had to be 
non-smoking, vegetarian students.  One tenant declined to inter-
view the applicant, explaining that two Indian women already 
lived in the house, and he did not want to live “with three people 
of the same cultural orientation.”19  The applicant alleged she 
had been denied housing on the basis of her race, color, national 
origin and/or sex.20  The court held that the Mrs. Murphy ex-
emption did not apply and would not have permitted discrimina-
tory statements in any case. The court did not conclude that the 
roommates were entitled to any special protections when creat-
ing criteria for cohabitants.21 
 
 
FAIR HOUSING LAWS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF 
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2.  PROHIBITION ON DISCRIMINATORY ROOMMATE SELECTION 
 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reviewed a local ordi-
nance prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion in Sprague v. City of Madison.22  Two roommates extended 
an offer to a lesbian but later withdrew it, stating that they were 
not comfortable living with her. The court held that the ordi-
nance unambiguously applied in all housing rentals and rejected 
the appellants’ argument that it was unconstitutional in the 
roommate context: “Appellants gave up their unqualified right to 
such constitutional protections when they rented housing for 
profit.”23 Subsequent to commencement of the case, Madison’s 
City Council had amended the ordinance24 to exempt room-
mates, but the court nonetheless held the defendants liable.25  
The court’s conclusion that the solicitation of co-roommates 
constitutes “renting housing for profit,” and that renters who do 
so forfeit their privacy and First Amendment rights, may mean 
that people who lack the resources to live alone are particularly 
at risk of facing infringements on their constitutional rights.  
 
3. PROHIBITIONS ON STATEMENTS/ADVERTISEMENTS  
EXPRESSING PREFERENCES  
 
In Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. 
DeSantis, a woman renter sought a roommate to share her two-
bedroom apartment “to help pay the rent.” 26  An African Ameri-
can male potential renter stated that the advertised room was too 
small, and asked to see the other bedroom.  The woman refused, 
indicating it was her room.  The applicant later claimed that she 
told him no room was available, and that she had denied him the 
rental due to his race.  A housing-
rights group sent one Caucasian and 
one African American tester to the 
apartment.  The respondent told the 
Caucasian tester that she “really 
[doesn’t] like black guys.  I try to be 
fair and all, but they scare me.”27  She 
was legally permitted to discriminate 
in selecting a roommate under Califor-
nia’s single roomer exemption, but 
was held liable for making a discrimi-
natory statement.28  
In Fair Housing Advocates 
Association v. McGlynn,29 a black 
female responded to an ad seeking a 
female roommate placed by a white 
male.  After inquiring about her race, he told her “blacks should 
live with blacks and whites should live with whites.”30  A fair 
housing organization then had testers contact the respondent.31  
His behavior suggested he may have been seeking not just room-
mate, but a girlfriend.32  He asked a black tester about her occu-
pation, if she smoked or drank, if she had a boyfriend and why 
she was not living with him, and if it would bother her that he 
was a white smoker who drank.33  He invited her to the apart-
ment, but she left after he asked her if she wanted a massage and 
then asked for a kiss.34  The respondent was found liable for 
placing a discriminatory ad and for making discriminatory state-
ments.35  
 
 
 
 
4. PERMITTING SEXUAL ORIENTATION  
DISCRIMINATION 
  
The commissioners in Department of Fair Employment 
and Housing v. Baker36 concluded that California’s statute pro-
hibiting sexual orientation discrimination did not apply to a 
roommate seeker.  The respondent rejected a lesbian applicant 
via voicemail, stating his other roommate was a Christian Fun-
damentalist, and they “would not get along too well.”37  The 
commissioners explained that sexual orientation discrimination 
was incorporated into California fair housing law through the 
Unruh Civil Rights Act,38 which applies only to “business estab-
lishments,”39 and “does not apply to those relationships that are 
truly private.”40  They further stated “truly private and social 
relationships” are protected by the right of intimate association, 
and held that the record did not reveal whether the respondent’s 
housemate relationship “was sufficiently non-continuous, non-
personal and non-social to preclude being a constitutionally pro-
tected intimate association.”41  The facts were thus insufficient 
to show that his “housing operation constituted a ‘business es-
tablishment’ rather than a constitutionally protected intimate 
association.”42  
 
5. CASES AGAINST INTERNET FORUMS OR ROOM-
MATE SEARCH SERVICE PROVIDERS 
 
In Chicago Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under 
Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,43 a public interest consortium al-
leged that it had diverted substantial time and resources away 
from its fair housing program responding to Craigslist’s publica-
tion of discriminatory classified ads.44  
Many ads appeared to have been 
placed by roommate seekers.45  The 
court held that Craigslist was afforded 
immunity by the Communications 
Decency Act (CDA),46 under which 
providers of an interactive computer 
service are not to be treated as the 
publisher of information created by 
another content provider.  Because 
Craigslist served only “as a conduit” 
for information provided by its users, 
it was not liable for ads that violated 
fair housing laws.47  Roommate seek-
ers who place discriminatory ads may 
nonetheless be held individually liable 
as the content providers. Although the court’s analysis focused 
on the CDA, in affirming the decision of the district court, the 
Seventh Circuit hinted at the constitutional rights issues raised 
by the case, stating: “[A]ny rule that forbids truthful advertising 
of a transaction that would be substantively lawful encounters 
serious problems under the First Amendment.”48 
An online roommate matching service was similarly 
sued in Fair Housing Council v. Roommate.com,49 but with a 
very different outcome.  Subscribers to the service respond to 
questionnaires by selecting answers in drop-down menus.50  The 
Ninth Circuit concluded that “By requiring subscribers to pro-
vide the information as a condition of accessing its service, and 
by providing a limited set of pre-populated answers, Roommate 
becomes much more than a passive transmitter of information 
provided by others; it becomes the developer, at least in part, of 
that information.”51  The Court thus remanded the case for a 
The Court’s decision may mean that 
people who lack the resources to live 
alone are particularly at risk of fac-
ing infringements on their constitu-
tional rights.  
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determination as to whether Roommate’s publication of certain 
postings violates the FHA, “or whether they are protected by the 
First Amendment or other constitutional guarantees.”52 
   
 
III. OUTRIGHT BANS ON DISCRIMINATION 
 
1. FEDERAL INTIMATE ASSOCIATION AND PRIVACY RIGHTS  
AND DISCRIMINATORY SELECTION 
 
In Roberts v. Jaycees, the Supreme Court suggested 
that the Fourteenth Amendment right to intimate association 
encompasses roommate relationships, explaining that “highly 
personal relationships” are protected because “individuals draw 
much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with oth-
ers.”53  Though the Supreme Court specifically identified family 
relationships, the Court imagined other relationships would be 
similarly protected: 
 
Family relationships, by their nature, involve 
deep attachments and commitments to the 
necessarily few other individuals with whom 
one shares not only a special community of 
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also 
distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.  
Among other things, therefore, they are distin-
guished by such attributes as relative small-
ness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions 
to begin and maintain the affiliation, and se-
clusion from others in critical aspects of the 
relationship.  As a general matter only rela-
tionships with theses sorts of qualities are 
likely to reflect the considerations that have 
led to an understanding of freedom of associa-
tion as an intrinsic element of personal lib-
erty.54  
 
The identification of “selectivity in decisions to begin and main-
tain the affiliation” underscores that relationships beyond blood 
ties are protected.  Because people cannot choose their families, 
if only familial relationships were protected, identifying 
“selectivity in decisions to begin” the association as a criterion 
for determining whether a relationship is protected would be 
incongruous.  Roommate relationships, in particular, are charac-
terized by each of the three factors identified by the Court in 
Roberts.  They are small, usually including no more individuals 
than there are bedrooms in a dwelling.  Most people are quite 
selective when deciding to live with another person—they are 
choosing someone who will have access to their possessions, 
pets and personal information.  And roommate relationships are 
highly secluded.  Roommates often see each other in their paja-
mas or underwear, and when they are sick, exhausted, or just 
sad.  People often hide from the rest of the world aspects of 
themselves that are unavoidably revealed in the privacy of the 
home.55   
Thus, denying the right to choose cohabitants based on 
personal criteria profoundly violates personal liberty, and fair 
housing laws that ban discrimination outright should be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny’s least restrictive means test.  Yet, as 
“liberty and autonomy” mean little if individuals are powerless 
to decide with whom to create intimate relationships,56 no means 
of combating housing discrimination could be more restrictive.  
Prohibiting discriminatory selection only when housing is not 
shared is a reasonable alternative because the result would likely 
be the same.  Because a roommate seeker may consider many 
factors—compatible schedules, similar tastes in music or televi-
sion—she can state many reasons for rejecting an applicant, 
even if consciously or unconsciously her motivation is discrimi-
natory preference.  Furthermore, the exemption of Mrs. Murphy 
landlords from all but the advertising and statement prohibitions 
illustrates Congress’s belief that certain privacy interests are 
important enough to justify some sacrifice of the FHA’s goals.57  
Eliminating roommate choice is thus unlikely to pass the least-
restrictive-means test.     
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas58 has nonetheless led 
some to conclude that federal intimate association and privacy 
rights do not protect roommates.59 Six students challenged a 
zoning ordinance limiting the occupancy of single-family dwell-
ings to traditional families or to groups of not more than two 
unrelated persons.  The Court determined that the ordinance did 
not compromise any fundamental right to association or privacy.  
However, a zoning ordinance that prohibits groups of people 
from living in certain areas is quite different from a law that 
affirmatively requires an individual to accept a cohabitant.  The 
former only affects where people in an existing relationship may 
live, but the latter determines with whom an individual must 
create a relationship, at least if she cannot afford to live alone or 
would prefer to have a roommate.60    
In Carey v. Brown,61 the Supreme Court stressed the 
importance of residential privacy: “The States’ interest in pro-
tecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is 
certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.”62  
The Court continued, “Preserving the sanctity of the home, the 
one retreat to which men and women can repair to escape the 
tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important 
value.”63  Not only has the Court chosen to protect residential 
privacy,64 it has recognized privacy within the home as a consti-
tutional right.65  The range of contexts in which the right has 
been recognized suggests that it includes autonomy in determin-
ing the person roommate seekers are likely to greet first in the 
morning and see last at day’s end. 
 
2. PRIVACY RIGHTS GRANTED UNDER THE CALIFORNIA  
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS THAT PREVENT SEEKERS  
FROM ULTIMATELY SELECTING ROOMMATES  
 
At least nine state constitutions provide privacy protec-
tions more expansive than those afforded federally.66  In City of 
Santa Barbara v. Adamson,67 the California Supreme Court con-
cluded that California’s privacy right68 protects roommate rela-
tionships when it struck down a zoning ordinance prohibiting 
more than five unrelated persons from living together. The Court 
described the plaintiffs: 69 
 
They chose to reside with each other when 
Adamson made it known she was looking for 
congenial people with whom to share her 
house.  Since then, they explain, they have 
become a close group with social, economic 
and psychological commitments to each 
other . . . they have chosen to live together 
mainly because of their compatibility. . . . Ap-
pellants say that they regard their group as ‘a 
family’ and that they seek to share several 
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values of conventionally composed families.  
A living arrangement like theirs concededly 
does achieve many of the personal and practi-
cal needs served by traditional family living.70 
 
The Court concluded that California’s right to privacy encom-
passed the right to live with whomever one wishes, and Santa 
Barbara would have to show a compelling public interest in re-
stricting communal living.71   The highest Courts of New Jersey 
and New York have concluded that similar zoning laws violated 
state constitutional privacy or due process protections.72 
The three part test for invasions of privacy announced 
by the California Supreme Court in Hill v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Association73 suggests that roommate relationships are 
protected beyond the zoning context and that roommate seekers 
should have autonomy in selecting cohabitants.  If a plaintiff 
establishes: “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) 
conduct by [the] defendant constituting a serious invasion of 
privacy,” the defendant must show that the invasion substan-
tively furthers a countervailing interest.74  The plaintiff may re-
but that defendant’s assertion by showing there are alternatives 
with a lesser impact on privacy interests.75  
In Tom v. City and County of San Francisco,76 an ordi-
nance preventing tenants-in-common from excluding other co-
owners from their individual dwellings was struck down under 
this test.  After pooling resources to acquire multi-unit residen-
tial property, the co-owners signed right-of-occupancy agree-
ments specifying who would live in which unit.  The court ex-
plained the effect of the ordinance, which had been passed to 
discourage the conversion of rental housing to owner-occupied 
housing: “[U]nrelated persons . . . would be required to share 
occupancy of their dwelling units with each other, or could not 
prevent other cotenants from entering their private living 
space.”77  The court held that the city had articulated no interest 
that justified “an extreme privacy violation, such as rendering 
homeowners unable to determine the persons with whom they 
should live, or forcing them to share their homes with others 
who are unwelcome.”78  
Fair housing laws that prohibit discriminatory room-
mate selection have a greater impact on privacy.  The ordinance 
struck down in Tom prevented the contractual protection of pri-
vacy, and thus tenants-in-common could theoretically have been 
“forced to share their homes with others who [were] unwel-
come.”  But, as each co-owner was provided an individual 
dwelling by mutual agreement, it was unlikely anyone would 
actually invade another’s dwelling.  However, fair housing laws 
that require a roommate seeker to accept an applicant create 
more than a theoretical burden.  They force her to share her 
home with someone “who [is] unwelcome.”79  As virtually any 
alternative means of combating housing discrimination would 
have a lesser impact on privacy, such laws are unlikely to be 
upheld under California’s constitution.  
 
IV. PROHIBITIONS ON DISCRIMINATORY  
ADVERTISEMENTS 
 
1. DISCRIMINATORY ADVERTISEMENTS AND FEDERAL  
INTIMATE ASSOCIATION RIGHTS 
 
The Supreme Court set a high bar for determining when 
the right to intimate association has been violated, and federal 
appeals courts have followed suit.   Only laws that “directly and 
substantially”80 interfere with the relationship have been struck 
down, and laws creating significant burdens have been upheld 
even in the context of marriage, a relationship that is in most 
cases far more intimate than the relationships created between 
roommates.81  Even when roommate seekers desire a close com-
panion and not just someone to share the rent, advertising re-
strictions may require them to interview candidates whom they 
are unlikely to choose, but in most cases, the prohibitions do not 
prevent seekers from identifying suitable roommates and thus do 
not violate intimate association rights.  
In Zablocki v. Redhail,82 the touchstone case for the 
“direct and substantial” interference standard, the Court re-
viewed a statute requiring parents with child support obligations 
to obtain a court’s permission prior to remarriage.  It held that 
the law directly and substantially interfered with the fundamen-
tal right to marry, because it prevented people who could not 
prove they could pay child support from remarrying.83  How-
ever, the Court made clear that laws only implicating the right to 
marry would not face similar scrutiny: “[W]e do not mean to 
suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way to 
the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected 
to rigorous scrutiny.  [R]easonable regulations that do not sig-
nificantly interfere with the decisions to enter into the marital 
relationship may be legitimately imposed.”84  The Court found 
no significant interference in Califano v. Jobst,85 concluding that 
a Social Security Act provision terminating benefits for a de-
pendent, disabled adult upon marriage to someone ineligible for 
benefits did not directly and substantially interfere with the right 
to marry. 
The Court’s conclusions in Califano may have been 
influenced by its determination that the government has greater 
authority to attach conditions to recipients of its own benefits.  
However, in Montgomery v. Carr,86 the Sixth Circuit directly 
contrasted Zablocki and Califano without suggesting that a dif-
ferent standard applied in Califano because a government bene-
fit was involved.  Rather, the court explained “the directness and 
the substantiality of the interference with the freedom to marry 
distinguish[ed]” the two cases.   It continued: “[w]hatever the 
form of the government action involved . . . rational basis scru-
tiny will apply to the rationales offered by government defen-
dants in cases presenting a claim that a plaintiff’s associational 
right to marry has been infringed, unless the burden on the right 
to marry is direct and substantial.”87  
Furthermore, under the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions, the government may not require a beneficiary to sur-
render a constitutional right as a condition to receiving a bene-
fit.88 The Supreme Court has been unpredictable in applying the 
doctrine,89 and has almost universally rejected challenges related 
to government welfare programs.90  But notably, in cases involv-
ing privacy in family relationships, the explanation as to why the 
laws under review were not found impermissible has been that 
the government’s condition either did not substantially deter the 
exercise of the rights,91 or its action was not sufficiently direct.92  
This analysis mirrors the direct and substantial interference test 
discussed in Zablocki and applied in the lower courts. 
Even presuming the threshold for direct and substantial 
interference varies with the government’s role, nothing in the 
case law suggests that requiring roommate seekers to interview 
additional applicants rises to the level of an unconstitutional 
burden.  Although the advertising restrictions remove a tool for 
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filtering out candidates whom roommate seekers are unlikely to 
accept, they create no limitation on seekers’ ability to say yes or 
no to any candidate and thus do not “significantly interfere” with 
the right to enter into the relationship.  Facial challenges succeed 
only where a law is unconstitutional in all or nearly all of its 
applications.93  In the few cases where a roommate seeker could 
establish that the prohibitions actually prevented her from form-
ing a roommate relationship,94 she could bring an as-applied 
challenge.  In most cases, the restrictions pass the “direct and 
substantial interference” test and thus do not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
 
2. DISCRIMINATORY ADVERTISEMENTS AND  
OTHER FEDERAL PRIVACY RIGHTS  
 
Roommate seekers are unlikely to show that advertising 
restrictions violate their privacy rights under the undue burden 
standard that the Supreme Court has created in other privacy 
contexts: access to abortion or contraceptives. In Planned Par-
enthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court held 
that a twenty-four hour waiting period for abortions imposed a 
‘particularly burdensome’ obstacle on women with the fewest 
resources, “those who must travel long distances, and those who 
have difficulty explaining their whereabouts to husbands, em-
ployers, or others,”95 but that “[did] not demonstrate that the 
waiting period constitute[d] an undue burden.”96  Given this 
high bar, even if advertising restrictions require a person to in-
terview ten times as many 
candidates in order to locate a 
roommate, the burden they 
create is unlikely to be 
deemed “undue,” particularly 
because decisions involving 
cohabitation are less funda-
mental than decisions involv-
ing reproduction. 
The Court’s decision 
in Carey v. Population Ser-
vices, International97 does 
suggest that its standard for 
reviewing infringements on 
privacy may sometimes be 
lower than the abortion cases 
indicate.  The Court struck down a New York statute permitting 
only licensed pharmacists to sell contraceptives, concluding that 
it imposed a “significant burden” on the right to use contracep-
tives.98  At first blush, it seems this law simply made it less con-
venient for women to obtain contraceptives and was thus not so 
dissimilar from the roommate advertising prohibitions.  How-
ever, the Court stated that although not a total ban, the law sig-
nificantly reduced public access to contraceptives by increasing 
costs and reducing privacy.99  In New York’s many small towns 
in 1977,100 where there may only have been one pharmacy, re-
quiring an unmarried woman to interact with a pharmacist every 
time she wanted to buy contraceptives could result in a decision 
to forgo the purchase entirely.  In his concurring opinion, Justice 
Brennan emphasized that the law burdened the right to prevent 
conception “by substantially limiting access to the means of 
effectuating that decision.”101  
To some extent, advertising prohibitions “limit access 
to the means” of finding a roommate, because searches become 
more time-consuming and costly if people must interview un-
suitable applicants.  However, it is unlikely that this would be 
deemed a substantial limitation because the restrictions do not 
limit whom a roommate seeker may consider or where she can 
place her ads.  They only require her to consider a broader group 
of applicants than she might otherwise prefer, and ultimately she 
controls the amount of time she dedicates to her search. More-
over, she maintains a great deal of control through her ad place-
ment decisions.  This is quite different from Carey, in which the 
restrictions on how contraceptives could be distributed resulted 
in a significant reduction in access not just to one’s choice of 
contraceptive but to any contraceptives.  Therefore, the restric-
tions on roommate ads are not unduly burdensome to the point 
of violating the constitutional right to privacy. 
 
3. DISCRIMINATORY ADS AND PRIVACY RIGHTS  
UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION 
 
Under California’s state privacy standard, a roommate 
seeker is unlikely to show that advertising prohibitions are an 
invasion of privacy.  She must establish: “(1) a legally protected 
privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
circumstances; and (3) conduct by [the] defendant constituting a 
serious invasion of privacy.”102  People have a privacy interest in 
selecting a roommate, but not a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy “in the circumstances.”  Because ads are a means of public 
communication, it is logical that the interests of those who read 
ads, and not just those who place them, would be considered 
when regulating content.  
Furthermore, the restrictions on discriminatory 
ads do not constitute a “serious invasion of 
privacy,” because in most cases, they do not 
actually prevent a roommate seeker from locat-
ing a suitable roommate, but merely require 
him to interview additional candidates.103  It is 
in this third step that roommate advertising 
differs from advertising for romantic partners.  
Although such romantic partner ads are also a 
means of public communication, people are 
likely to have far more particularized criteria in 
a greater number of areas when seeking 
mates.104  Advertising restrictions could sub-
stantially interfere with locating a compatible 
companion due to the combination of character-
istics sought.  Moreover, there is typically a significantly higher 
level of anxiety and fear of rejection105 involved with 
“interviewing” potential lovers than there is with interviewing 
potential roommates.  Therefore, forcing those looking for love 
to “interview” many more applicants does constitute a much 
more serious invasion of privacy.  
 
4. DISCRIMINATORY ADS AND FREE SPEECH RIGHTS 
 
The Supreme Court has explained that commercial 
speech may be distinguished “by its content”106 and has catego-
rized speech that “inform[s] the public of the availability, nature, 
and prices of products and services,”107 and speech in which the 
speaker’s interests are “largely economic,” as commercial.108  It 
has further explained that the “diverse motives, means and mes-
sages of advertising may make speech ‘commercial’ in widely 
varying degrees,” but that advertising “may be subject to reason-
able regulation that serves a legitimate public interest.”109  
Roommate ads apprise the public of the availability of rental 
People have a privacy interest in se-
lecting a roommate, but not a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy “in 
the circumstances.”   
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housing, and although roommate relationships may be intimate, 
the ads placed by roommate seekers propose transactions that 
benefit them financially by reducing housing costs.  Indeed, in 
the cases discussed in Part II, multiple 
roommate seekers indicated that their 
motives for seeking a roommate were 
financial.110  Moreover, offering shared 
living space is not “inextricably inter-
twined”111 with stating a roommate 
seeker’s discriminatory criteria regarding 
those with whom she wants to create an 
intimate association: As was discussed 
in Part IV.1, prohibitions on discriminatory ads rarely prevent a 
roommate seeker from locating a cohabitant.   
Roommate ads should thus be evaluated as commercial 
speech, and their regulation evaluated under the four-part test 
articulated in Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporation v. 
Public Services Commission of New York.112  First, the speech 
must concern lawful activity and must not be misleading.  Sec-
ond, the government must assert a substantial interest.  Third, 
the regulation must advance that interest, and fourth, it may not 
be “more extensive than necessary.”113  This does not mean the 
absolute least restrictive means; rather, the government has a 
burden of affirmatively establishing a “reasonable fit” between 
its interest and the speech restriction.114  If, as discussed in Part 
III, the right to choose cohabitants is constitutionally protected 
under federal intimate association or federal or state privacy 
rights, then discriminatory roommate ads describe lawful activ-
ity and are not misleading.  Because the first prong of Central 
Hudson is satisfied in the roommate context, the government 
must show a substantial interest in barring the ads, and that the 
restrictions advance the interest asserted without being more 
extensive than necessary.  
 
A. ADS THAT STATE PREFERENCES RELATED TO RACE, NA-
TIONAL ORIGIN OR ANCESTRY 
 
 Achieving residential integration was one of Con-
gress’s primary goals when the FHA was enacted in 1968.115  
Nearly forty years later, racially homogenous housing patterns 
continue to be a serious concern.116  Thus, the government con-
tinues to have a substantial interest in preventing housing dis-
crimination based on race.  Despite the fact that roommate seek-
ers may ultimately select whomever they wish as cohabitants, 
any racially discriminatory housing ads in public forums frus-
trate the integration of communities by stigmatizing minorities 
and creating animosity.  Thus, as a means of combating racially 
homogenous housing patterns, a direct and concrete harm, ad-
vertising prohibitions do advance the goals of the FHA and are a 
means no more extensive than necessary to achieve those goals. 
Admittedly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Linmark 
Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro117 reveals an unwillingness to 
uphold laws enacted to promote integrated housing when the 
burden on individual rights is too great.118  The Court struck 
down a ban on “For Sale” signs, despite a city’s contention that 
promoting integration justified the ordinance because fear 
among white homeowners that their property values would drop 
as the town’s black population increased had caused “panic sell-
ing.”119  The Court sharply denounced the city’s restriction on 
the free flow of information.120  However, its decision must be 
considered in light of the type of restriction under review.  “For 
Sale” signs are a widely-used means of advertising the availabil-
ity of property.  Thus, the city was depriving its residents of 
commercial speech rights enjoyed by virtually all other home-
owners.  In contrast, prohibitions on discriminatory housing ads 
are the norm, not the exception.   
Furthermore, unlike “For Sale” signs that, on 
their face, send no stigmatizing message, 
discriminatory housing ads are per se harm-
ful and inflict an immediate harm on those 
they degrade.  In Florida Bar v. Went For It, 
Inc.,121 the Supreme Court upheld restrictions 
prohibiting lawyers from soliciting personal 
injury or wrongful death clients within thirty 
days of an accident under the Central Hudson test.122  It found 
the attorney ads offended their recipients and tarnished the repu-
tation of attorneys, and that the government has a substantial 
interest in restricting speech that both creates an immediate harm 
and has a demonstrable detrimental effect on a particular group.  
The Court distinguished its decision in Bolger v. Youngs Drugs 
Products Corp., striking down a federal ban on direct-mail ad-
vertisements for contraceptives, on the grounds that the harm 
that the attorney solicitations caused could not be “eliminated by 
a brief journey to the trash can.”123   Whereas contraceptive ads 
may offend some people, they did not substantially burden re-
cipients who could simply dispose of them. 
Similar to the attorney solicitations in Florida Bar that 
were likely to create “outrage and irritation”124 in their recipi-
ents, racially discriminatory ads are likely to have an analogous 
immediate impact on those they degrade.125  And, just as the 
Court found that disposing of the attorney solicitations did little 
to combat the offense they generated, once a discriminatory ad 
has been read, its harm is not easily undone.   
Moreover, like the ads in Florida Bar, racially dis-
criminatory ads create a secondary harm by perpetuating racially 
homogenous housing patterns.  In United States v. Hunter,126 the 
Fourth Circuit found a newspaper editor liable under 42 U.S.C. § 
3604(c) for publishing a Mrs. Murphy’s ad for an apartment in a 
“white home.”  The court explained how seeing significant num-
bers of such ads in one part of a city could deter non-whites 
from seeking housing in those neighborhoods, even if other 
dwellings were available in those areas on a non-discriminatory 
basis.127  It further explained that prohibiting even exempt land-
lords from placing discriminatory ads served the FHA’s purpose 
because wide circulation of statements of personal prejudice 
could magnify their negative effect.128  The wide distribution of 
roommate ads stating racially discriminatory preferences may 
similarly deter applicants from applying for roommate situations 
in certain areas.  It is not unlikely that people with racist atti-
tudes live in more racially homogenous neighborhoods.  If an 
applicant sees multiple racially discriminatory roommate listings 
in a particular neighborhood, she may determine that it would be 
wiser to seek housing elsewhere, thereby perpetuating the exist-
ing housing pattern.   
Further, racially discriminatory housing ads stigmatize 
minorities, frustrating the integration of communities.  In his 
writings on racial stigma and African Americans, economist 
Glenn C. Loury describes two kinds of behavior: discrimination 
in contract (in the execution of formal transactions) and dis-
crimination in contact (in the personal associations and relation-
ships created in the private spheres of life).129  Both have debili-
tating consequences because the rules of contract and patterns of 
contact control access to resources and social mobility.130  
“Liberty and autonomy” would become meaningless if people 
It is not unlikely that people 
with racist attitudes live in 
more racially homogenous 
neighborhoods. 
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could not discriminate when creating personal relationships, and 
thus discrimination in contact must remain a prerogative.131  
However, differential treatment of individuals in contract—
including housing—can be legitimately regulated because it 
significantly contributes to racial inequality and stigma.132  
A 2000 study measuring preferences among various 
ethnic groups in Los Angeles illustrates the effects of racial 
stigma on housing.133  Subjects were asked to imagine the racial 
mix of a neighborhood in which they would feel most comfort-
able.  Forty percent of Asians, thirty-two percents of Latinos, 
and nineteen percent of whites envisioned neighborhoods with 
no African Americans, and immigrants were more likely to ex-
clude African Americans.134  This suggests that new arrivals to 
America are taught that African Americans are a group to be 
avoided.135  Because discriminatory housing ads are widely cir-
culated, they are likely to contribute to this stigmatization, even 
in cases in which the underlying discrimination is legal.  Restric-
tions on roommate ads are not simply a case of the government 
restricting speech in order to combat the spread of beliefs with 
which it disagrees.  Rather, it is regulating housing-related com-
mercial speech to counteract a concrete housing-related harm.  
The government’s substantial interest in promoting integration 
thus meets the third prong of the Central Hudson test. 
One might argue that prohibiting discriminatory ads 
actually contributes to racially homogenous housing patterns 
because allowing people to 
candidly state preferences 
may encourage minorities to 
seek housing where they oth-
erwise might not.136  If stat-
ing preferences is legal, mi-
nority applicants may assume 
that those who do not state such preferences would welcome 
them.137  To the contrary, if stating preferences is prohibited and 
in a predominantly white neighborhood half the roommate seek-
ers are open to minority applicants and half are not, to create a 
“match,” a minority applicant would have to visit twice as many 
apartments in that neighborhood.138  The applicant may not have 
formal knowledge of those statistics, but over time and talking to 
others, she may come to suspect it and decide to avoid the white 
neighborhood, thereby reinforcing the existing housing pat-
tern.139  
While this model is plausible, the “ifs” are significant.  
If the percentage of roommate seekers in the white neighbor-
hood who welcome minority applicants is more like 80% or 
90%, the number of homes that the applicant would need to visit 
in order to create a “match” drops considerably, and the stigma-
tizing effects of discriminatory ads in widely circulated media 
may reinforce existing housing patterns more than prohibitions 
do.  While it is plausible that if discriminatory ads are allowed, 
the absence of a stated preference may be turned into a positive, 
the opposite is equally plausible.  Seeing some racist ads may 
create the impression that prejudice is more widespread than it 
actually is.  Applicants might assume that many more people are 
racists—particularly people who live in areas with a dispropor-
tionate number of discriminatory ads—but do not want to admit 
their prejudices in print.   
Where there are conflicting factual theories, legislatures 
have latitude in shaping policy. In commercial speech and other 
First Amendment contexts, the Supreme Court has often de-
ferred to legislative judgments.140  When the FHA was enacted, 
Congress decided that even those who are allowed to discrimi-
nate could not publish discriminatory ads related to race, color, 
religion, or national origin.141  The same arguments would apply 
regarding the number of Mrs. Murphy landlords that a minority 
boarder or renter would need to meet in order to create a 
“match” and locate housing in a predominantly white neighbor-
hood, but Congress determined that the advertising restrictions 
were a necessary tool in achieving its integration goals.  
The last prong of the Central Hudson test is thus satis-
fied.  Although roommate seekers cannot ultimately be forced to 
live with someone against their will, because racially discrimina-
tory ads stigmatize minority groups in a manner that frustrates 
integrated housing goals, eliminating such ads from widely ac-
cessed public media is a means no more extensive than neces-
sary to further the government’s interest in promoting integrated 
neighborhoods.  Thus, as long as Central Hudson remains the 
controlling test for commercial speech,142 roommate ads that 
discriminate on the basis of race, ancestry or national origin may 
be prohibited.  
 
B. ADS THAT STATE PREFERENCES RELATED  
TO OTHER PROTECTED CATEGORIES 
 
It is less clear that barring other types of discriminatory 
ads, like those expressing preferences based on sexual-
orientation or religious practice,143 passes the Central Hudson 
test.  The government has a substantial inter-
est in assuring that all citizens have equal 
access to housing, but because roommate 
seekers can ultimately choose their cohabi-
tants, preventing them from advertising their 
preferences does not make any additional 
housing available to those with whom they 
prefer not to live.   Whereas the FHA’s legislative history is re-
plete with discussions regarding the need to racially integrate 
housing,144 its history does not suggest that lawmakers were 
concerned with integrating housing along other than racial 
lines.145  Thus, prohibiting ads stating preferences unrelated to 
race does not serve the independent legislative objective of inte-
gration.  These ads do risk creating psychological injury and 
stigma, but the Supreme Court has held that the government may 
not restrict speech only to prevent such harms.  Its decision in 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,146 striking down an ordinance that 
made it a misdemeanor to use inflammatory symbols to know-
ingly arouse “anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis 
of race, color, creed, religion or gender,” illustrates that a more 
tangible interest is required to overcome a First Amendment 
challenge.  Racially discriminatory ads are unique because they 
frustrate the integration of neighborhoods.  
A second reason for applying advertising restrictions to 
Mrs. Murphy landlords, and to roommate seekers, is that these 
ads could create a false impression that housing discrimination is 
legal.147  People may see ads placed by individuals who are 
uniquely allowed to discriminate, and mistakenly believe that 
any landlord may do so.148  But, while preventing confusion may 
be a substantial government interest, it can likely be achieved 
without a total ban.  Such a ban would be “more extensive than 
necessary” because a policy to educate would suffice:  Disclaim-
ers explaining that housing discrimination is illegal outside the 
roommate context could be mandated in any ad stating a dis-
criminatory preference.149  Restrictions that create a total ban on 
discriminatory ads unrelated to race, national origin, or ancestry 
therefore likely fail the fourth step of Central Hudson. 
while preventing confusion may be a 
substantial government interest, it can 
likely be achieved without a total ban. 
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c. ADS THAT USE RELIGION AS A PROXY FOR ETHNICITY 
 
The difficult area is when race, national origin and an-
cestry categories overlap with religion.  In Saint Francis College 
v. Al-Khazraji, Justice Brennan explained “the line between dis-
crimination based on ancestry or ethnic characteristics [] and 
discrimination based on place or nation of ... origin, [] is not a 
bright one.” 150  Similarly, for members of some religious 
groups, like Muslims, Jews, Sikhs and Hindus, membership in 
the religious group is equated with an ethnic distinction, not 
simply a distinction based on belief.  And, the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866151 created protection for Jews against racial discrimina-
tion—protection that remains intact.152  Thus, religious prefer-
ences in roommate ads must not be used as a means to skirt the 
prohibitions on discriminatory ads related to race, national ori-
gin, or ancestry.  The intense discrimination faced by people 
identified with Islam since September 11, 2001153 could eventu-
ally drive them into segregated enclaves.  And, although some 
may argue that antireligious statements are too tangential to the 
government’s interest in promoting integration to fall within the 
“substantial interest,” all groups who could face discrimination 
on the basis of race must be treated equally in this context.  In 
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, the Supreme Court 
explicitly rejected the idea that judges are equipped to draw lines 
as to which groups deserve protection against such discrimina-
tion.154  Although discrimination against certain ethnic groups 
may have more harmful effects in various circumstances, all are 
to be afforded equal protection. 
How then to discern the prohib-
ited religion-as-ethnicity ads from the 
permissible religion-as-belief ads?  Ads 
that describe the religious practices that 
roommate seekers perform within the 
home—like keeping kosher, prohibiting 
alcohol for religious reasons, studying 
the bible, or praying, would suggest that 
the roommate seeker’s preference for a 
roommate of a particular religion is re-
lated to her belief system: she is not sim-
ply using religion as a proxy for ethnic-
ity.  Under this approach, an ad that 
states “no Jews” or “no Muslims” or “no 
Hindus” would be prohibited.  However, 
a religious roommate seeker looking for 
a roommate who keeps kosher or observes Ramadan155 could 
state so in her ad.  Ads that state “no fundamentalists” or “no 
Atheists” would also be permissible, because they focus on reli-
gious ideology and not ethnicity.  The tougher case would be ads 
that read “no Catholics” or “no Protestants” or “no Christians,” 
as these religions are not identified with a particular race or an-
cestry.  However, they should nonetheless be prohibited.  Other-
wise, individuals whose national origin or ethnic group is identi-
fied with a particular religion would be granted special rights to 
discriminate: a result that would probably not survive an equal 
protection challenge.156  
 
5. ADDITIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR ADVERTISEMENTS  
THAT STATE RELIGIOUS PREFERENCES  
 
Homogeneity of tastes, attitudes and orientations help 
create a successful living arrangement,157 especially when they 
stem from religious beliefs.158  Because religious practice can 
overlap with the organization of a household, locating cohabi-
tants who share their faith and practices may be uniquely impor-
tant for devout roommate seekers.   When there are few fellow 
practitioners in the communities where religious individuals 
live, the advertising restrictions may make it extremely difficult 
for devout roommate seekers to locate suitable cohabitants.  
Several provisions in existing legal doctrine may provide addi-
tional grounds for as-applied challenges in these cases.  
 
 
a. RFRAS AND PROTECTIONS UNDER RELIGIOUS  
EXERCISE CLAUSES  
 
 Living with an individual of another faith could seri-
ously burden the religious exercise of some roommate seekers.  
An Orthodox Jew who maintains a kosher kitchen may be con-
cerned that a roommate who does not share her devotion would 
compromise her practice—perhaps by eating meat on a plate 
restricted to dairy.159  Some Hindus may believe that living with 
an individual who is not a member of their caste jeopardizes 
their reincarnation.160  Restrictions on birthday and holiday cele-
brations could make cohabitation with people of other faiths a 
serious burden for a Jehovah’s Witness.161  In towns or cities 
with large populations of people practicing their faiths, these 
roommate seekers could probably locate roommates by placing 
non-discriminatory ads in places where fellow practitioners con-
gregate.162  However, when roommate seekers are part of a small 
minority, the restrictions may prevent them from finding a suit-
able cohabitant and therefore pose a 
serious burden, particularly if they 
cannot afford to live alone. 
 The Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Employment Division, De-
partment of Human Resources of 
Oregon v. Smith163 created an obsta-
cle for such roommate seekers to 
invoke the free exercise clause of 
the First Amendment as a defense to 
fair housing laws.  The Court con-
cluded that the clause does not apply 
to statutes of general applicability 
that are not directed at religious 
practice.  However, Congress re-
sponded by passing the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),164 exempting indi-
viduals from generally applicable laws that substantially burden 
their exercise of religion, unless the government shows the law 
is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling govern-
ment interest.  Twelve states have since enacted state RFRAs.165  
The Supreme Court later held that the federal RFRA could not 
constitutionally restrict state laws,166 but RFRA’s application to 
federal laws continues,167 and state RFRAs continue to apply to 
state laws.  Furthermore, many states apply a compelling interest 
test similar to the Sherbert-Yoder168 test for infringements on 
free exercise rights granted by their state constitutions.169 
 State RFRAs or state religious free exercise constitu-
tional provisions are a possible source of protection for devout 
roommate seekers whose religious practice is substantially bur-
dened by the advertising prohibitions.  Religious landlords 
whose beliefs would be compromised by renting to unmarried 
cohabitants have sought protection under these provisions.  The 
individuals whose national origin or 
ethnic group is identified with a par-
ticular religion would be granted 
special rights to discriminate: a re-
sult that would probably not survive 
an equal protection challenge. 
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law remains largely unsettled, but some courts have found merit 
in the landlords’ claims.170 The California Supreme Court de-
clined to uphold such a landlord’s free exercise rights in Smith v. 
Fair Housing and Employment Commission (Evelyn Smith),171 
but the factors outlined by the court suggest that a burdened 
roommate seeker could be protected under a RFRA: 172   
 
(1) The burden must fall on a religious 
belief rather than a philosophy or a way of 
life.  (2) The burdened religious belief 
must be sincerely held.  (3) The plaintiff 
must prove the burden is substantial or, in 
other words, legally significant.  (4) If all 
the foregoing are true, the government 
must demonstrate that application of the 
burden to the person is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest; and is 
the least restrictive means of furthering 
that compelling government interest.173  
 
Religious roommate seekers likely meet each of the four parts of 
this test: (1) The housing laws burden religious belief (2) that is 
sincerely held;  (3) the burden is substantial because the laws 
prevent the devout seeker from locating a roommate who will 
not interfere with her religious practice; and (4) as described in 
Part IV.4.b, the government is unlikely to demonstrate that pro-
hibiting ads unrelated to race is a means no more extensive than 
necessary of furthering a compelling state interest.  In theory,174 
the least restrictive means standard creates an even higher bur-
den on the government.175  Roommate seekers whose free exer-
cise of religion would be burdened if they were unable to locate 
a cohabitant would virtually always be describing their religious 
practices (like dietary restrictions, observing the Sabbath, or 
barring alcohol within their dwelling) in their advertisements.  
Therefore, the preferences would describe religion in terms of 
belief, and not as a stigmatizing proxy for ethnicity.176  Thus, 
prohibitions on these advertisements would not survive even 
intermediate scrutiny.177 
 Nonetheless, to raise a RFRA defense, unless a room-
mate seeker lives in a jurisdiction recognizing an affirmative 
right to have a roommate, she would need to show that she actu-
ally could not afford to live alone – not merely that living alone 
costs more.  The Evelyn Smith court explained: “an incidental 
burden on religious exercise is not substantial if it can be de-
scribed as simply making religious exercise more expensive.”178  
Given the large number of renters for whom housing costs are 
categorized as “severe cost burdens,”179 some roommate seekers 
are likely to make this showing.  Perhaps some could find less 
desirable housing that required a longer commute or was located 
in a more dangerous part of town, but denying a renter safe, con-
venient housing may indeed be held a substantial burden on her 
religious practice.  Thus, RFRAs or state free exercise clauses 
interpreted to follow Sherbert and Yoder may provide some reli-
gious roommate seekers with a defense to generally applicable 
fair housing laws.  
 
B. RIGHTS TO EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION 
 
 In some cases, roommate seekers are looking for people 
with whom they can build a religious community for purposes of 
expressive association.  In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the First Amendment right “to associ-
ate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, 
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”180  Even 
when a challenged action is not specifically directed to the free-
dom of association for free speech purposes, strict scrutiny is 
applied to infringements on that right.181  To come within First 
Amendment protection, a group must engage in some form of 
public or private expression.182  The association’s aim need not 
be disseminating a certain message or expressing its views to the 
public.183  Expression within the community suffices; the asso-
ciation need only engage in expressive activity “that could be 
impaired in order to be entitled to protection.”184  
 Roommate seekers attempting to create an association 
for the purpose of communal prayer or bible study would likely 
be afforded “traditional First Amendment”185 protection: “We 
are three Christian females . . . . We have weekly bible studies 
and bi-weekly times of fellowship.”186  As only a small subset of 
people who respond to roommate ads would be interested in 
such a relationship, prohibiting these roommate seekers from 
advertising specific religious practices could substantially inter-
fere with their ability to identify applicants.187  As discussed, the 
government is unlikely to demonstrate a compelling state inter-
est that justifies prohibitions on roommate ads stating prefer-
ences unrelated to race even under the less rigorous “no more 
extensive than necessary” standard.188  The Supreme Court has 
rejected the suppression of speech that impairs an association’s 
expressive message on First Amendment grounds.189  By pre-
venting the creation of the association, restrictions that prevent a 
roommate seeker from identifying a co-worshipper create just as 
great an injury to the right of expressive association.190   
 
V. PROHIBITIONS ON DISCRIMINATORY STATEMENTS 
 
The FHA’s prohibitions on discriminatory statements 
make illegal any statement “that indicates any preference, limita-
tion, or discrimination” or indicates “an intention to make any 
such preference, limitation, or discrimination,” if based on a 
protected characteristic.191  Courts have consistently interpreted 
“indicates” to mean indicates “to an ordinary reader” or “to an 
ordinary listener,” regardless of the speaker’s actual intent.192  
Thus, roommate seekers who make statements or ask questions 
that “an ordinary listener” interprets as indicating an intention to 
make a preference related to a protected characteristic could be 
held liable under § 3604(c).  Phrases as seemingly innocuous as 
“religious landmark” or “retired,” and even the word 
“integrated” are potential sources of liability.193  Inquiries about 
issues like religion194 or, in jurisdictions where it is protected, 
sexual orientation, are prohibited.  A roommate seeker could be 
found in violation of the law for describing her own religious 
practices or sexual orientation, if it would seem to “an ordinary 
listener” that the statements indicate a discriminatory preference.  
The restrictions thus effectively create a category of taboo sub-
jects that people who are considering living together may not 
discuss without risking liability.   
 
1. INTIMATE ASSOCIATION AND PRIVACY RIGHTS AND  
DISCRIMINATORY STATEMENTS  
 
Limiting the subjects that potential cohabitants can 
discuss may substantially burden roommate seekers’ ability to 
create successful roommate relationships and to feel comfortable 
in their homes.  For example, the restrictions could adversely 
affect an Orthodox Jew who observes Shabbat195 and must as-
   12                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           THE MODERN AMERICAN 
 
certain that her future roommate will not interfere with her prac-
tice.  So too for the devout Muslim who prays in the living room 
– the only room in the apartment with an Eastward facing win-
dow – several times a day, or the Evangelical Christian who 
holds weekly bible studies around the kitchen table.  These indi-
viduals would want to confirm that a roommate will not inter-
rupt their worship by turning on a television or stereo in their 
common space while they are deep in prayer or study.  Disclo-
sure of these practices also serves applicants’ interests.   An ap-
plicant who wants to watch Oprah may be annoyed if her room-
mate commandeers the living room for prayer, just as an appli-
cant who does not participate in bible study may resent lost ac-
cess to her kitchen each week.  Because it is likely that tensions 
would later arise as a result of these undisclosed competing de-
sires, a devout roommate seeker could be significantly burdened 
if unable to discuss her religious practice with a potential co-
habitant.  The statement prohibitions thus directly and substan-
tially prevent her from establishing 
a workable roommate relationship, 
and therefore violate her intimate 
association rights.   
Privacy rights are similarly 
infringed.  If an evangelical Chris-
tian who truly believes that homo-
sexuality is a sin winds up with a 
lesbian roommate because she was 
unable to determine an applicant’s orientation prospectively, 
greeting her roommate’s lover in the bathroom several mornings 
a week may make her acutely aware that behavior that violates 
her belief system is occurring within her home.  The result may 
be feelings of alienation in “the one retreat to which men and 
women [are supposed to be able to] repair to escape the tribula-
tions of their daily pursuits.”196  If an individual cannot exercise 
enough control over the composition of her household to create 
an environment in which she feels at ease, the right to privacy 
seems little more than a platitude.  Therefore, under such cir-
cumstances, statement prohibitions would likely violate the test 
outlined in Carey v. Population Services, International.  Just as 
limiting the distribution of contraceptives to licensed pharma-
cists “burden[ed] an individual’s right to decide to prevent con-
ception or terminate pregnancy by substantially limiting access 
to the means of effectuating that decision,”197 statement prohibi-
tions that prevent a roommate seeker from talking about critical 
aspects of her personal life or from asking a candidate about 
matters of great importance to her, substantially limit her ability 
to effectively select future roommates. 
Unlike advertising prohibitions, statement prohibitions 
actually prevent a roommate seeker from finding a compatible 
cohabitant.  That is, a roommate seeker who is religious, has 
strong feelings about homosexuality or politics,198 or cares about 
national origin or race but cannot discern an applicant’s ancestry 
by looking at her, would be unable to find a suitable cohabitant.  
Unlike advertising prohibitions, which increase the size of the 
applicant pool that a roommate seeker must consider, but do not 
“directly and substantially” interfere with the right to form an 
intimate association or unduly burden privacy, statement prohi-
bitions may make it impossible for a roommate seeker to deter-
mine that an applicant is someone with whom she wants to form 
an intimate association—someone to whom she will reveal her 
“backstage” self.199  Thus, they do “directly and substantially” 
interfere with her right to intimate association and create an 
“undue burden” on her privacy rights.   
 
2. FREE SPEECH RIGHTS AND  
STATEMENT PROHIBITIONS 
 
Prohibitions on discriminatory statements unrelated to 
race, national origin or ancestry do not require new analysis.  
Even if statements made during the interview process are con-
sidered commercial speech, prohibitions on such statements fail 
the Central Hudson test just as prohibitions on parallel adver-
tisements fail because the government is unlikely to establish 
that such restrictions are no more extensive then necessary to 
further a substantial government interest.    
However, prohibitions on discriminatory statements 
related to race, national origin or ancestry require a fresh look.  
The government maintains its interest in integration, but state-
ments made in private are unlikely to undermine this objective 
and contribute to the stigmatization of minority groups to the 
extent that widely circulated ads do.  The 
risk remains that individuals subjected to 
offensive statements may no longer con-
sider a roommate of another race200 or 
may restrict their search to neighbor-
hoods primarily inhabited by members 
of their own race.  Nonetheless, state-
ments made in private will not be seen 
by potentially thousands of people and 
thus do not contribute to the stigmatization of minority groups in 
the way that widely distributed advertisements do.  Because the 
connection to the government’s integration objectives is more 
tenuous, these prohibitions may not pass even the intermediate 
scrutiny applied to restrictions on commercial speech.  
Furthermore, whether these statements should even be 
classified as commercial speech is less clear.  Once prospective 
cohabitants are identified and roommate seekers and applicants 
are determining whether they will be compatible, their dialogue 
may be considered speech afforded full First Amendment pro-
tection and restrictions upon it subjected to strict scrutiny.  This 
dialogue cannot be characterized as an advertisement, and al-
though it relates to a commercial transaction—the rental of 
housing for financial gain—the Supreme Court has explained 
that speech does not retain its commercial character “when it is 
inextricably intertwined with otherwise protected speech.”201  
Because locating suitable applicants does not require the vast 
majority of roommate seekers to include discriminatory prefer-
ences when they are placing ads, such statements are not 
“inextricable” in the advertising context.  But, there is nothing 
commercial about a roommate seeker explaining that she wants 
a roommate who will join her in communal prayer, and she is 
unlikely to find such a cohabitant if unable to discuss religion 
when interviewing applicants.  As it cannot be extracted from 
the speech related to the commercial transaction, this speech 
should retain its full First Amendment protections.   
Therefore, the government cannot regulate the state-
ments made when roommate seekers interview applicants, at 
least those related to determining compatibility.  Outside the 
commercial speech realm, “content-based restrictions are sus-
tained only in the most extraordinary circumstances: ‘The First 
Amendment forbids the government from regulating speech in 
ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of oth-
ers.’”202  In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,203 the Court concluded that 
prohibiting the use of inflammatory symbols was unconstitu-
tional despite its “belief that burning a cross in someone’s front 
a devout roommate seeker could be 
significantly burdened if unable to 
discuss her religious practice with a 
potential cohabitant. 
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yard [was] reprehensible.”204  Unless the government can show 
that prohibitions on discriminatory statements made when room-
mate seekers are interviewing applicants serve a compelling 
interest—apart from protecting applicants from exposure to rep-
rehensible ideas205—the restrictions also violate the First 
Amendment. 
 A determination that the government can prohibit ra-
cially discriminatory ads, but not statements between individu-
als, risks a counterproductive result.  Roommate applicants who 
respond to non-discriminatory ads could then be subjected to 
offensive statements in a more inimical form, such as those spo-
ken to them directly.  However, scholars analyzing prejudice and 
discrimination in cyberspace suggest that because explicit ex-
pressions of prejudice have become taboo, people are signifi-
cantly less likely to explicitly deny someone a resource or ser-
vice based on discriminatory criteria when interacting with an-
other person in real time.206  Rather, they will find a non-explicit 
excuse for behaving discriminatorily.207   
Prejudice is more likely to be overtly expressed on the 
Internet because of the anonymous and disinhibited nature of the 
forum,208 where people feel free to express themselves in less 
self-conscious and less socially desirable ways.209  One example 
of this phenomenon is cyberbullying.  As explained by a teen-
ager whose friend committed suicide after being harassed by his 
classmates on-line, “You wouldn’t do that to someone’s face, 
but on-line it’s completely different.   You can do whatever you 
want and no one can do anything—you’re at your house they’re 
at their house—it’s different.”210 
Roommate seekers are more likely to be discreet when 
dealing with applicants in person than when placing Internet or 
classified ads.  In most of the cases discussed in Part II, the 
roommate seekers rarely spoke of their own prejudices to the 
complainants; rather, they either claimed that another roommate 
had a problem with the candidate, made the statement to a third 
party, or otherwise diffused their remarks.  In Larrick, the defen-
dant told the applicant that her other roommate did not want to 
live with a black person.211  In Baker, the respondent explained, 
via voicemail, that it was his fundamentalist Christian roommate 
with whom the lesbian applicant “would not get along.” 212  In 
DeSantis, the respondent told the white tester that she was afraid 
of black men. 213  In Marya v. Slakey, the roommate who re-
jected the applicant did not make per se insulting remarks about 
Indians, instead claiming that he feared a third Indian roommate 
would create an environment dominated by a single culture.214  
While the statements made in each case vary in degree of offen-
siveness, the speakers were somewhat sheepish about making 
them.  They may have made more overtlyprejudiced statements 
in an anonymous advertisement.   Thus, prohibiting discrimina-
tory ads, even while permitting discriminatory statements, may 
indeed shield applicants from the most pernicious speech.  
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Whether it is for months or years, an individual’s 
choice to allow someone to share her living space is a private 
decision.  The government cannot interfere with the individual’s 
ultimate selection without violating her Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.  This is no less true when an individual takes a roommate 
in order to defray housing costs.  A conclusion to the contrary 
would mean that those with fewer resources have lesser rights to 
intimate association and privacy.  Such an outcome runs counter 
to the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Zablocki v. Redhail215 that 
people may not be deprived of their fundamental rights of asso-
ciation simply because they are poor.  
The more information that a roommate seeker can place 
in an advertisement—about herself and about what she desires in 
a roommate—the less time she will spend interviewing unsuit-
able candidates. Descriptive ads also save applicants the time 
and energy they would otherwise expend contacting people who 
are unlikely to accept them.  Therefore, both sides benefit when 
roommate seekers are granted more leeway in advertising their 
preferences.  Nonetheless, there is a tipping point at which the 
harm that an advertised preference causes outweighs the benefits 
of targeted advertising.  By stigmatizing minority groups, ra-
cially discriminatory ads perpetuate racially homogenous hous-
ing patterns and the resulting social harms.  Although ultimately 
a roommate seeker can rely on any characteristic in choosing a 
cohabitant, saving some time is not worth the damage caused by 
racially discriminatory ads.  Furthermore, unlike preferences 
motivated by practical or religious concerns, like keeping a ko-
sher kitchen, because preferences related to race are often moti-
vated by fear of the unknown, intergroup contact during an inter-
view may cause some roommate seekers to reevaluate their 
prejudices.216 
Fair housing laws should thus balance these competing 
interests.  I urge legislatures to recognize the intimate associa-
tion and privacy concerns that roommate seekers face when 
choosing those with whom they will negotiate taking out the 
garbage, cleaning the bathtub, and whether to set up a Christmas 
tree in the living room.  Because these issues are not encoun-
tered by either traditional or most Mrs. Murphy landlords, fair 
housing laws should be amended to address the special consid-
erations of roommate seekers, but the integration goals of the 
FHA should not be sacrificed. 
 
 
 
 
 
The Modern American is available on  
the Westlaw, LexisNexis, and V.lex databases.    
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See City-Data.com, New York Very Small Towns and Villages, http://www.city-
data.com/city/New-York3.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2008). 
101 431 U.S. at 689 n. 5 (1977) (quoting 431 U.S. 678, 703-704) (Powell, J. con-
curring). 
102 Hill, 7 Cal. 4th 1 at 39-40. 
103 See supra Part IV 1. 
104 On November 2, 2008, the following ad was posted in the New York Times 
personals on line: “…Lovely, intelligent, poet/ professor with good bones would 
like to meet an intelligent, compassionate, witty man for dinner, theater opera. 
Turn-ons include availability, British Accents, Israel lovers, singers, world trav-
elers, left-leaning liberal of human white activist's, cat lovers, late sleepers, sun/
beach worshipers, Jews, yiddish speakers, interesting story tellers, writers, Stop-
pard lovers. . . . .” Advertisement 12, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
personals.html?pquery=&cat=All&submit2.x=10 (last visited Nov. 2, 2008). 
105 Advertising prohibitions modeled after those in the fair housing context 
would prevent an individual looking for a mate from describing herself, as well 
as from describing the characteristics she sought in a partner.  Thus, an individ-
ual would be prevented from listing her own race, religion, age or, in some juris-
dictions, sexual orientation, in her ad, increasing the possibility that she would 
face rejection during the “interview.” 
106 See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 363 (1977). 
107 Id. at 364.  
108 Id.  
109 See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) (overturning the Virginia 
Supreme Court’s decision that ads for New York abortion clinics in Virginia 
newspapers received no First Amendment protection, but indicating that the state 
can regulate advertising to some extent so long a it may legitimately regulate the 
underlying activity).  
110 See DeSantis, 2002 WL 1313078 at *2, (looking for a roommate “to help pay 
the rent”); Dep’t of Fair Employment & Hous. v. Larrick, No. H 95-96 Q-0510-
02, 1998 CAFEHC LEXIS 15 at *5-6, (looking for a third person “to share their 
unit and help pay the rent”). 
111 See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) 
(holding that disclosures regarding the profits of professional solicitors, required 
before charitable contributions could be requested, were inextricably related to 
fully protected speech and thus could not be “parceled out” and treated as com-
mercial speech).  This is discussed in Part V 2, when prohibitions on discrimina-
tory statements are contrasted with prohibitions on discriminatory advertise-
ments. 
112 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 477 U.S. 557 (1980).   
Several justices expressed dissatisfaction with the Central Hudson test in 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) but the test remains good 
law.  See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367-68 (2002) 
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(plurality opinion); Anderson v. Treadwell, 294 F.3d 453, 460, 461 (2d. Cir. 
2002); Passions Video, Inc. v. Nixon, 458 F.3d 837, 841 (8th Cir. 2006); Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 495 F.3d 151, 168 (5th Cir. 2007). 
113 477 U.S. at 566. 
114 In Bd. of Trs., State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989), the 
Court declined to impose a “least-restrictive-means requirement.”  It explained 
that its decision “take[s] account of the difficulty of establishing with precision 
the point at which restrictions become more extensive than their objective re-
quires, and provide[s] the Legislative and Executive Branches needed leeway in 
a field (commercial speech) ‘traditionally subject to governmental regulation.’” 
Id. at 481 (citations omitted). 
115 See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).  The Court 
examined the FHA’s legislative history and quoted a statement by Senator Mon-
dale, who drafted the legislation, explaining that the “proposed law was to re-
place ghettos ‘by truly integrated and balanced living patterns.’”  Id. at 211 
(citing 114 Cong. Rec. 3422). 
116 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 127 
S. Ct. 2738 (2007), in which the Supreme Court reviewed efforts by public 
schools “to address the effects of racially identifiable housing patterns on school 
assignments,” id. at 2747, illustrates both that integration remains an elusive goal 
and the broader repercussions of racially homogenous neighborhoods. 
117 Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977). 
118 The Court determined that a ban on “For Sale” signs left homeowners with no 
satisfactory means to sell their houses.  Id. at 92-94. 
119 Id. at 87-88. 
120 The Court stated: “The Council has sought to restrict the free flow of these 
data because it fears that otherwise homeowners will make decisions inimical to 
what the Council views as the homeowners' self-interest. . . . ”  Id. at 96.  It 
continued: 
‘There is . . . an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach.  That 
alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, 
that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well 
enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the 
channels of communication rather than to close them. . . .’  
Id. at 97 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)). 
121 Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995). 
122 Id. at 625-627. 
123 Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).  
124 515 U.S. at 631. 
125 The bi-racial complainant in Dep’t of Fair Employment & Housing v. Larrick 
who was subjected to a racist statement during a telephone conversation de-
scribed her reaction as “angry and hurt,” stating that she “felt as though there had 
been no progress in race relations.” Dep’t of Fair Employment & Hous. v. Lar-
rick, No. H 95-96 Q-0510-02, 1998 CAFEHC LEXIS 15, *8.  And, research has 
shown that exposure to prejudice increases the occurrence of depression, anxi-
ety, and other negative health consequences on people “who perceive high levels 
of discrimination.”  Devah Pager, The Dynamics of Discrimination, Nat'l Pov-
erty Center Working Paper Series #06-11 at 4 (June, 2006) (citing Ronald C. 
Kessler, Kristin D. Mickelson, & David R. Williams, The Prevalence, Distribu-
tion, and Mental Health Correlates of Perceived Discrimination in the United 
States, J. OF HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 40(3), 208-230 (1990)).   
126 United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 213 (4th Cir. 1972). 
127 Id. at 214. 
128 Id. at 215. 
129 GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 95-96 (Harvard 
Univ. Press) (2002).  
130 Id. at 99. 
131 Id. at 96. 
132 Id. at 100-01. 
133 Id. at 90-91 (citing Camille Zubrinksy Charles, Neighborhood Racial-
Composition Preferences: Evidenced from a Multiethnic Metropolis, 47 SOC. 
PROBS. 379, 386 (2000)). 
134 Id.  
135 Id. at 90. 
136 Comments on an earlier draft of this article from Eugene Volokh, UCLA 
Professor of Law, given Nov. 7, 2007. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507-508 (1981) 
(upholding billboard ban “despite the meager record” showing a connection 
between billboards and traffic safety); City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 
475 U.S. 41, 50-52 (upholding ordinance which prohibited adult theaters: “The 
First Amendment does not require a city . . . to conduct new studies or produce 
[independent] evidence. . . so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is 
reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses”) 
(emphasis added); Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995) 
(“We do not read our case law to require that empirical data come to us accom-
panied by a surfeit of background information”).  But see 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. 
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996) (plurality opinion) (“[a] commercial 
speech regulation ‘may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote 
support for the government's purpose’”) (citations omitted)). 
141 42 U.S.C §§ 3604-06, 3617 (1969); see Schwemm, supra note 9, at 194. 
142 Proponents of the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in 44 Liquormart would 
suggest that speech related to any lawful transaction be subject to strict scrutiny.  
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484.  
143 As described infra, Section IV 4.c, religion is a less clear category because of 
the overlap with ethnicity. 
144 Senator Mondale explained that segregation and the resulting “ghetto 
schools” created “[o]ne of the most significant barriers impeding progress and 
opportunity for Negroes.”  See 114 Cong. Rec. 2275, 2276 (1968).    Senator 
Javits stated that “the segregation index of racial residential dissimilarity in 207 
cities” is such that, as of 1960, “86 percent of the urban Negro population would 
have to move to all-white or integrated slums in largely all-white neighborhoods 
if the segregation was to be at zero.” See 114 Cong. Rec. 2704 (1968).  Con-
gressman Halpern stated, “[W]e will never bring it about that Negro pupils and 
white pupils go to school together—until we make it possible for Negroes to 
obtain housing outside the ghetto areas of our cities.” See 114 Cong. Rec. 9589 
(1968). 
145 The legislative history of the amendments outlawing discrimination on the 
basis of sex and familial status describes the need to eliminate these types of 
discrimination, but says nothing about creating residential integration for these 
groups.  See Schwemm, supra note 9 at 279 n.417.  One sentence in the 1988 
Amendments suggests that there was an interest in mainstreaming handicapped 
persons: “The Fair Housing Amendments Act [] is a clear pronouncement of a 
national commitment to end the unnecessary exclusion of persons with handi-
caps from the mainstream.” See H.R. Rep. No 100-711 at 18 (1988), reprinted in 
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2179; see also Schwemm, supra note 9 at 279 n.417.  By 
contrast, the 1988 Amendments contain almost a full page describing the con-
tinuing problem of racial segregation.  See H.R. Rep. No 100-711 at 15-16 
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2176-77. 
146 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992). The Court’s five-
member majority concluded that St. Paul had failed to show that the statute 
served a compelling interest: “[T]he only interest distinctively served by the 
content limitation is that of displaying the city council’s special hostility toward 
the particular biases thus singled out.  That is precisely what the First Amend-
ment forbids.” Id. at 396.  For a broader discussion, including the concerns ex-
pressed by the dissenting justices, see Schwemm, supra note 9, at 285-289.  
147 See Schwemm, supra note 9, at 225-26. 
148 See Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(holding that housing organizations that might need to increase educational 
programs to combat the misimpression created by real estate advertisements that 
featured only white models had standing). 
149 See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977) (holding that 
total ban on advertising prices for “routine” legal services violated the First 
Amendment where disclaimers or warnings could be required to dissipate the 
possibility of misleading the public); Peel v. Attorney Regis. & Discip. Comm’n 
of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 117 (1990) (holding that an attorney had a First Amendment 
right to advertise his certification as a trial specialist by the National Board of 
Trial Advocacy (NBTA), but the State could require him to include a disclaimer 
stating that the NBTA is a private organization not sanctioned by the State or 
Federal government).  
150 Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 614 (1987) (Brennan, J. 
concurring). 
151 42 U.S.C §§ 1981, 1982 (2001). 
152 In Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) the Supreme 
Court explained:  
[T]he Court of Appeals erred in holding that Jews cannot state a § 
1982 claim against other white defendants.  That view rested on the 
notion that because Jews today are not thought to be members of a 
separate race, they cannot make out a claim of racial discrimination 
within the meaning of § 1982. . . . [T]he question before us is . . . 
whether, at the time § 1982 was adopted, Jews constituted a group of 
people that Congress intended to protect. It is evident from the legis-
lative history. . . that Jews and Arabs were among the peoples then 
considered to be distinct races and hence within the protection of the 
statute.  Jews are not foreclosed from stating a cause of action against 
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other members of what today is considered to be part of the Cauca-
sian race. 
Id. at 617-18.  See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 449 (1968) 
(Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]he Congress that passed the so-called Open Hous-
ing Act in 1968 did not undercut any of the grounds on which § 1982 rests”).  
See also Schwemm, supra note 9. 
153 See generally, Letti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 
1575 (2002). 
154 The Court explained:  
As observed above, the white ‘majority’ itself is composed of various 
minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of prior dis-
crimination at the hands of the State and private individuals.  Not all of 
these groups can receive preferential treatment and corresponding judi-
cial tolerance of distinctions drawn in terms of race and nationality, for 
then the only ‘majority’ left would be a new minority of white Anglo-
Saxon Protestants.  There is no principled basis for deciding which 
groups would merit ‘heightened judicial solicitude’ and which would 
not.  Courts would be asked to evaluate the extent of the prejudice and 
consequent harm suffered by various minority groups. Those whose 
societal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary level of tolerability 
then would be entitled to preferential classifications at the expense of 
individuals belonging to other groups. Those classifications would be 
free from exacting judicial scrutiny.  As these preferences began to have 
their desired effect, and the consequences of past discrimination were 
undone, new judicial rankings would be necessary.  The kind of variable 
sociological and political analysis necessary to produce such rankings 
simply does not lie within the judicial competence—even if they other-
wise were politically feasible and socially desirable.  
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295-97 (1978). 
155 During Ramadan, the ninth month of the Muslim calendar, observant Mus-
lims fast during daylight hours.  See Ramadan on the Net, Holidays on the Net, 
http://www.holidays.net/ramadan/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2008). 
156 Were such ads permissible, a Pakistani woman wishing to discriminate 
against all non-Pakistanis could place an ad that said “No Christians.”  Because 
the overwhelming majority of Pakistani Americans are Muslim, see Tinaz Pavri, 
Pakistani Americans: Overview-Religion, http://www.everyculture.com/multi/
Le-Pa/Pakistani-Americans.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2008), she could imper-
missibly dissuade many non-Pakistanis from applying, without significantly 
reducing the pool of applicants she finds acceptable. 
157 See Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights 
Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 252 (2006).  Ellickson describes how 
“[m]ost people prefer to consort with those who share their orientations and 
attitudes.”  He states that co-occupants are likely to choose others of similar 
tastes, and that “to the extent that tastes vary according to attributes such as 
social class, age, gender, and ethnicity, participants in a household relationship 
can be expected to show a tendency to cluster accordingly.” 
158 Intentional communities united by religious belief have been uniquely suc-
cessful.  Ellickson contrasts long-lived religious sects that require “dozens of 
adult residents of each of their communities to dine together for virtually all 
meals,” like the Hutterites, who were organized in 1528 and currently have about 
8000 members living on eighty-nine rural settlements in the United States, and 
convents of the Order of Saint Benedict, established in 530 and maintaining just 
under 7000 members in a total of 174 monasteries and convents in the United 
States, with the “secular experiments with strongly communal forms of living 
and dining [that] implode[d] within a handful of years”: Brook Farm in Massa-
chusetts (1841-47), New Harmony in Indiana (lasting only a few years starting in 
1825), and Oneida in New York (1848-1881).  Id. at  272-73. 
159 “[A] pan used to fry a hamburger or a pot used to make stew become fleishig. 
If the fleishig pot or pan is then used to boil milk, [Jewish Law] has been vio-
lated.” Religion Facts – Keeping Kosher: Jewish Dietary Laws, http://
www.religionfacts.com/judaism/practices/kosher.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 
2008). 
160 Believers may be reincarnated into a higher caste only if they have followed 
the rules of their caste during their previous life.  “In this way karma has dis-
couraged people from attempting to rise to a higher caste or to cross caste lines 
for social relations of any kind.” “Caste (social),” Microsoft Encarta Online 
Encyclopedia 2007, http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/refpages/RefArticle.aspx?
refid=761565041 (last visited Aug. 25, 2008). 
161 “All holidays, including birthdays, are considered ‘pagan holidays’ and may 
not be observed by Witnesses.” Religion Facts – Jehovah’s Witnesses and Holi-
days, http://www.religionfacts.com/jehovahs_witnesses/holidays.htm (last vis-
ited Aug. 25, 2008). 
162 Placing ads exclusively in such locations would violate the FHA: 24 C.F.R. § 
100.75(3), which prohibits “selecting media or locations for advertising the sale 
or rental of dwellings which deny particular segments of the housing market 
information about housing opportunities because of . . . religion. . . .”  However, 
roommate seekers could include these locations among the places they list their 
ads.  And, realistically, it is unlikely that anyone would sue an Orthodox Jew 
who, seeking a kosher roommate, listed his apartment exclusively on the bulletin 
board at his synagogue or in a local Jewish newspaper.   
163 Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
881 (1990) (holding that Oregon’s application of a generally applicable criminal 
prohibition to the sacramental use of peyote by members of the Native American 
Church did not violate the free exercise clause). 
164 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb (2001).  
165 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1493 to -1493.02 (West 2004); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b (West Supp. 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 761.01-.05 
(West Supp. 2004); IDAHO CODE §§ 73-401 to -404 (Michie Supp. 2004); 775 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1-99 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 
1.302-.307 (West Supp. 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-22-1 to 28-22-5 (Michie 
Supp. 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §§ 251-258 (West Supp. 2004); 71 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2401-2407 (West Supp. 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-
80.1-1 to -4 (1998); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-32-10 to -60 (West Supp. 2003); TEX. 
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 110.001-.012 (Vernon 2004). 
166 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
167 See Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 
418 (2006) (holding that the government failed to demonstrate a compelling state 
interest in prohibiting a religious sect’s sacramental use of a hoasca tea contain-
ing DMT, a hallucinogenic regulated under the Controlled Substances Act). 
168 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (creating exemptions under the free 
exercise clause when a generally applicable law that did not pass strict scrutiny 
substantially burdened religious conduct); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 
234 (1972), (holding that a compulsory education law violated the free exercise 
rights of the Amish). 
169 See Hunt v. Hunt, 162 Vt. 423, 436 (1994); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W. 
2d 393, 397-98 (Minn. 1990); Rourke v. N.Y. State Dept. of Corr. Serv., 603 
N.Y.S. 2d 647, 649-50 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (aff'd, 615 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472-73 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994)).  For an exhaustive list, see  Douglas Laycock, Theology 
Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the 
Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 211-12 (2004). 
170 See State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9-11 (Minn. 1990) (The court 
upheld a landlord’s right not to rent to unmarried cohabitants.  Three justices 
held that the Minnesota Constitution granted far broader religious freedom pro-
tection than the United States Constitution.  Finding the text of the fair housing 
statute dispositive, the concurring justice did not reach the constitutional ques-
tion.); Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 240, 243 n.15 (Mass. 1994) 
(The court held that the fair housing law substantially burdened the landlord’s 
free exercise rights, but whether Massachusetts had a compelling interest in 
ensuring rental housing to unmarried people was a fact question precluding 
summary judgment.  Three dissenting justices held that the Massachusetts con-
stitution “absolutely protect[ed] the defendants’ right to decline to lease any 
premises to a cohabitating couple”). 
171 Smith v. Fair Hous. & Employment Comm’n (Evelyn Smith), 12 Cal.4th 
1143 (1996) (plurality opinion). 
172 Evelyn Smith predated City of Boerne v. Flores, and thus the Court reviewed 
Smith’s case under the federal RFRA, but an analysis under a state RFRA would 
likely be similar. 
173 12 Cal.4th at 1166-67. 
174 See Christoper L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Con-
science: The Constitutional Basis For Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1245, 1247 (1994).   Describing the test in religious freedom cases as 
“strict in theory but feeble in fact,” Eisgruber and Sager explain that modern 
strict scrutiny has been relatively deferential.  However, as discussed, prohibi-
tions on discriminatory roommate advertisements related to religious practice are 
unlikely to be upheld even under intermediate scrutiny.  In jurisdictions where 
courts apply rational basis review to RFRA claims, seeking protection under a 
RFRA would be a less viable option than raising a free speech challenge as 
described in section IV.4.b. 
175 See See Bd. of Trs., State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469; supra note 103. 
176 See the discussion in Part IV 4.c regarding advertisements that describe relig-
ion-as-belief versus religion-as-ethnicity. 
177 See supra Part IV.4.b-c. 
178 12 Cal. 4th at 1173 (“[i]t is well established that there is no substantial burden 
placed on an individual's free exercise of religion where a law or policy 
[regulating secular conduct] merely 'operates so as to make the practice of [the 
individual's] religious beliefs more expensive'”) (citations omitted). 
179 Between 2001 and 2004, the number of households paying more than half 
their income for housing— considered “severe cost burdens”—increased by 
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nearly 2 million to a record 15.8 million.  The total record of households paying 
at least 30 percent of income on housing—considered “at least moderate cost 
burdens”—rose from 31.3 million to over 35 million.  The incidence is higher 
among renters.  THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2006, Joint Center for 
Housing Studies of Harvard University, pg. 25, available at http://
www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2006/index.htm (last visited 
Aug. 25, 2008). 
180 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (quoting Roberts v. 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (New Jersey’s public accommodations law 
held to violate the Boy Scout’s rights to freedom of association by forcing the 
organization to retain an openly gay assistant scoutmaster)). 
181 468 U.S. at 624-25. 
182 530 U.S. at 648. 
183 Id. at 659. 
184 Id. at 655 (describing its decision in Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & 
Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995)) (purpose of St. Patrick’s 
day parade “was not to espouse any views about sexual orientation, but we held 
that the parade organizers had a right to exclude certain participants nonethe-
less.”). 
185 530 U.S. at 659. 
186 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 
489 F.3d 921, 930 n.2  (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (court’s em-
phasis). 
187 As discussed supra in Part IV.1, such roommate seekers may also raise as-
applied intimate association challenges, arguing that the prohibitions directly and 
substantially interfere with their ability to create an association. 
188 See supra Part IV.4.b. 
189 530 U.S. at 661 (stating “We are not, as we must not be, guided by our views 
of whether the Boy Scouts' teachings with respect to homosexual conduct are 
right or wrong; public or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization's 
expression does not justify the State's effort to compel the organization to accept 
members where such acceptance would derogate from the organization's expres-
sive message”). 
190 Additionally, devout roommate seekers may assert a hybrid-rights claim, 
arguing that the advertising restrictions should be reviewed under strict scrutiny 
because more than one constitutional right is implicated: their free exercise 
rights coupled with either expressive association, intimate association, or free 
speech rights.  In Smith, the Supreme Court suggested that a higher standard of 
review may apply where a case involved the Free Exercise clause in conjunction 
with other constitutional protections. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of 
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).  However, to date, the Court has yet 
to apply strict scrutiny to a hybrid-rights claim, and Justice Souter has criticized 
the theory in a concurring opinion.  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. 
v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993) (Souter, J. concurring) ("[i]f a 
hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated, 
then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith 
rule....").  Furthermore, the Second and Sixth Circuits have explicitly rejected the 
hybrid rights language from Smith as dicta, concluding the standard of review 
should not vary “simply with the number of constitutional rights that the plaintiff 
asserts have been violated.” Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 
2003); see also Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State Uni., Coll. of Vet. 
Med., 5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir.1993).  Thus, the hybrid-rights approach seems a less 
viable option. 
191 See 42 USCA § 3604(c) (2003). 
192 See, e.g., Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898, 905 (2d Cir. 
1993) (Plaintiff could bring action if housing ads “’suggest[ed] to an ordinary 
reader that a particular race [was] preferred or dispreferred for the housing in 
question,’ regardless of the defendant's intent”) (quoting Ragin v. N.Y. Times 
Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1000 (2nd Cir. 1991)); see also Schwemm, supra note 9, at 
210-11. 
193 See GUIDELINES ON HOW TO ADVERTISE WITHOUT VIOLATING HOUSING 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS, available at http://www.ndfhc.org/fair_housing/PDF-
NDDOL%20Fair%20Housing%20Ads.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2008). Because 
the statement and advertisement prohibitions are both contained in 42 USCA § 
3604(c), the same phrases would likely create liability in either context. 
194 Id. 
195 Those who strictly observe the Sabbath are forbidden from activities includ-
ing, but not limited to: using the phone, operating anything electric or electronic, 
and flipping light switches from 18 minutes before sunset on Fridays until night-
fall (approximately 40 minutes after sunset) on Saturdays.  See Ask Moses, 
http://www.askmoses.com/article_list.html?h=208 (last visited Aug. 25, 2008).   
196 Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980). 
197 Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. at 689 n.5 (emphasis added). 
198 The District of Columbia Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination based 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2000, a thirty-year-old female dentist with an interna-
tional relief organization prepares for surgery in a tent marked 
“Hospital.”  Her patient, a ten-year-old boy, has several infected 
molars.  The hospital is located in the southernmost part of Putu-
mayo, Colombia near the border of Ecuador.  The boy squirms 
in his chair knowing that the needle in the dentist’s hand will 
soon be injecting into his gums.  “¡Tranquilo Niño!  I have done 
this many times and you need to be a brave boy!”  
 Just as she places the needle in the child’s mouth, she hears 
the sound of the tent flap opening.  Entering are two easily iden-
tifiable members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom-
bia (“F.A.R.C.”) - one of Colombia’s most notorious guerilla 
organizations.  With eyes yellowed from jaundice and glazed 
with hate, they surround the dentist.  “I am operating here!” she 
protests.  “Shut-up bitch!” one states as he pulls her surgical cap 
off, yanks her hair back, and sticks his AK-47 hard into her 
neck.  The other man moves his filthy hands along each surgical 
instrument.  “You will operate on this man and his teeth.”  With 
that statement, the man who contaminated the instruments slaps 
the child out of the chair and sits in it himself.  Knowing that 
any sudden move would be her death, the dentist looks inside 
the mouth of the guerilla member and begins to work.   
Fortunately for the dentist, she was granted asylum before 
the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropri-
ate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 
2001 (“PATRIOT Act”) took effect in 2001, and before the pas-
sage of the REAL ID Act in 2005.  Had she sought asylum any 
later, the U.S. government would have barred her from applying.  
Under the PATRIOT Act and REAL ID Act, she had committed 
a terrorist act by giving material support to individuals that she 
knew belonged to a terrorist organization. 
The REAL ID Act provides arcane and widely unknown 
relief provisions that, in some limited cases, offset the harshness 
of the act.  Relief under the REAL ID Act is tenuous as it can be 
revoked at any time, and the asylum seeker must navigate its 
narrow legal path.  This is the tightrope. One misstep would bar 
an asylum application. 
Part I of this article will give an overview and the legislative 
background of the PATRIOT Act and the REAL ID Act as they 
apply to asylum seekers.  Part II will explore examples of the 
material support bar and its devastating effect on asylum appli-
cants.  Part III will describe the new forms of  relief under the 
REAL ID Act, offer case law defining duress in a criminal and 
immigration context, and explain the totality of circumstances 
test.  Lastly, part IV presents a practitioner’s checklist for those 
who wish to assist clients with their exemption to the material 
support bar. 
 
I. OVERVIEW AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
 
THE PATRIOT ACT OF 2001 
 
When American Airlines Flight 11 hit the first tower on 
September 11, 2001, the legal landscape in the U.S. for asylum 
seekers, changed forever.  Pushed by the Bush administration,1 
Congress, with very little debate,2 passed the PATRIOT Act.  
The PATRIOT Act only expanded existing inadmissibility pro-
visions and did not add any new provisions affecting asylum 
seekers.3  Asylum seekers had already been barred from both 
asylum and withholding of removal if they had participated in 
terrorist activities since the 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) and the Illegal Immigration Re-
form and Immigrant Responsibility Acts (“IIRIRA”).4  But the 
lack of new provisions did not mean the PATRIOT Act had no 
impact.  Expanding the existing anti-terrorism provisions via the 
PATRIOT Act broadened the asylum bars not only to terrorists, 
but also in many cases, to their victims.5  
Prior to the PATRIOT Act, the Secretary of State had desig-
nated twenty-seven Foreign Terrorist Organizations.6  After the 
passage of the PATRIOT Act, the Secretary of State Donald 
Rumsfeld used his authority granted under INA § 219 to desig-
nate an additional fifteen Foreign Terrorist Organizations, alto-
gether referred to by the Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”) as Tier I.  The PATRIOT Act also authorized the Sec-
retary of State to designate a new class of terrorist organizations 
under the “Terrorist Exclusion List,” otherwise known as Tier 
II.7 Added together, 100 terrorist organizations have been offi-
cially identified.8 
  A third terrorist organization category added by the PA-
TRIOT Act is called the “undesignated category” or Tier III.  
This is the catch-all of the PATRIOT Act codified under INA § 
212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III), as the definition of terrorist organizations 
was expanded to “a group of two or more individuals, whether 
organized or not, which engages in terrorist activities.”9  Asylum 
proponents worry most about this category because the broadly 
worded provisions are open to a gamut of interpretations.  For 
example, student protesters throwing bricks at government 
forces to intentionally cause bodily harm, could be considered to 
have (1) formed a terrorist organization and (2) have committed 
terrorist acts. These students would be barred from asylum re-
gardless of their persecution claims.10      
Prior to the PATRIOT Act, in order for an applicant to fall 
under the inadmissibility provisions for a terrorist activity, mate-
rial support had to be given with the knowledge that the support 
was going to a group planning terrorist activity.  Under the PA-
TRIOT Act, the applicant, who gives material support is barred 
whether or not he had any knowledge that the group was about 
to commit a terrorist act.11 
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Congress believed that the PATRIOT Act granted DHS the 
tools needed to filter terrorists out of the immigration process.  
In late 2004 however, the Commission on 9/11 released its ini-
tial public report and pointed out that asylum was an even bigger 
portal to terrorists than initially believed.12  In light of the report, 
certain members of the House of RepresentativesRep.Steve 
Chabot (R-OH), Rep. John Hostettler (R-IN), Rep. Daniel Lun-
gren (R-CA), Rep. Randy Forbes (R-VA), Rep Mary Bono (R-
CA), Rep. Peter Hoecstra (R-MI), and Rep. Randy Neugenbauer 
(R-TX), felt that they had the moral authority to slam that portal 
shut,13 culminating in one of the most powerful assaults on asy-
lum in Congress’ fifty year history: the REAL ID Act of 2005.  
 
THE REAL ID ACT OF 2005 
 
The REAL ID Act comprised of twenty-nine amendments 
to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).14  While most 
famous for the yet unimplemented requirement that states make 
driver’s license applicants prove their lawful immigration status, 
the REAL ID Act also changed many asylum elements, such as 
requiring that race, religion, nationality, membership in a social 
group, or political opinion, be central to the applicant’s persecu-
tion claim.15  In addition, the REAL ID Act established a 
“totality of the circumstances” test, which requires that the trier 
of fact base credibility on the applicant’s demeanor, candor, 
responsiveness, and the internal consistency of the applicant’s 
statements.16  Also of note is the REAL ID’s elimination of the 
writ of habeas corpus from 
removal proceedings.  Lastly, 
REAL ID added relief to the 
material support bar under 
the definitions of terrorist 
activities, allowing the Secre-
tary of State to waive the 
asylum bar for particular in-
admissibility provisions. 
Congress holds the Sec-
retary of DHS accountable 
for these waivers, and should 
he activate them, he must 
report to several House and 
Senate committees within one 
week of the waiver, and an-
nually report the number of individuals waived.17  Considering 
its harsh nature toward asylum seekers, the idea that the REAL 
ID Act provides any relief at all seems quite incongruous.  Un-
derstanding the nature of REAL ID and the tenor of its Congres-
sional sponsors requires an examination of its legislative history.  
Only then will it be clear why asylum applicants seem to be un-
der such an onerous burden of proof, and why its relief provi-
sions seem almost an oversight.   
 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MATERIAL SUPPORT  
PROVISIONS 
 
The Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Representative 
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (R - WI), pushed for modifying the 
material support provisions to terrorists because he and other 
Representatives were concerned that a person who was involved 
with terrorism could become an asylum applicant.  During the 
Congressional floor debates, Representative John Hostettler (R - 
IN) stated that the current law misunderstood the real workings 
of a terrorist organization because actual terrorists often used 
humanitarian work projects to fund their “criminal” functions as 
money is fungible and can go to “bullets …instead of babies.”18  
The legislative debate over REAL ID shows that few of its pro-
visions have unintended consequences.19   
The material support provisions were designed to be an un-
forgiving filter for asylum seekers.  
 
ELEMENTS OF THE MATERIAL SUPPORT PROVISIONS  
 
The material support bar of the REAL ID Act breaks down 
into three elements where (1) the applicant knows or should 
have known (mens rea) that (2) the material support the appli-
cant provided (3) was to a terrorist organization.   Due to the 
previous discussion defining terrorist organizations, only the 
first and second elements of the material support bar will be 
presented in detail. 
MENS REA  
 
The mens rea standard for knowing has gone through sev-
eral iterations as it applies to the material support provisions.  
Prior to REAL ID, individuals had to have known or should 
have known that the material support that they gave furthered 
the goals of the terrorist organization.20  Under REAL ID, the 
mens rea standard is much stricter.  If an individual knows or 
should reasonably know that they are giving support to a terror-
ist organization, then the individual meets the mens rea require-
ment and is barred from applying for asylum.   
Intent is not part of the current mens rea re-
quirement.21  It does not matter whether or not 
the individual gives material support with the 
intent to aid the organization or to harm others.  
Additionally, the individual does not have to 
give material support willingly.  Even if an 
individual merely acquiesces to a guerilla or-
ganization under threat of harm, the mens rea 
requirement has been met because the individ-
ual gave material support knowing that it was 
aiding a terrorist organization. 
 The Matter of S-K shows the resolve 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
to enforce the mens rea standard strictly and 
literally.  In S-K, an ethnic Chin woman pro-
vided money and supplies to the Chin National Front, who was 
protecting an ethnic group from the malicious assaults of the 
Burmese military junta.  She was found credible, but was denied 
asylum because she knowingly supported a group who engaged 
in armed resistance.22  S-K is continuing to impact the immigra-
tion community because the mens rea standard seems almost 
unassailable, even for “freedom fighters,” or rebels against gov-
ernments unrecognized by the United States.23  Attacks on the 
mens rea standard have often differentiated those asylum appli-
cants who have given material support knowingly but not will-
ingly.  Immigration judges and the BIA have struck down many 
such attacks post-Patriot Act, denying asylum to thousands of 
individuals who were forced to provide material support to ter-
rorist organizations.24   
 
 
 
 
 
If an individual knows or should 
reasonably know that they are giving 
support to a terrorist organization, 
then the individual meets the mens 
rea requirement and is barred from 
applying for asylum.   
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DEFINITION OF MATERIAL SUPPORT 
 
The INA defines material support as a “safe transportation, 
communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material finan-
cial benefit, false documentation or identification [and] weap-
ons.”  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals believes these are 
suggestions and not the entire spectrum of possibilities.25  The 
BIA uses a “de minimis contributions” standard for examining 
cases of material support:26 offering of food, arranging shelter 
for militants,27 facilitating phone calls,28 even providing a glass 
of water, are all bars to asylum.29  By the BIA’s own admission, 
the statute is breath-taking in its scope.30  Consequently, in 
Cheema v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit limited the BIA’s broad 
definition of material support activities holding that where “not a 
scrap of evidence” shows that the aid recipients had anything to 
do with terrorism, the United States cannot impose the material 
support bar.31 
 
II. THE IMPACT OF THE MATERIAL SUPPORT  
PROVISION TO ASYLUM SEEKERS 
 
Though there is no proof that the material support provi-
sions had an overall impact on the asylum process, the total 
number of U.S. asylum cases dropped by 41.51% in the years 
2001 to 2005.32  Additionally, the number of asylum grants 
dropped by 11.95% in the years 2003 to 2005.33  As of 2006, the 
United States had only allowed 26,113 asylees to enter.34   
But the statistics showing the impact on specific nations, 
demonstrate that Congress had wielded an effective tool with the 
material provisions bar.35  Colombia was hit particularly hard, 
seeing a 32.14% drop in asylum grants (from 4,368 to 2,964) 
since REAL ID.36  Responding to the prolonged civil war, and 
the surge of refugees crossing into Ecuador, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) began trying in 
2001 to resettle Colombians in the United States.37  Starting with 
an initial referral group of 288 refugees in 2003, the number 
dwindled to thirty-five and then to nothing, when the United 
States began indefinitely deferring any Colombians who raised 
material support issues.38  UNHCR believes that 70 to 80% of 
these Colombian refugees would be barred under the material 
support provisions.39    
The material support provision has barred people of many 
other nationalities, including a Sri Lankan man kidnapped by 
guerillas and forced to pay them ransom from his entire life sav-
ings; a Liberian woman, whose captors killed her father, gang-
raped her multiple times, and forced her to wash their clothes;40 
and a Nepalese man beaten by a gang of Moaist rebels, who 
surrendered all of his money and fled to the United States when 
he was told that the gang would come again.  His case has lan-
guished in review since his 2002 application was submitted.41  
The negative impact of the material support bar to asylees is 
not without its critics.  After interviewing dozens of Colombians 
barred from asylum and living under oppressive circumstances 
in Ecuador, the Georgetown Law Center for Human Rights Fact-
Finding Investigation made recommendations to Congress that 
the material support bar should be amended to allow exceptions 
for involuntary provisions, mistaken compliance, and insignifi-
cant support to terrorist organizations.42  Lifting the bar for these 
exceptions would allow the U.S. to regain balance between pro-
tecting the safety of its citizens and being the humanitarian na-
tion that it so claims to be. 
 
 
THE GUIDE TO THE RELIEF PROVISIONS:   
HOW TO WALK THE TIGHTROPE  
 
Regardless of the reasons, relief has come to some asylum 
applicants.  Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security, 
used his authority granted under the relief provisions of the 
REAL ID Act, to create some exemption from the material sup-
port bar in five memorandums in 2007.43  While some asylum 
seekers may benefit from these exemptions, the exemptions are 
still complicated and narrow.    
 
BURDENS AND EXEMPTIONS UNDER THE  
MATERIAL SUPPORT BAR 
 
No presumption that an applicant has provided material 
support to a terrorist organization exists.44  Generally, the appli-
cant is the one who will bring up the material support issue ei-
ther within his asylum affidavit or when answering a question by 
the asylum officer.  Additionally, the Asylum Officer may infer 
that an applicant encountered a terrorist group because of the 
location of the applicant’s home.  Once the issue of material 
support is raised, the applicant carries the burden of proving that 
the organization was not a terrorist organization, that he or she 
did not know it was a terrorist organization, or that he or she is 
entitled to the material support relief.   
 Currently, there are only three categories of applicants eli-
gible for material support relief: 
 
(1) Applicants who provided material support to only 
designated groups with no conditions;45  
(2) Applicants who provided material support to Tier 
III (undesignated terrorist organizations)46 on the 
condition that (1) the applicants supplied the mate-
rial support under duress and (2) applications are 
validated by the “totality of the circumstances” 
test;  
(3) Applicants who provided material support to speci-
fied Tier I and Tier II Terrorist Organizations 
(currently only applicable to F.A.R.C.) on the con-
dition that (1) the applicants supplied the material 
support under duress and (2) applications are vali-
dated by the “totality of the circumstances” test.47 
 
CONDITION 1: THE DURESS EXEMPTION48 
 
Asylum applicants prove duress when they show that they 
had no or very little choice in providing material support to a 
terrorist organization because they would face serious, life-
threatening circumstances, if they did not comply.  
DHS field officers observe the following factors to deter-
mine whether an applicant will receive a duress exemption: 
 
• The extent to which the applicant reasonably could 
have avoided or took steps to avoid, providing ma-
terial support 
• The severity and type of harm inflicted or threat-
ened 
• The person to whom the harm or threat of harm 
was directed 
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• The perceived imminence of the harm threatened 
• The perceived likelihood that the threatened harm 
would be inflicted 
• Any other relevant factor regarding the circum-
stances under which the applicant felt compelled to 
provide the material support.49 
 
While not involving an immigration cause of action, the case of 
United States v. Contento-Pachon, provides guidance for the 
workings of a duress defense.  Here, the Ninth Circuit, deter-
mined whether a Colombian citizen had a duress defense for 
narcotics trafficking.  The court noted that proving duress re-
quires, a) immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury; b) a 
well-grounded fear that the threat will be carried out; and, c)no 
reasonable opportunity to escape the threat.50 
In the Third Circuit case, Arias v. Gonzales, a fish farm 
manager who, with his family, was being threatened by the 
F.A.R.C., offered a duress defense to a material support 
charge.51  The manager stated that he made “war payments” to 
the F.A.R.C., but also that he was making good money at the 
farm, and “doing well there.”52  The court found that the nature 
of the manager’s payments disproved any duress factors as it 
seemed that the manager paid F.A.R.C. voluntarily because he 
enjoyed his lifestyle.53 
 
CONDITION 2: THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
TEST                          
 
Once DHS determines that the applicant has met the initial 
duress burden, it then applies the “totality of the circumstances” 
test.  Generally, a court applies this test by balancing all the in-
ferences involved in the suspicious conduct. Similarly, DHS 
advises its field officers to weigh factors such as the amount and 
type of material support the applicant provided, the frequency of 
material support provided, and the nature of the terrorist activi-
ties committed by the terrorist organization.54 For instance, a 
comprehensive analysis of how the totality of the circumstances 
operates in an immigration (denaturalization) context, occurs in 
Breyer v. Ashcroft.  In this case, the Third Circuit determined 
that a former World War II German soldier, who was actually a 
U.S. citizen, did not forsake his citizenship when becoming a 
member of the SS Corps.55  The key issue was whether the sol-
dier acted voluntarily in joining the Totenkopf Sturmbann 
(Death’s Head Battalion) at Auschwitz.56  The court weighed the 
positive factors of the soldier trying to get leave every weekend, 
and his refusing to be tattooed with the SS mark, against the 
negative factors such as his reporting for his initial SS training, 
even though a politician volunteered to secure his release from 
the service.57 
The “totality of the circumstances” test should be of con-
cern to the immigration law practitioner because an adverse 
finding here will eliminate even a worthy applicant who can 
prove duress in giving material support. 
 
 
III. PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO MATERIAL  
SUPPORT RELIEF 
 
Little, if any, aid exists to help the practitioner navigate this 
brave new world of material support relief.  The goal of this 
checklist is to assist the practitioner in walking the tightrope of 
the REAL ID waivers and to point out some of the hazards that 
exist along the way.  It will help the practitioner to frame the 
approaches to their asylum applicant’s material support exemp-
tions that would constitute a material support exemption for an 
asylum applicant. 
The basic elements of an asylum claim have not changed.  
An applicant still has the burden of proof that one of the five 
protected areas (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, 
membership in a social group) is central to the persecution 
claim, and that the applicant filed a claim within one year of 
arrival.  Practitioners should remember that Congress is guarded 
against the asylum system.  Practitioners should also heed Mi-
chael Chertoff’s warning on each of these exemptions, that he 
may revoke the waiver at his discretion.  In order to encourage 
use of the relief exemptions, practitioners can start by presenting 
DHS officers with asylum cases that directly fall under the ex-
emption, gradually letting DHS and Congress know that those 
seeking the relief are not a danger to the nation.   
 
CHECKLIST: 
INITIAL STEPS IN FRAMING YOUR STRATEGY 
 
1. Does your client even need to consider the material sup-
port exemption? 
 
a. Has the client given any aid to anyone who may be con-
sidered a terrorist or belongs to a terrorist group? 
 
i. Consider whether the client has ever had any contact 
with any non-government groups that are on the State 
Department terrorist lists or could be considered terror-
ist organizations. 
 
ii. The key point is “knowing or should have known” 
that (a) the client has given any aid and that (b) aid was 
given to a terrorist organization.  If the client is not sure 
on these issues, the attorney should continue down the 
checklist.  
 
1. Question the client about giving any aid to 
anyone that they remotely consider to be dan-
gerous as a potential refresher of his or her 
memory.  
  
a.  Check both the Foreign Terrorist 
Organization List and the Terrorist 
Exclusion List available at the U.S. 
Department of State.  See if the client 
is familiar with any of these names, 
and if so, the circumstance under 
which he or she is familiar. 
 
2. Note that cases where the clients are not 
sure that they have given material support to a 
terrorist organization are fairly rare.  Most 
clients are quite clear with whom they were 
dealing. 
 
3. Remember that material support is de mini-
mis: 
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• A cup of coffee, a glass of water, spare 
coins 
• Food, shelter, repairs 
 
4. The mens rea requirement is knowing or 
should have known: 
 
• Even if client believes that his or her help 
will not further the terrorists’ criminal 
activities, this does not exempt him or her 
from the material support bar. 
 
iii. Listen for the DHS “buzz words” in your client’s 
story.   
 
1. DHS advised its field officers to watch for 
these words in an asylum interview:58 
 
Ie. Ransom, War Tax, Slave, Force, Threat 
      Extortion, Fighter, Militant, Soldier, Rebel 
 
2. If, during your client conversations, he or 
she uses any of these phrases, it should alert 
the attorney to a potential material support 
issue.   
 
b. Research the location where the client claims persecu-
tion. 
 
i. Many of the Tier I and Tier II terrorist organizations 
have information available online.  Many of the terror-
ist organizations have specific uniforms, and areas of 
geographic operations.  If your client lived outside of 
these areas, it will bolster his or her case, disproving 
any claims of material support if the attorney can pro-
vide the material support showing the distance between 
the client and the active terrorist groups in his or her 
geographic area. 
 
ii. Removing doubt from the Asylum Officer’s or Im-
migration Judge’s mind requires proof contrary to the 
presumption that the client, if living in certain areas, 
encountered terrorist groups.  Enlist the client’s help in 
proving lack of encounters: 
 
1. Factors such as: 
a. Education: 
i. Most educated people do not live in 
rural areas, where some terrorist 
groups are known to operate 
b. Profession:  
i. Some professions, such as econo-
mists, would rarely encounter terror-
ist organizations 
 
c. Family: 
                              i. Some cultures forbid women   
                              from talking to strangers.   
 
c. Explore with the client any suspicion that you believe 
will raise security concerns about your client being a 
danger to the United States. 
 
i. DHS examines all asylum applicant cases to see 
whether they are a danger to the nation, regardless of 
whether the material support issue exists.  Should DHS 
have any doubts regarding the client being a danger, the 
client will lose his or her opportunity to apply for either 
asylum or the material support relief.  Some clients do 
not realize that their activities, which may be only di-
rected towards some group not associated with the 
United States, will be considered participating in terror-
ist activities and a danger to the United States.  
 
 ii. The best approach is a comprehensive interview 
with the client asking about his or her associations, 
spouse’s affiliations, and any activities that could possi-
bly flag the client. 
 
 
THE MATERIAL SUPPORT RELIEF PROCESS 
 
2. Use this stage when it is fairly certain that the client pro-
vided material support to a terrorist organization. 
 
a. Identify the organization: 
 
i. No Duress Exemption Required: 
 
• Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation 
Army (“KNU/KNLA”) 
• Chin National Front/Chin National Army (“CNF/
CNA”) Chi National League for Democracy 
(“CNLD”) 
• Kayan New Land Party (“KNLP”) 
• Arakan Liberation Party (“ALP”) 
• Tibetan Mustangs 
• Cuban Alzados 
•  Karenni National Progressive Party (“KNPP”). 
 
1. If the client gave material support to any of these 
organizations, then the attorney may go directly to 
step 3. 
 
ii. Duress Exemption Will be Required: 
1. TIER I/II Terrorist Organizations: 
a. F.A.R.C. 
 i. This is the only terrorist organiza-
tion allowed an exemption. 
 
2. TIER III Undesignated Organizations: 
a. Organizations that could be considered ter-
rorists under INA §212(a)(3)(B)(iv)
(vi)(III). 
 
iii. No Material Support Exemption Available: 
 
1. Any organization not mentioned above: 
 
a. As of writing, the client is barred  from 
applying for asylum 
b. This stage may end the client’s asylum 
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journey if he or she has knowingly given 
material support to a non-exempted terror-
ist organization. 
 
b. Full Disclosure Required: 
 
i. Should the attorney believe that the client qualifies 
for the material support exemption, DHS requires 
that any submission for this relief must be accom-
panied by a full and complete disclosure of “the 
nature and circumstances of each provision of ma-
terial support.”59 
ii. Attorney should assist the client in documenting the 
circumstances. 
 
c.     Begin Duress Analysis: 
i. Duress involves these three factors: 
 
1. Imminent threat of death or serious bodily 
injury 
2. A well-grounded fear that the threat will be 
carried out 
3. No reasonable opportunity to escape the 
threatened harm 
 
ii. The client must give a detailed explanation as to 
what occurred, involving all three factors: 
 
1. The client’s story must be consistent, plau-
sible and believable. 
2. Details that bring the Asylum Officer or 
Immigration Judge into the picture are cru-
cial to the duress analysis: 
 
a. Ask the basic “who, what, when, where and 
why” questions. 
b. Have the client give his story using the de-
tailed facts: 
 
i. For example: “In December 2006, my wife, 
children, and I were having our standard lunch 
of boiled chicken and peanuts when these 
armed men stormed into our house and held 
their rifle against my daughter’s head.  They 
said that if we didn’t give them the chickens 
that we kept in our farm, they would kill my 
daughter and take my sons into their group.” 
ii. Here, there is a threat to a life that seems 
imminent, by people who look as if they 
would carry it out if the client did not comply.  
Additionally, the client and his family were 
detained by threat of force, and  there was no 
reasonable avenue of escape.  This small story 
meets all of the duress elements. 
 
iii. In instances where the client gives material support 
over a longer period, such as a farmer in a guerilla in-
fested area where he is paying “war taxes” monthly, the 
client will need to show why he or she did not try to 
escape or remove himself or herself from the danger. 
 
 
 
1. For example: 
 
a. Guerillas surrounded the area and thus, the family 
could not exit 
b. Natural barriers such as high water rivers during the 
monsoon season existed 
               c. Lack of transportation 
 
d. Begin Totality of the Circumstances Analysis: 
 
i. .DHS has the discretion to deny the material support 
relief simply because it does not find that the client’s 
duress justifies the exemption. 
 
ii. At this writing, two factors will quickly eliminate the 
client as a potential asylee: 
 
1. DHS believes that the client gave material 
support voluntarily: 
 
• For example: the terrorists only 
collected their fees by mail and 
the client never encountered the 
group directly. 
 
2. DHS believes that the client, because of the 
duration of support given, was receiving bene-
fits from the relationship with the terrorist 
organization instead of simply cooperating to 
protect his or her life, limb, and property.  In 
Arias v. Gonzales, the client continued to pay 
the F.A.R.C. because “the money was good” 
where he was working. 
   
iii. When the practitioner is confident that the elements 
in the checklist are well documented, he or she must 
then submit an I-589 Form, and specifically claim the 
material support exemption, if it is warranted. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Denied by the thousands, individuals who applied for asy-
lum after the passage of the PATRIOT Act and REAL ID Act up 
to early 2007, faced a Congressional majority convinced that 
this group of worthy beneficiaries was a dangerous threat to the 
United States.  As a nation, the United States had “strained out 
the gnat, yet swallowed the camel.”60  Providentially, in the very 
legislation that denies asylum to so many, a paragraph that pre-
sents some hope exists.  Obtaining this relief is a precarious bal-
ancing act, and any misstep will destroy the applicant’s chance 
of entry.  Representation is crucial to help those who are not 
terrorists but are indeed terrorized, gain access to this narrow 
exemption.  Only then, can asylum seekers walk the tightrope. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
After the end of the Civil War, slavery was formally 
abolished, and the right to vote and other civil rights for African-
Americans were finally enshrined into the Constitution of the 
United States via the Reconstruction Amendments.  However, 
such a narrow reading of the history of this period belies the 
nebulous boundary between “war” and peace.  As Yoram Din-
stein has noted, “[t]he phrase ‘war’ lends itself to manifold uses. 
. .  [and thus] may appear to be a flexible expression suitable for 
an allusion to any serious strife, struggle or campaign.”1   
This expansive notion of war is appropriate for describ-
ing African-Americans’ arduous path as they have struggled to 
achieve the status of equal human beings endowed with full civil 
rights.  This paper will examine how public officials with Con-
federate sympathies in the postwar South managed to preserve, 
in law and in practice, many of the badges of slavery that had 
ostensibly been eradicated by the Reconstruction Amendments 
and the early Civil Rights Acts; and will do so with specific ref-
erence to racial disparities imposed by the death penalty.2  Under 
our modern legal system, “much has remained consistent in the 
administration of injustice for black ‘defendants’… [since] the 
age of slavery, when blacks had little to nothing in the way of 
legal recourse.”3  Keeping in mind that capital punishment is an 
exercise of power over the powerless,4 this article seeks to trace 
the lineage of this inequality by examining the historical sym-
biosis between the application of the death penalty and the lega-
cies of slavery and apartheid in the United States. 
The analysis of this paper will proceed in three parts.  
First, I will present a historical overview of the institution of 
slavery that will clarify how it entrenches a social caste system 
by reducing the slave to an object of property.  Second, I will 
closely examine the period following the American Civil War to 
demonstrate how a faction of Southern public officials reestab-
lished the domination of whites in the postbellum South by for-
mally acknowledging civil rights for African-Americans while 
simultaneously continuing to subjugate them through both legal 
and quasi-legal channels.  Third, I will analyze how capital pun-
ishment has played a central role in allowing America to retain 
the indelible stain of racial inequality long after the emancipa-
tion of the slaves, purported to fulfill the egalitarian promise 
upon which America was founded. 
 
I. THE LAW OF SLAVERY FROM ROME TO  
ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 
 
SLAVES AS PROPERTY UNDER ROMAN LAW 
 
The institution of slavery reduces human beings to ob-
jects devoid of any protections against incursions upon their life, 
liberty, and dignity.  In order to understand how slaves were 
owned in antebellum America, it is helpful to trace the lineage 
of the legal institution of ownership back to the concept of do-
minium that emerged in the late Republican period of Ancient 
Rome.  Dominium “was the highest, the ultimate form of title to 
property, specifically distinguished from lesser types of property 
interest.”5  Under dominium, “[t]he owner was lord and master 
of his property.”6   
Slavery was widely practiced and deeply imbedded in 
the social order of Rome, and the distinction between slaves and 
free men was one of three constitutional elements of personhood 
under Roman law.7  This distinction had enormous juridical con-
sequences, as “in many ways slaves were regarded as property 
rather than as human beings.”8  As with any other object of 
property falling under the rubric of dominium, they were 
“things”9 without rights10 that “could be acquired, owned and 
disposed of.”11  
 The concept of dominium, with its almost unlimited 
powers for the owner, was a means of keeping the ever-
increasing slave population under control.12  This explains the 
stripping of juridical protection for slaves under dominium,13 
which meant that “a master could do what he liked with his 
slave, over whom he had the power of life and death.”14 
 
THOMAS HOBBES’ INFLUENCE ON ENGLISH THOUGHT  
ON SLAVERY  
 
Roman law was preserved throughout the Middle Ages 
via Justinian’s Digest15 and other ancient documents, and ulti-
mately formed the bedrock of most civil law systems that had 
developed in Continental Europe by the Sixteenth century.  
While the courts of England developed their own distinct brand 
of common law, Roman law was preserved by the English in 
their universities: for centuries, the elite establishments of Ox-
ford and Cambridge taught exclusively Roman law and not com-
mon law.  Against this backdrop, Seventeenth century political 
philosopher Thomas Hobbes published his Leviathan, “...a work 
which more than any other defined the character of modern poli-
tics.”16  According to Hobbes, whose philosophical treatise was 
heavily influenced by classical jurisprudence, prior to the estab-
lishment of civil society, human beings existed in a state of na-
ture.17  In this state, all men enjoyed a common capacity for do-
minion over all things in the world, as well as over one an-
other.18  Although all men were formally equal in this environ-
ment, scarcity of resources and unchecked animalistic impulses 
meant that life was a perpetual war, where every man was en-
emy to every man.19  The resulting quality of life was necessar-
ily “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”20  For these rea-
sons, Hobbes argued that it was imperative for humans to form 
social covenants, in which some men relinquished their natural 
dominion to a higher sovereign in exchange for peace and secu-
rity.21     
Hobbes postulated that these social covenants for estab-
lishing sovereign power of one human over another could be 
created either by acquisition (i.e., force)22 or by institution (i.e., 
consent).23  He described two ways of acquiring power by force:  
(1) by generation, “when a man maketh his children”24; or (2) by 
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conquest, when a man “subdueth his enemies to his will.”25  In 
contrast to sovereign power that is forcefully acquired, Hobbes 
theorized that sovereign authority could also be instituted when 
men freely consent to give a higher authority - i.e. the state - the 
power and responsibility to ensure peace and security.26  The 
most obvious and direct mechanism through which a state pur-
sues this mandate is the criminal law.27  Hobbes was convinced 
that the quality of the sovereignty exercised by these two types 
of “commonwealths”28 was “the very same.”29  
In this sense, a family was akin to a “little 
Monarchy,”30 with the male head of the house-
hold exercising a despotic dominion over his 
underlings (including wives, children, and 
slaves) in the absence of any superseding au-
thority.  The power delegated to the resulting 
state often included the head of the family’s 
right to impose death upon his subjects.31  Once 
sovereign power was authoritatively vested in 
the state, “the sovereign of each [state] hath 
dominion over all that reside therein”,32 includ-
ing the children and slaves of the men who con-
vened the commonwealth, since “no man can 
obey two masters.”33    
Thus, two central themes become clear 
from Hobbes’ oeuvre:  power and inequality.  Hobbes felt no 
qualms over limiting the liberty of some humans so that peace 
and prosperity could prevail for society as a whole.  In his view, 
the sovereign power that some men exercised over others was 
merely a mutation of man’s natural right to self-defense,34 for if 
a man did not subordinate his enemy, there was nothing in the 
state of nature to stop his enemy from killing him.  In this way, 
“[v]iolence, as both a… fact and metaphor, [became] integral to 
the constitution of modern law.”35  Such violence has the direct 
effect of sustaining inequality, since “[l]aw in its determining 
effect cannot be everything.  Obviously, law must choose and 
elevate some modes of existence and suppress or ignore oth-
ers.”36 
 
FROM ANTIQUITY TO AMERICA:  THE ROMAN AND HOBBESIAN 
ROOTS OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 
 
 William Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws 
of England, expanded on the Hobbesian undertones of legal 
domination.37  In one passage, he wrote: 
 
[t]here is nothing which so generally strikes 
the imagination and engages the affections of 
mankind, as the right of property; or that sole 
and despotic dominion which one man claims 
and exercises over the external things of the 
world, in total exclusion of the right of any 
other individual in the universe. 38 
 
This domination was reaffirmed as a distinctly American institu-
tion when James Madison wrote approvingly of “that dominion 
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of 
the world, in exclusion of every other individual.”39   
Premised upon the concept of dominion that emerged 
in Ancient Rome, slavery flourished in America for nearly a 
century after it was abolished in England.40  Together, these 
closely related legal institutions perpetuated a stark disparity in 
the valuation of human life between white Americans and Afri-
can-Americans.41  As Chief Justice Taney of the United States 
Supreme Court infamously stated in the Dred Scott decision, 
blacks were considered “so far inferior, that they had no rights 
which the white man was bound to respect.”42  This dearth of 
rights for slaves was consistent with Hobbes’s idea that the 
dominant class needed to reinforce the normative social order 
against the specter of insubordination.  In keeping with the Hob-
besian premise that sovereign power will only be delegated to a 
higher authority when the 
head of the household is in-
capable of maintaining peace, 
we would expect to see a rise 
in the application of sover-
eign state power in situations 
when the status quo is most 
threatened.  This expectation 
is supported by the observa-
tion that for most of the his-
tory of American slavery, 
“the controlling factor in a 
slave’s life was not the legis-
lation on the books but the 
master’s whim.  Though 
slaves were occasionally 
tried in courts and tribunals, the chattel slavery system gave 
slaveholders almost total control over their ‘property,’ including 
the manner in which slaves were punished.”43  However, as the 
institution of slavery continued to face mounting pressure, both 
from within the United States and a fledgling international 
movement toward its abolition,44 we see a gradual rise in the use 
of the law as a means of buttressing the American social hierar-
chy.  Therefore, although evidence from early colonial times 
shows some instances of equality under the law, laws dealing 
with law-breaking slaves grew more stringent as the slave popu-
lation increased and threats of slave insurrections rose.  These 
‘Slave Codes’ were extreme laws reflecting white supremacy 
and fear, and allowing slaves to be put to death for transgres-
sions ranging from helping a fellow slave escaping to destroying 
property.45 
Further evidence of the correlation between racially 
discriminatory penal practices and slavery is found in the higher 
preponderance of capital punishment in areas where slavery was 
most integral to the local economy.  Thus, we see that from a 
very early point in the colonial period, northern colonies, who 
had never been as reliant on plantation-based agriculture as the 
southern colonies, adopted much more lenient attitudes toward 
capital punishment,46 while “[i]n the South, capital punishment 
had a different history linked, in large part, to slavery.”47  Not 
only was capital punishment more prevalent in the South gener-
ally, but it “was a powerful tool for keeping the slave population 
in submission.”48  This was in part due to the perceived need to 
control them as they were not only a captive workforce, but also 
made up significant portions of the populations of many south-
ern states.”49   
As the above examples demonstrate, “[c]apital punish-
ment during this time… [embodied] an ‘emphatic display of 
power, a reminder of what the state could do to those who broke 
the laws.”50  The most brutal and extreme exhibitions of em-
phatic state power were almost always reserved for the subju-
gated classes, who had the most to gain from a disruption of the 
social status quo and the least to lose should their efforts be 
thwarted.  Therefore, in an attempt to ratchet up the deterrent 
Not only was capital punishment 
more prevalent in the South gener-
ally, but it “was a powerful tool for 
keeping the slave population in sub-
mission.” 
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value of criminal power against potential insurrection, “many 
executions were ‘intensified’ through extreme methods such as 
burning at the stake, dismemberment, dissection, and public 
display of bodies after death;”51 barbarous tactics that were usu-
ally, if not always, reserved for blacks.52  In fact, offences by 
slaves against their masters for crimes of “petit treason”53 were 
often brutally punished in a manner quite similar to those con-
victed of treason against the state.   
    The disparity in the application of capital punishment 
between the northern and southern regions of America continued 
to widen in the decades leading up to the Civil War.   Early 
movements in the 18th century to abolish or restrict the death 
penalty54 “were mostly concentrated in northern states,”55 and 
formed part of a broader movement toward the “rejection of 
other social institutions such as slavery.”56  This trend continued 
well into the Nineteenth century, when “[l]aws in northern states 
were ‘all in the direction of abolition’ from the 1820s through 
the 1850s.”57  At the same time, the abolitionist cause was much 
more attenuated in the South.  “This owed itself partly to the 
institution of slavery, which was firmly in place in the South 
until after the Civil War.”58  Even where modest abolitionist 
trends were observed in the South, the death penalty retained a 
distinctly racial flavor.  “No southern states abolished capital 
punishment completely, but every 
southern state did eliminate it for 
some crimes committed by 
whites.”59  Moreover, “in southern 
states, capital punishment was 
still used for crimes related to 
spreading discontent among free 
black people, insubordination 
among slaves, and even attempted 
rape by a black person against a 
white person.”60   
The disparity between 
northern and southern states is 
also visible in the differing pace 
at which executions ceased to be 
conducted as public spectacles.  
Whereas “from 1830 to 1860, every Northern state… moved its 
public hangings indoors” in response to a concern that public 
executions fostered “occasions for rioting, revelry and rib-
aldry,”61 the abolition of public executions took much longer in 
the South, with the last public execution occurring in 1936 in 
Kentucky.62  Because public executions were believed to engen-
der licentiousness, “[p]erceptions of unruly crowds meant public 
executions were no longer perceived as legitimate exercises of 
state power nor mechanisms to deliver a message of lawful retri-
bution.”63  This posed a much greater problem for southern au-
thorities, who relied more heavily on public executions to serve 
as a manifestation of force and pedagogy of power in order to 
secure their inequitable social hierarchies.64  Thus, it would be 
more difficult for southern authorities to accept that public exe-
cutions had a futile (or worse, a detrimental) effect on public 
order, since the public execution was so integral to the state’s 
“display of the majestic, awesome power of sovereignty.”65     
By the 1860s, it was apparent that the abyss between 
northern and southern states on the issue of slavery had become 
so entrenched that a war was inevitable.  The ultimate “victory” 
of Union forces on the battlefield, however, would prove to be a 
Pyrrhic victory in the struggle for equality. 
 
II. THE WAR THAT DIDN’T END  
 
THE RESISTANCE AGAINST RECONSTRUCTION 
 
The surrender of the Confederate army in the Spring of 
1865 marked the formal end of the American Civil War and 
ushered in the Reconstruction period of American history.  
While it is generally conceded that “[t]he Confederate generals 
surrendered honorably… the spirit of the South was hardly de-
feated.  Slavery was gone, but the idea of states’ rights and 
autonomy survived.”66  The indomitable spirit of the Confeder-
acy was apparent immediately following its surrender to Union 
forces.  In 1865, pending re-admission to the Union, every 
southern state passed a series of “Black Codes” that purported to 
reduce freed slaves to second class citizenship and give whites 
“some of the control of blacks they had during slavery.”67  Such 
thinly-veiled attempts at reintroducing slavery through the ju-
ridical back door were met with swift action after the 1866 fed-
eral election yielded a Congress devoted to the agenda of 
“Radical Reconstruction.” 
Under the doctrine of Radical Reconstruction, the fed-
eral government sought to ensure the adherence of recalcitrant 
southern authorities to the letter and spirit of the Reconstruction 
Amendments, which formally abolished 
slavery and extended voting and other civil 
rights to black freedmen.  In order to en-
sure compliance, Congress passed the Re-
construction Acts of 1867, placing the 
South under federal military control.68  It 
was under the authority of this martial law 
that freed slaves were registered to vote.  
The ensuing elections saw a handful of 
blacks elected to Congress, as well as size-
able black constituencies (and in some 
cases, majorities) elected to state public 
office.69     
As one can imagine, the federal laws 
passed immediately after the Civil War 
“had effected a complete revolution in [American] constitutional 
jurisprudence by transferring from the states to the United States 
[responsibility over] all the fundamental rights of citizens – their 
life, their liberty, and their property.”70  Such a massive change 
from the antebellum power dynamic in the South was met with 
considerable opposition by the recently deposed southern white 
establishment, who resented this complete rewriting of the 
“racial contract” upon which America had been founded.71  Such 
resentment was exacerbated by the perceived “fervor with which 
Reconstruction Republicans set about the legislative remodel-
ing” through legislative instruments “drawn in sweeping lan-
guage appropriate to the federal government’s new-found sense 
of power.”72    
 
THE NEW DEPARTURE:  THE TROJAN HORSE OF RACE RELA-
TIONS IN AMERICA 
 
The short-term effectiveness of Radical Reconstruction 
in ensuring the right to vote and civil rights for blacks was a 
humiliating blow to the supremacy of the white southern estab-
lishment after the Civil War.  Having recently faced military 
defeat through both the loss of the Civil War and the failure to 
resist the presence of federal troops during Radical Reconstruc-
tion, any hope for resurrecting a semblance of antebellum domi-
In 1865, pending re-admission to the 
Union, every southern state passed a 
series of “Black Codes” that pur-
ported to reduce freed slaves to sec-
ond class citizenship and give whites 
“some of the control of blacks they 
had during slavery.” 
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nation required the adoption of a radical new strategy against 
an overbearing, even suffocating, federal presence.  This arti-
cle suggests that, at this point in American history, southern 
jurists adopted a strategy of apparent acceptance of the Recon-
struction agenda that actually allowed many badges of slavery 
to persist in relatively undiluted form.   
Southern authorities appear to have modeled their 
approach to restoring the antebellum status quo on a Roman 
precedent.  In the Aeneid, famed Roman poet Virgil recounts 
the legendary story of how Rome was founded.  One episode 
from this epic has since gained almost universal recognition 
in Western society:  the “Trojan Horse” used by the Greeks 
during their long siege upon the city of Troy.  The Greek 
army, whose “strength [was] broken in warfare” after many 
years of futile hostilities,73 offered the colossal wooden horse 
as a gift.  The Trojans accepted the horse as a token of peace 
and surrender, and brought it within their city’s walls.74  Later 
that night, as the Trojans slept, the horse “opened wide” and 
“emitted men,”75 who stole into the darkened city, “[l]et in 
their fellow soldiers at the gate, [a]nd joined their combat 
companies as planned.”76  This parable is instructive in under-
standing how the southern authorities regained the upper hand 
in the ongoing war for political supremacy in the postbellum 
South.      
As the Greeks realized in the Aeneid, the Southern 
establishment understood that they did not have sufficient 
military prowess to achieve their objectives through all-out 
war.  Thus, a new, less belligerent approach was needed to 
continue the struggle for “states’ rights.”  This strategy was 
first employed by a faction of southern Democrats known as 
“Redeemers,” whose primary political objective was the re-
turn of political sovereignty to the southern states through 
cooperation with and concession to the federal government 
and the North.77  The Redeemers gradually gained control of 
the party agenda through the implementation of a “New De-
parture” tactic, whereby the emphasis of political dialogue 
was shifted away from suffrage and civil rights to economic 
and other less controversial matters. The movement became 
so successful that within four years, all Democrats and most 
northern Republicans agreed that Confederate nationalism and 
slavery were dead and further federal military interference 
was unnecessary.78  By 1870, the Democratic–Conservative 
leadership across the South decided it had to end its opposi-
tion to Reconstruction as well as to black suffrage in order to 
survive and move on to new issues.79   
Like the Trojans, whose readiness to accept the 
Horse was likely prompted by a  desire to end a seemingly 
endless war with little prospect of victory in sight, the  will-
ingness of southern Democrats to suddenly surrender on such 
a major bone of political contention was welcomed by a belea-
guered Republican party yearning to turn the page on this 
chapter of American political history.80  The South’s willing-
ness to accept the new constitutional reality convinced the 
Republicans to adopt a let-alone policy toward the South.81  
The goal of the New Departure was ultimately achieved in the 
Compromise of 1877, whereby The South agreed to accept the 
hotly-disputed victory of Republican presidential candidate 
Rutherford Hayes in the election one year earlier, if he agreed 
to withdraw the last of the federal troops from their states.82  
At that point, all sides agreed that Reconstruction was fin-
ished.83  
 
Hobbes wrote, “war consists not in battle only, or the 
act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the will to con-
tend by battle is sufficiently known.”84  With those words in 
mind we understand how, in the course of Reconstruction, a 
hotly contested Civil War morphed into a cold war fought 
along political and juridical fronts.  With the perfection of the 
New Departure in 1877, it became clear that the courts were 
the new battlefield.85  Future grievances between the North 
and the South would be governed by the rule of law and the 
requirements of due process.  What remained to be seen was 
the extent to which the Supreme Court and Congress would go 
to eliminate the social implications of slavery and racial dis-
crimination.86  As African-Americans would soon learn, nei-
ther would go very far.  
The Supreme Court set the tone when it released a 
series of decisions that gradually overturned much of the Re-
construction civil rights legislation.  Beginning with the Civil 
Rights Cases87 of 1883, it held that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment only gave Congress the power to outlaw public, not pri-
vate, discrimination.88  The Court reinforced this ruling with 
Plessy v. Ferguson89 in 1896, announcing that state-mandated 
segregation was legal as long as the law provided for 
“separate but equal” facilities.  As a result, “[t]he strict limita-
tion of the postbellum amendments to state action expresse[d] 
the view called ‘states’ rights’ – the very position that the 
South fought for in the Civil War, which had ostensibly been 
repudiated not only by the war but also by the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as the civil 
rights acts of 1866 and of 1875.”90 
This laissez-faire line of Supreme Court jurispru-
dence permitted state courts to follow suit.  They enforced a 
wide range of postwar “Jim Crow Laws” that transformed the 
South into a virtual apartheid state, where African-Americans 
became second-class citizens continuing to bear many badges 
of the slavery from which they had supposedly been emanci-
pated.  While varying widely in their disregard of the Recon-
struction Amendments,91 what these laws had in common was 
“[t]hrough these means, the neutrality of the liberal state was 
formally upheld, as demanded by the social contract, without 
in any significant way challenging the racial polity.”92  Indeed, 
so striking was the ability of southern authorities to retain the 
essence of slavery through their juridical institutions, that “[i]f 
you look at the subsequent history of the United States, there 
is some truth in the paradoxical statement that the Confeder-
acy was born when Lee handed Grant his sword.”93   
 
III. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT’S ROLE IN  
EXTENDING THE BADGES OF SLAVERY  
 
LYNCHING AS A CONTINUATION OF WHITE DOMINION 
 
The central premise for the Compromise of 1877 was 
the understanding that Southern lawmakers would formally 
adhere to the aims of Reconstruction.  Thus, the art of the 
New Departure and its Jim Crow Laws was in how they 
spawned an entire movement allowing sovereignty over the 
South to be wrested from the federal government and returned 
to local white hands without appearing to violate the postbel-
lum Constitution.  Once this repatriation of sovereign control 
was complete, the subjugation of blacks resumed with zeal 
and was hindered only by a need to outwardly conform to due 
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process.  One stark example of this phenomenon was the prolif-
eration of lynching that occurred at the hands of local mobs.  
While it is generally conceded that the practice of lynching far 
predates the Civil War,94 it has also been observed that prior to 
that conflict “only rarely were the punishments imposed under 
what had come to be known as ‘Lynch’s Law’ specifically capi-
tal,”95 and it was only after Reconstruction that “the term 
‘lynching’ c[a]me to acquire its contemporary connotations,…
the targeting of African-Americans, and, more specifically, Afri-
can-American men, chiefly in the South, and the absence of the 
due process of law.”96   
       That the widespread lynching of blacks began its ascent 
following the New Departure is no coincidence.  Rather, this 
trend served as a useful “means of reaffirming an endangered 
form of white… identity… [and] a lethal means of regenerating 
the racial contract once the racial polity could no longer be se-
cured through the institution of chattel slavery.”97  “Lynchings 
were characterized by their celebratory and public nature, their 
brutal method of killing, their disregard for any semblance of 
due process for the accused, and an absence of punishment for 
the killers.”98  By restoring the antebellum dichotomy between 
racial classes99 and affirming life-or-death sovereignty of white 
males over blacks, “lynching provided a de facto extralegal res-
toration of the antebellum Black Codes.”100 
In order for the application of lynch law to survive the 
scrutiny of the Supreme Court, it was imperative that lynching 
cloak itself in the Court’s language condoning “private” dis-
crimination.  Southern law enforcement claimed that the state 
did not perpetuate the violence.  This fiction was enough to 
shield lynching from the scrutiny of the federal courts, since 
they had no jurisdiction to intervene on the mere grounds that 
state police and prosecutors were failing to solve crimes.  For 
these reasons, “conventional definitions of lynching [typically]
…draw a sharp line of demarcation between violence inflicted in 
the name of the law and that which stands 
outside or in violation of the law.”101  
Nonetheless, a brief peek under the hood 
of this ruse reveals the reality of state par-
ticipation in these supposedly “private” 
acts.  “[A]s the very phrase ‘lynch law’ 
implies… the mutually exclusive opposi-
tion between the legal and the illegal fails 
to appreciate how unstable and often irrele-
vant was the liberal formulation of the dis-
tinction between the official and unofficial, 
public and private, in the conduct of lynch-
ing.”102  The complicity of southern public 
officials in lynchings was entrenched by 
the refusal of southern senators in the 
United States Congress to endorse an anti-
lynching bill that would allow federal law enforcement officials 
to investigate and prosecute lynchings when local authorities 
failed to intervene.103  Although no less than seven presidents 
had requested such a law from Congress, and the House of Rep-
resentatives had passed an anti-lynching bill four times, “the 
Senate’s powerful southern senators used the filibuster to ensure 
that the bill never got a vote.”104  Once again, we see the modus 
operandi of the New Departure at work; southern lawmakers 
could invoke the democratic principle of legislative due process 
to perpetuate a racist legacy passed down from the antebellum 
era.   
 
Recent scholarship has challenged the conventional 
depiction of lynch law:  
 
[M]any lynchings should be classi-
fied not as irrational deeds perpetrated by 
mobs of private persons, acting without legal 
authority but, rather, as ritualized enactments 
that drew their authority from the unwritten 
racial contract of the white community and 
that patterned their proceedings, to a greater or 
lesser extent, on the very judicial procedures 
they are characteristically said to flout.105   
 
This argument maintains that the 
public spectacle lynchings of African-
Americans by whites in the post-
Reconstruction era “should be located not in 
the domain of the illegal or the extralegal but, 
rather, near the heart of a more comprehensive 
structure of racial control, one that vested in-
formal police powers in members of the white 
race and that encouraged vigilantism as a nec-
essary complement to its weak agencies of 
formally authorized political discipline.”106    
 
THE DEATH PENALTY AS A “LEGAL LYNCHING” 
 
While it is true that no region in America has displayed 
a historical monopoly over capital punishment, it is also true that 
“[d]eath penalty practice in America is highly regionalized.”107  
The plain fact of the matter is that “[m]ost modern executions 
occur in the South,”108 where “the death penalty is as firmly en-
trenched as grits for breakfast.”109  This pronounced regional 
disparity means that it is impossible to speak of an American 
pattern or single national profile 
regarding capital punishment.110  
This regionalization shares a close 
historical affinity with the institu-
tion of slavery, and its dispropor-
tionate application against blacks 
in the modern era is a vestige of 
the dominion historically enjoyed 
by the white elite establishment 
over blacks.   
A historical examination of capi-
tal punishment in America reveals 
its provocative correlation with 
lynching.111   The incidence of 
racially-motivated lynchings, 
which rose to prominence after 
Reconstruction, declined steadily from a peak in the 1890s and 
disappeared (or at least went into hiding)112 by the 1940s-
1950s.113  Despite this apparent success at eradicating racial vio-
lence, however, a judicial analogue had been created in its place.  
“With these ‘legal lynchings,’ whites deferred to the courts but 
remained ready to return to mob justice if the results were not 
favorable to them.”114  In this way, institutionalized racial vio-
lence against African-Americans was able to persist to a great 
degree.115  For example, over half (54%) of citizens executed 
between 1930 and 1967 were African-American,116 despite 
never comprising more than 11% of the American population 
during that time,117 and three out of five executions during that 
The plain fact of the matter is that 
“[m]ost modern executions occur in 
the South,”108 where “the death pen-
alty is as firmly entrenched as grits 
for breakfast.” 
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time took place in the southern states,118 where 90% of those 
executed for rape, 100% of those executed for burglary, and 
83% executed for armed robbery, were black.119   Throughout 
that period, blacks never consisted of more than 25% of the 
population of the South.120 
This statistical trend is faithful to the Redeemers’ strat-
egy of weaving antebellum attitudes into the fabric of democ-
ratic institutions.  Because legislatures and courts were enacting 
and applying facially neutral laws, the law provided a gloss of 
“stability and regularity”121 that was absent in the context of 
mob lynchings.  The genius of these legal lynchings was in how 
they co-opted the Constitution itself -specifically, the division of 
powers doctrine, as the pursuit of criminal prosecutions has his-
torically been understood as a matter of local concern- to shelter 
a racist institution.122  Under the pretense of due process,123 a 
legal apparatus was created that would “use force against its 
citizens without itself appearing like a criminal.”124  Much like 
the Greeks who attacked the city of Troy under cover of night-
fall, these complicit agents worked “in a state of relative invisi-
bility,”125 fostered by an “epistemology of ignorance”126 that 
deflected accusations of bias by pointing an exculpatory finger 
toward the incontrovertibly race-neutral language of the black-
letter law.127  As an end result, “[m]ore graphic forms of racial 
violence, such as spectacle lynching, became less imperative 
once white dominance was assured by less transparent but more 
calculable means,”128 and with the passage of time the Confeder-
acy’s most enduring weapon in perpetuating the subordination 
of blacks as “subpersons”129 has proven not to be the musket or 
the noose, but the gavel.130  
The ability of the state to impose the death penalty 
completes this paradigm.  “Along with the right to make war, the 
death penalty is the ultimate measure of sovereignty and the 
ultimate test of political power.”131  Thus, “[w]ith the end of 
slavery… [t]he belief that capital punishment was necessary to 
restrain a primitive black population became an article of faith 
among white southerners lasting well into the twentieth cen-
tury.”132  Because the death penalty treats “members of the hu-
man race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and dis-
carded,”133 it is the ultimate manifestation of the ability of the 
state “to do anything it pleases with life,”134 a direct Hobbesian 
descendant “of the personal power of kings.”135   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this analysis is not to illustrate that the 
American system of capital punishment system is tainted by 
race.  Rather, by tracing the link between the current practice of 
capital punishment and the classical doctrine of dominion, it 
attempts to expose how the imposition of state-sanctioned death 
in contemporary America is marred by the indelible stain of 
slavery.  Having been stealthily carried into modern jurispru-
dence via the Trojan Horse of the New Departure, the Hobbesian 
paradigm of a master wielding life-or-death dominion over his 
chattel remains a live concept in the American criminal justice 
system today, particularly in the South.  Through its racially 
selective administration, the modern application of the death 
penalty represents one of the most enduring fronts in the strug-
gle for legal equality, a vestige of a Civil War that purportedly 
ended nearly a century and a half ago. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Despite the fact that law schools are admitting men and 
women in relatively equal numbers, they are failing to ade-
quately prepare women for success.1  Not only do women report 
feeling marginalized in law school classrooms, but also they 
statistically under-perform men.2 Additionally, men continue to 
dominate the upper levels of the legal profession.3  Recently 
though, it has also become clear that men experience law school 
negatively.4  Just like women, men are not being taught all the 
skills they need to be effective attorneys.5 
Over the course of contemporary women’s legal his-
tory, different feminist scholars have attempted to identify solu-
tions to gender inequities in law school.6 Many feminist legal 
scholars have hypothesized that the adversarial nature of law 
school is inherently discriminatory against women because it 
rewards masculine behavior.7  They argue that the Socratic 
method, the hierarchical nature of law school journals, the fierce 
competition for clerkships and externships, and mock/moot 
court competitions all reward such behavior.  These feminist 
scholars, therefore, propose a reinvention of law school peda-
gogy that would reward feminine behavior. They also propose to 
insert feminist perspectives into the curriculum.8 This essay ar-
gues that while this approach could benefit women and men, it 
may perpetuate gender inequity by stereotyping a highly diverse 
group of women.9   
In Part II, I will provide a background on the concept of 
gender inequity and negative experiences in law school. Then, I 
will also sketch the different feminist approaches to address gen-
der inequity in law school.10 In Part III, I will identify the gaps 
in such feminist scholarship. I will also argue that feminists 
should shift their critique to how law schools are failing to pro-
vide both women and men with all the skills they need to be 
effective attorneys.11 Finally, in Part IV, I will suggest that law 
schools would lessen gender inequity if they commit to produc-
ing lawyers who are capable of meeting diverse professional 
demands.12  
 
BACKGROUND 
 
GENDER INEQUITY AND NEGATIVE LAW SCHOOL  
EXPERIENCES 
 
The scholarship devoted to examining the marginaliza-
tion of law students on the basis of gender has risen with the 
increase of women entering law school.13 By conducting empiri-
cal studies through the lens of feminist theory, scholars have 
identified significant gender inequities in law school that nega-
tively impact students’ experiences.14 Generally, in law school 
women under-perform men in terms of grades.15 They are also 
unrepresented on grade-based law journals.16 Specifically, stud-
ies show that women participate less than men do in the class-
room.17 Women are discouraged from participating partly be-
cause the majority of first year professors are males.18  Women 
also report higher levels of anxiety, stress, and depression in law 
school than men do.19 Studies indicate that, after their first year 
of law school, women are less confident in their ability to be-
come successful lawyers.20 Some women attribute their lower 
rates of classroom participation, feelings of anxiety, and lack of 
confidence in part to the Socratic method and competitive class-
room environment.21 They also attribute these feelings to the 
limited professor feedback in classes culminating in a “one-
shot,” end of the year exam.22  
 
FEMINIST APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING GENDER INEQUITY  
 
Feminist scholars have attempted to devise a variety of 
solutions in response to finding that women under-perform men 
and experience law school negatively.  
 
    INSERTING WOMEN AND WOMEN’S ISSUES INTO LAW 
SCHOOL 
 
Some scholars suggest that a basis for reforming legal 
education should be inserting gender and feminist perspectives 
into first year classes, such as torts and contract law.23 This ap-
proach would insert into the curriculum the legal accomplish-
ments and contributions of women.24 This approach would also 
recast classes on feminism and the law as essential.25 These 
scholars argue that integrating women’s issues into the law 
could help female students feel less alienated from law school.26 
Not only would women participate more in the classroom, but 
male students would also learn about pervasive gender attitudes 
in the legal field.27  
To achieve equality for women in law school, this ap-
proach would also increase both, the sheer number of female law 
professors as well as the number of female professors in posi-
tions of seniority.28 In order to achieve equality for women in 
law school, scholars argue that female faculty members are es-
sential as role models because they bring greater diversity in 
pedagogy and perspectives to the classroom.29 Scholars also 
assert that having female role models would increase the com-
fort level of women in the classroom and female students’ self-
esteem would rise by seeing successful women in the profes-
sion.30 This higher level of confidence could translate into 
higher grades and improved overall performance rates for 
women in law school.31 
 
ADOPTING “WOMEN-FRIENDLY” TEACHING METHODS 
 
Some scholars suggest going beyond introducing more 
women and women’s issues into law school. They advocate re-
structuring the current adversarial law school model by using 
more feminized teaching methods 32 to make it friendlier to 
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women.33 Specifically, these scholars recommend making law 
school a more “nurturing environment”. They suggest eliminat-
ing or tempering the Socratic method, encouraging small-group 
discussions and smaller class sizes. They also suggest increasing 
professor feedback. Professors would be encouraged to establish 
a good rapport with students.34 As a result, women would be less 
anxious and be more likely to participate in a “comfortable 
classroom” environment where professors provide positive rein-
forcement and create a sense of community.35  
Scholars that advocate making law school friendlier to 
women also suggest importing aspects of feminist pedagogy into 
the classroom.36 This would include encouraging more collabo-
rative and cooperative styles of teaching and learning to de-
crease adversariness.37 Using more feminist teaching methods 
could empower women to assert themselves in the classroom 
and later, in the professional world.38  
 
“HUMANIZING” LAW SCHOOL 
 
Instead of changing law school to accommodate 
women’s different learning style, some scholars argue that hu-
manizing law school eliminates gender inequity without stereo-
typing women.39 Humanizing law school means fostering an 
ethic of care in the classroom. This would include providing 
positive reinforcement to students and demonstrating respect for 
students’ opinions and ideas.40 For instance, professors would 
encourage cooperation in class by asking students to assist their 
colleagues or “co-counsel” when a student gets nervous and 
then, return to the student after she or he has regained compo-
sure.41 
Demystifying the learning process is another hallmark 
of the humanizing approach.42 Instead of eliminating the So-
cratic method, professors should explain the purpose for using 
it.43 Explaining to students that the Socratic method is more of a 
dialogue rather than their only opportunity to demonstrate that 
they can “think like a lawyer,” could relieve anxiety in the class-
room.44 When professors explain to students that the Socratic 
method is meant to generate discussion rather than a single 
“correct” answer,, law schools would reward women’s ability to 
think with a multiple consciousness, or a greater variety of per-
spectives.45 
 
SETTING ASIDE THE ASSUMPTION OF GENDER  
DIFFERENCE 
 
Arguing from a very different viewpoint, some scholars 
advocate setting aside gender differences as something occurring 
prior to women’s marginalization in law school.46 Instead of 
looking at gender as the problem, feminists should examine the 
concept of gender as the consequence of the power structure of 
law school.47 In other words, “gender” is nothing more than a 
construct perpetuated by male-dominated law schools to keep 
women from advancing with the same rates of success.48  
Addressing gender inequity in law school then becomes 
a question of examining operations of power rather than general-
izing about women’s perspectives.49  Law schools should change 
their focus from attempting to make law school a more 
“feminine” place to increasing the political representation of 
feminist ideas.”50 This approach contends that by imbuing the 
content of legal education with feminist politics, not femininity, 
women’s law school experiences would improve.51 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
GAPS AND PROBLEMS IN CURRENT FEMINIST SCHOLARSHIP 
 
“STIRRING IN” WOMEN AND FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 
 
 Feminist perspectives should be included in the law 
school curriculum. However, introducing separate “women’s 
issues” in basic classes may exacerbate the notion that these are 
“outsider” interests or “asides to the more important objective 
business that is the true subject of the class.”52 Moreover, ad-
dressing women’s issues in separate courses may perpetuate the 
notion that women’s interests are personal having limited rele-
vance to the law generally.53 Merely introducing feminist per-
spectives as asides also fails to address the current law school 
methods and institutions that perpetuate gender inequity.54  
Similarly, merely increasing the number of women on 
law school faculty will not automatically alleviate gender ineq-
uity in the classroom.55 Female professors who heavily utilize 
the Socratic method also intimidate women students.56  In fact, 
seeing women “do law like men” can only heighten feelings of 
inadequacy for female law students.57  Therefore, inserting more 
women onto law school faculty without also restructuring the 
pedagogy may only perpetuate gender inequity.58 
 
SEX-STEREOTYPING GENDER NORMS 
 
Attempting to humanize law school or make it more 
women-friendly based on stereotypically feminine characteris-
tics, necessitates defining what is feminine because it does not 
escape essentializing both men and women.59 Restructuring law 
school based on sex-stereotypes of masculinity and femininity 
excludes from the discourse women that are “unfeminine” and 
men that are more “feminine.”60 The humanizing approach pur-
ports to circumvent sex-stereotyping. However, it still seeks to 
accommodate stereotypical feminine traits such as thinking with 
multiple consciousnesses.61 The Socratic method does not dis-
serve all women, just as it does not benefit all men.62 Envision-
ing femininities and masculinities as homogeneous norms only 
serves to sex-stereotype a highly diverse student body. Sex-
stereotyping marginalizes differences with regard to race, class, 
and sexual orientation.63  
 
LOWERING EXPECTATIONS FOR WOMEN 
 
Feminist rhetoric advocating that law schools should 
become more women-friendly exacerbates gender inequity and 
lowers the expectations for women in law school. This rhetoric 
encourages the notion that women cannot succeed in law school 
unless it “softens up.”64 Advocating the need to make law school 
more “nurturing” or “women friendly” as essential for women’s 
success perpetuates female law students’ feelings of inadequacy 
in the legal profession.65 This rhetoric does not address the law 
schools’ failure to meet demands on lawyers. Instead, it can 
wrongfully lead to the conclusion that restructuring law school 
to accommodate women comes at the expense of professional 
training for all students.66 Instead of addressing the way in 
which gender inequity in law school is inextricably linked to the 
failure of law schools to adequately depict the range of demands 
on lawyers, the women friendly approach lowers the expecta-
tions for women in law school.67 
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MEN ALSO EXPERIENCE LAW SCHOOL NEGATIVELY 
 
Feminist legal scholarship largely ignores the negative 
impact that the adversarial law school model also has on men.68 
Studies on gender inequity in law school show that men experi-
ence law school negatively as well.69 Although 41% of females 
reported a loss of confidence in law school, 16.5% of men did 
too.70 While 16.5% is a significant percentage, the number of 
men that experience a loss in self-esteem may be even higher 
since men are less likely to report or seek help for feelings of 
distress.71 Another study indicated that while one in two female 
law students reported feeling less intelligent in law school, so 
did almost one in three male students.72 The law school model, 
therefore, is harming men as well as women.73  This is particu-
larly true for men who represent a minority or less-traditional 
male perspectives. By not stressing the fact that legal education 
is failing everyone, feminists risk giving the impression that 
reform should occur purely to accommodate women.74  
 
SHIFT IN FOCUS 
 
Feminist legal scholars should re-focus their critique of 
law school to address the practical failings of the adversarial 
model, which negatively impacts women and men as students 
and professionals. By couching recommendations for reform of 
law schools purely in terms of gender, feminists are not effec-
tively identifying the gross failings of legal education. Address-
ing the failure of law schools to adequately prepare women and 
men to meet the range of demands on lawyers could push law 
schools to make real changes without exacerbating gender ineq-
uity.75  
 
THE CURRENT LAW SCHOOL MODEL DOES NOT ADE-
QUATELY DEPICT THE RANGE OF DEMANDS ON LAWYERS 
 
Law school currently overemphasizes certain skills and 
underemphasizes others, failing to prepare women and men for a 
diverse professional world.76 Currently emphasized skills in-
clude adversarial competition, aggressiveness, abstract doctrinal 
analysis, quickness, and performance.77 Underemphasized skills 
include collaboration, counseling, mediation, lawyer-client rela-
tionships, problem solving, and facilitating transactions.78 The 
former model, primarily based on litigation and doctrinal analy-
sis, only applies to a small fraction of real-world practice.79 
Many lawyers do not litigate, go to court, or even work in large 
firms.80 Additionally, “for those employed as in-house counsel 
or are engaged in transactional lawyering, negotiation contrasts 
starkly to the classic notion propagated by the Socratic method 
of advocating one side before an appellate court.”81  
Instead, the legal profession increasingly values col-
laboration, group problem-solving, role flexibility, and proffer-
ing question as well as criticisms.82 The American Bar Associa-
tion has identified problem-solving, comprised of generating 
alternative strategies and keeping the planning process open to 
new ideas, to be a fundamental lawyering skill.83 Therefore, 
learning collaborative skills is essential for students as lawyers 
and firms expand the kinds of services they provide to meet their 
clients’ diverse needs.84  
 
 
 
 
PRACTICAL CHANGES 
 
Law schools committed to producing lawyers that are 
more capable of meeting diverse professional demands should 
recast academic priorities. Recasting these priorities would si-
multaneously lessen gender inequity.85 Combining more col-
laborative teaching styles with current law school pedagogy 
would alter both the academic structure and educational sub-
stance of law school in a way that would benefit women and 
men.86  
In terms of academic structure, law schools should rely 
far less on large lectures or Socratic questioning. Law schools 
should, instead, add more emphasis to clinical programs and 
experiential learning.87 With more emphasis on hands-on 
lawyering skills and less on abstract and authoritarian inter-
change between students and professors, law schools should 
give students more of an inside look at what it takes to be a pro-
fessional instead of “hiding the ball.”88 
Law schools should also increase small group discus-
sion sections in basic courses. Small group discussion would 
help students develop collaborative skills necessary for real 
world practice. By developing collaborative skills, small group 
discussions would simultaneously break down competitiveness 
in the classroom.89 In addition, unlike an end of the year, one-
shot exam, more exercises and class simulations would give 
students increased feedback on a regular basis. Using diverse 
teaching methods such as small group discussions, therefore, 
would increase possibilities for students with different learning 
styles and more accurately reflect the demands on lawyers in 
practice.90 
In terms of educational substance, more focus should 
be on the contextual application of the law rather than on ab-
stract doctrinal analysis.91 Topics such as race, gender, class, 
ethnicity, and sexual orientation should become more central to 
the discussion of legal institutions and lawyer-client relation-
ships.92 Instead of the occasional insertion of gender and race 
into the curriculum,93 these issues should become an integral 
part of the core curriculum.94 Analysis that uses dimensions such 
as gender to socially contextualize cases would move beyond the 
“add women and stir” approach.95 Moreover, emphasis on inter-
personal skills and diversity would more adequately equip stu-
dents to deal with clients and colleagues. Students would move 
away from the false notion that lawyering is always about adver-
sariness.96  Focusing on the contextual application of the law, 
therefore, will address the current professional failings of law-
yers to understand and better represent a diverse client body.97 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Since the 1980’s, more women have been admitted into 
law schools. However, ever since then, feminist legal scholars 
have identified more subtle forms of gender inequity in law 
school.98 Many feminists argue that the source of inequity is the 
inherently masculine law school model. This model, they argue, 
rewards male behavior and penalizes women in terms of per-
formance and experience.99 Similarly, scholars have proposed 
solutions to the disparate law school experiences in terms of 
gender without problematizing femininities or masculinities.100 
However, these solutions rest on stereotypical definitions of 
what is “male” and “female.” Stereotypical definitions only risk 
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T he Washington College of Law and the Women’s Bar Association of the District of Columbia share an im-portant historical connection; Ellen Spencer Mussey and Emma Gillett founded both institutions together, 
in 1898 and 1917, respectively.  Mussey and Gillett were pio-
neers in legal education, legal reform, and the development of 
women lawyers.2  More significant than the work they per-
formed during their lives, however, is the legacy of activism, 
reform, and support that they ignited by founding two institu-
tions that advance women in the law.  These institutions have 
trained and supported generations of women lawyers through 
world wars and depressions, through the abeyance and resur-
gence of the women’s movement and the ensuing backlash, and 
through the dramatic changes in the legal profession and legal 
education that accompanied these events.   We celebrate and 
explore their legacy in this essay. 
Sensing the importance 
of their work, the Women’s 
Bar Association of the Dis-
trict of Columbia (“WBA”) 
and the Washington College 
of Law (“WCL”)3 preserved 
their institutional histories.  
Yet, preserving these docu-
ments in a cardboard box or 
back room rendered them – 
and with them the unique 
relevance of both institutions – isolated and known by only a 
few.  This issue of The Modern American commemorates the 
“Shared History” project to preserve these archived documents, 
to house these physical documents in the WCL library, and to 
display them to the public in hard and digitized format, an effort 
that has both symbolic as well as practical significance. 
The WBA’s historical materials include correspondence, 
board minutes, newsletters, and photos compiled in informal 
scrapbooks and formal archive files (collectively, the “WBA 
Archives”).4  The WBA Archives tell the story of the WBA’s 
historic efforts to secure property rights for women, to champion 
the Equal Rights Amendment, to fight discrimination, to achieve 
fair pay, to support women lawyers, and to catapult women into 
public leadership positions – a virtual rendition of women’s le-
gal history from the perspective of one organization.  WCL has 
its own archives, containing documents, yearbooks, graduation 
announcements, and advertisements (collectively the “WCL 
Archives”).  The WCL Archives tell the story of a fledgling 
feminist institution that struggled for legitimacy, achieved the 
stature of a respected (albeit much less feminist) law school, and 
later rediscovered both its feminist and internationalist roots. 
The archived documents revealed several strong themes that 
we explore in this essay.  First, historians divide the broader 
feminist movement into a first and a second wave with a period 
of abeyance in between.  We noted that the work of women law-
yers associated with the WBA continued unabated even when 
the women’s movement was not generally active, indicating that 
the WBA played a part in keeping the women’s movement alive 
during its darkest days.  Second, the legacy that Mussey and 
Gillett began when they founded WCL and the WBA was a col-
laborative one, a feminist legal method that has great lessons for 
our work today.  Third, while women lawyers have made dra-
matic strides in a century – graduating from law schools at over 
fifty percent today and breaking into careers 
in the public, private, and non-profit sectors,5 
the institutions that support women lawyers 
nonetheless exist under objectives virtually 
identical to the ones that Mussey and Gillett 
espoused ninety years ago.  This tells us that 
Mussey and Gillett, and the law teachers, 
students and lawyers who joined them, hit 
upon something critical: a need for women 
lawyers to work together not only as lawyers, 
but as women. 
We begin in Section I by placing the origins and missions of 
the WBA and WCL in historical context.  Mussey and Gillett 
articulated three core pillars in the founding documents of the 
WBA: (1) the administration of justice; (2) the advancement of 
women attorneys; (3) and the social and professional support for 
its members.  In Section II, we use these three pillars as the 
framework for a historical analysis of the activities of these in-
stitutions, focusing on the WBA.6  Section III looks at the road 
ahead for women lawyers.  It considers how we can use the leg-
acy left by Mussey and Gillett to inspire a methodical, strategic, 
focused, collaborative, and inclusive response to today’s chal-
lenges, such as advancing women to the highest ranks of the 
profession and creating a meaningful inclusion for all women in 
legal education and practice.  We hope that the WCL and WBA 
Archives will ignite the dialogue necessary to achieve meaning-
ful change and inspire the ongoing success of women in the law. 
 
BANDING TOGETHER:   
REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE WOMEN’S BAR ASSOCIATION OF 
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND THE WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW 
IN PROMOTING WOMEN’S RIGHTS  
By  
Jamie Rene Abrams and Daniela Kraiem* 
 
“Providing such a legal education 
for women as will enable them to 
practice the legal profession” 
—Article of Incorporation, Wash-
ington College of Law (1898).1 
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ORIGINAL MISSIONS 
 
Buried in the archives at WCL is its Article of Incorporation 
dated 1898.  Its plainly worded statement of purpose belies a 
number of radical ideas.  Mussey and Gillett founded the co-
educational Washington College of Law to educate women for 
the practice of law at a time when the very notion of formal legal 
education was new.  Most lawyers at that time received training 
through an apprenticeship, which had the effect of excluding 
many women, immigrants, and members of minority groups.7  It 
was almost unheard of for women to study law.  Indeed, four out 
of the five law schools in Washington, D.C. would not admit 
women.8  And women generally could not find apprenticeships 
unless they practiced in a family law firm.9 
To contextualize the formal legal education of women in 
1898, female lawyers could argue in court, but were not permit-
ted to serve on a jury in the District of Columbia.10  Although 
trained in the same constitutional and common law as their male 
colleagues, women could not vote.11  The federal government 
employed a number of female attorneys, but it was not until 
1896 that women in the District of Columbia could hold prop-
erty in their own names after marriage.12 
Yet, both Mussey and Gillett had successful law practices in 
Washington D.C. when they founded WCL.  Mussey trained and 
practiced with her husband, and kept his international law and 
business practice for almost forty years after his death.13  Gillett 
apprenticed under Belva Lockwood,14 the first woman to prac-
tice in front of the United States Supreme Court.15  Gillett later 
graduated from Howard University Law School, the only institu-
tion in Washington D.C. that trained women at that time.16  She 
practiced in a variety of fields, focusing mainly on what she 
called “office work,” now termed transactional work.17 
Mussey and Gillett incorporated lessons from their personal 
and professional experiences into the law school structure.  
From the outset, the school took the lived reality of its female 
students into account.  The founders set the cost of tuition as low 
as possible to enable women, who often had little income, to 
attend.  They raised funds for scholarships for low-income stu-
dents.18  They offered night classes to accommodate working 
women.19  They even allowed one student to enroll under a 
pseudonym because she feared her family would ostracize her 
for studying law.20  Significantly, WCL’s early yearbooks and 
newsletters show how Mussey and Gillett created an environ-
ment where women could study and teach law without being 
isolated. 
The WCL Archives illuminate the trailblazing accomplish-
ments of the law school’s early years.  Mussey served as the first 
female dean of a law school,21 Gillett the second.22  The school 
graduated six women in the inaugural class of 1899; by the 
1920s it averaged approximately fifteen female students in its 
graduating classes.  Several female students and faculty mem-
bers wrote the first law textbooks authored by women.23  Early 
graduates went on to become some of the first female customs 
agents (which was fairly scandalous because it involved inspect-
ing ships at sea,) government attorneys, and even judges.24  The 
school also trained women from abroad.  Some of the first 
women to study law from countries such as Mexico, Sweden, 
and Uruguay, were graduates of WCL.25 
While Mussey and Gillett were pioneers of the formal law 
school, a new form of entry into the legal profession, the school 
was standard in many other ways.  Beyond the radical fact of the 
school’s existence, and Dean Gillett’s “caustic comments on 
dower and some of the other provisions of the common law 
whereby women were ‘protected,’”26 not much indication exists 
that WCL faculty taught law any differently than other law 
schools.  Indeed, it seems unlikely since they strove for legiti-
macy as not only a female-run, but also a part-time institution.  
Thus, while the act of founding the school was radical, and their 
support for formal legal education progressive, Mussey and Gil-
let’s approach to education was consistent with that of their con-
temporaries. 
The materials in the WCL Archives also reveal that the 
school, while radical in its acceptance of women in all aspects of 
legal practice and from many nations, remained mired in the 
prevailing views on racial segregation.  WCL excluded African-
Americans for over fifty years.27  The relationship of the foun-
ders and early graduates to the issue of racial discrimination is 
complex.28  Mussey’s biography indicates that she was the 
daughter of ardent abolitionists and grew up in a home that 
served as a station on the Underground Railroad.29  However, 
advertisements for the school through at least 1914, specifically 
pointed out that it was for whites only, 30 presumably to make it 
more attractive to white women than Howard University Law 
School.  The rhetoric softened slightly around the time when 
WCL admitted a Native American woman, but it would be many 
decades before the school took the first steps to remedy the in-
justice against African-Americans.31 
 
A. WOMEN’S BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE DISTRICT OF  
COLUMBIA  
 
“Professional women cannot rise one at a time – they must 
rise in groups.” 
 — Ellen Spencer Mussey, First Annual Address of the WBA 
 
Nineteen years after the founding of the school, women still 
faced overt discrimination in the practice of law even as they 
entered the profession at an increasing rate.32  The D.C. Bar As-
sociation, the professional association that supported male attor-
neys, excluded women.33  Left without the support of a profes-
sional organization, it was up to the women to found their own. 
Mussey and Gillett sent invitations on WCL Alumni Asso-
ciation letterhead to all of the female lawyers barred in the Dis-
trict of Columbia.34  On May 19, 1917, just after the United 
States entered World War I, Mussey and Gillett convened a 
meeting at WCL to form the WBA.35  Those present elected 
Mussey as their first president.36  The WBA’s original constitu-
tion stated its mission: 
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The object of this Associa-
tion shall be to maintain the 
honor and integrity of the 
profession of the law, to 
increase its usefulness in 
promoting the administra-
tion of justice; to advance 
and protect the interests of 
women lawyers of the Dis-
trict of Columbia; and to 
encourage their mutual im-
provement and social inter-
course.37 
 
The steady growth of the WBA indicated that it filled an 
acute need for women lawyers in D.C.  The WBA began with 
thirty-one charter members.38  In her first annual address in May 
of 1918, Mussey boasted that the WBA, then with forty mem-
bers, had enrolled forty percent of its eligible members in less 
than a year, while the D.C. Bar Association to which almost all 
male attorneys were eligible, had only 300 members after thirty 
years in existence.39  By May 1920, the WBA’s third year of 
existence, Mussey put the WBA in context when she said: 
“There are older and larger associations of women lawyers in 
the country, but without boasting, we can truthfully claim that 
none of them is more active, more harmonious, or more alive to 
its responsibilities than our own.”40  Membership continued to 
grow steadily, with 250 members in 1936,41 358 in 1944,42 427 
in 1949,43 600 in 1966,44 and 1,100 in 1982.45  The WBA’s mis-
sion today is nearly identical to its original language:  
“Maintaining the honor and integrity of the profession; promot-
ing the administration of justice; advancing and protecting the 
interests of women lawyers; promoting their mutual improve-
ment; and encouraging a spirit of friendship among our mem-
bers.”46 
WCL and the 
WBA maintained 
important connec-
tions, particularly in 
the early years.  The 
WBA held many of 
its early meetings at 
WCL.47  One of the 
WBA’s early initia-
tives was an ongoing 
scholarship program 
for female students 
at tending WCL 
(often at the behest of Mussey),48 and it contributed to the early 
building fund drives (often at the behest of Gillett).49  Mussey 
and Gillet both served as WBA Presidents50 and WCL Deans.51  
Our non-systematic review of the archives turned up other im-
portant figures who bridged the two institutions, including Eliza-
beth Harris (WBA President, WCL graduate), Grace Hays Riley 
(active WBA member, WCL Dean), Ida Moyers (WBA Presi-
dent, WCL graduate), Helen Jaimison (WBA President, WCL 
Professor), Burnita Shelton Matthews (WBA President, WCL 
Professor), Karen Lockwood (WBA President, WCL graduate, 
WCL Adjunct Professor), and Jennifer Maree (current WBA 
President, WCL graduate).52 
 
PROGRESS MEASURED 
 
The continuing legacy of these institutions is one of activ-
ism in pursuit of social and legal reform.  Mussey and Gillett 
founded the WBA on three core pillars:  the administration of 
justice; the advancement of women lawyers; and professional 
and social support for women lawyers.  We consider each pillar 
in turn as a framework to analyze the achievements and signifi-
cance of these institutions.  Though innumerable themes emerge, 
this section highlights only a few.  First, while the broader femi-
nist movement abated during certain points in history, the WBA 
continued to work for the betterment of women lawyers and 
women in the law.  Second, these institutions have advanced the 
rights of women through collaboration.  Third, while the legal 
reforms these institutions accomplished are truly remarkable, 
perhaps their most timeless and enduring quality is the profound 
need their professional and social support for women lawyers 
fills. 
 
A. THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
 
One of the most captivating aspects of the archives is the 
record of legislative and administrative advocacy by the WBA 
and the faculty and administrators of WCL.  While WCL itself 
did not engage in advocacy as an institution, there is no doubt 
that Mussey used her position as the Dean of the school, as well 
as her status as a well-respected lawyer in the community, to 
advocate for women’s rights legislation as well as other 
social policies.  Gillett also did considerable legislative 
work, although she does not appear to have been as fond 
of testifying in public as Mussey eventually became. 
To put this into context, Mussey, who became one of the 
most experienced lobbyists on behalf of women’s rights, 
did not dare speak in public until well into her forties for 
fear of social scandal.53  Prior to the founding of the bar 
association or the law school, Mussey and Gillett 
worked together on the passage of legislation (later 
called the Mussey Bill) granting women the right to hold 
property in their own name after marriage, granting 
mothers the same rights as fathers in custody disputes, 
and safeguarding dower rights.54  At that time, Gillett 
was also a local leader of the woman suffrage movement.55  
Mussey appears to have been a late convert to the cause of 
woman suffrage, but a trip to Norway, where women already 
had the right to vote, convinced her that the franchise was essen-
tial if women were to receive any consideration from lawmak-
while the broader feminist movement 
abated during certain points in his-
tory, the WBA continued to work for 
the betterment of women lawyers and 
women in the law.  
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ers.56  By 1910, she testified in front of a Senate Committee “to 
make a plea for the ballot.”57 
 
1. THE END OF THE FIRST WAVE:  1917-1925 
 
By the end of the first wave of the woman’s movement, 
WBA members and WCL faculty routinely appeared in the halls 
of power to make demands for their rights and the rights of oth-
ers.  Because of their location in Washington D.C. and their per-
sonal and professional contacts with members of Congress and 
various administrations, the women of the WBA were often the 
local face of the national women’s movement.  Although it took 
many years and several generations of lawyers, the association 
participated actively and powerfully in each step of the slow 
dismantling of legalized discrimination against women. 
In her inaugural annual address as president of the WBA, 
Mussey noted that the charter members organized the WBA 
after a dinner to honor the men who had marched with women 
lawyers at the 1913 suffrage parade,58 which had turned vio-
lent.59  The WBA formed just prior to the ratification of the 
woman suffrage amendment.  After its first few years, the asso-
ciation turned to advocacy on other aspects of 
women’s rights.  They supported bills to allow 
women to retain their own nationalities after 
marriage to a non-U.S. citizen,60 to eliminate 
the legal restrictions on the contractual capacity 
of married women,61 and to allow women to 
serve on juries.62  Also concerned with social 
welfare, WBA members supported measures 
for compulsory education and reduction of 
child labor in D.C.,63 as well as funding to re-
duce maternal mortality.64  They supported 
resolutions calling for suffrage for D.C. resi-
dents, because despite having won themselves 
the right to vote as women, they still found 
themselves disenfranchised because of their status as residents 
of D.C.65 
 
2. SURVIVING IN ABEYANCE: 1925-1965 
 
Historians often point to a period of “abeyance” in the 
women’s movement between the passage of the suffrage amend-
ment in 1920 and the start of the second wave of the women’s 
movement in the 1960s.66  Especially after World War II, most 
middle class women did not work outside of the home.  
Women’s rights, which had been a hot-button issue for decades, 
faded from public debate. 
The status of women at WCL reflects the decline of the 
women’s movement.  As the founders and original graduates 
passed away, the memory of the school’s early radicalism faded.  
The school appointed its first male dean in 1949, perhaps to 
smooth the merger with American University in 1950.67  Like 
most law schools of the time, WCL continued to admit women, 
although in small numbers.  In a more positive reflection of the 
changing times, it finally admitted its first African-American 
student in 1950.68 
The WBA, however, remained strong and active in the pe-
riod stretching from just before World War II to the 1960s.  In-
deed, the WBA Archives suggest that the WBA served as one of 
the movement structures bridging the first and second waves of 
the women’s movement.69  The WBA continued to recruit young 
members, and even started a new “junior” division in the 
1930s.70  In contrast, most feminist organizations in this time 
period were increasingly populated by older women who had 
been part of the struggle for suffrage prior to 1920.71 
Although many activists left the women’s movement after 
the passage of woman suffrage, the WBA sponsored a bill for 
gender parity in inheritance laws introduced in Congress in the 
late 1920s.72  The WBA also endorsed bills to remove exemp-
tions for women from jury duty.73  By the 1930s, the WBA fi-
nally succeeded in having Mrs. Mussey’s legislation restoring 
women’s citizenship after marriage to a non-U.S. citizen signed 
into law.74  The WBA also published a comprehensive report on 
the International Court of Justice that was incorporated into the 
record of the Senate debates 
on the matter.75 
Two points are critical to the 
importance of the WBA in 
the period between the first 
and second waves of the mass 
women’s movement.  First, 
the women who practiced law 
were still a small minority in 
the legal community, and the 
WBA Archives reveal that 
they remained concerned 
about discrimination against 
women, especially in govern-
ment employment.76  Public opinion of women who worked for 
wages outside the home ranged toward the cruel.  Popular books 
labeled feminists “severe neurotics responsible for the problems 
of American society.”77  The WBA served to protect its working 
women members from the stings of such attacks by legitimizing 
their work in the public sphere.78 
Second, the WBA’s membership developed the skills to 
lobby for legislation and the appointment of women to the judi-
ciary and political positions.  The WBA, throughout even the 
most politically conservative 1950s and early 1960s, never 
stopped taking positions on legislation.  In the 1950s, the WBA 
supported the creation of a Legal Aid Society for the District, 
promoted a family division in the Municipal Court, and submit-
ted a report (a provision of which was later incorporated into the 
legislation) abolishing dower and courtesy in the District.79  In 
the mid-sixties, the WBA endorsed the elimination of rules al-
lowing the federal government to specify “men only” when se-
lecting employees to serve under the Civil Service program.80  In 
1965, WBA members testified in support of divorce reform in 
the District, as well as in support of laws affirming that there 
Although many activists left the 
women’s movement after the passage 
of woman suffrage, the WBA spon-
sored a bill for gender parity in in-
heritance laws introduced in Con-
gress in the late 1920s. 
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should be no discrimination as to sex in Federal Agencies’ hir-
ing practices.81 
Members of the WBA were experienced at testifying before 
Congress in part because matters affecting the District of Co-
lumbia came before Congress, rather than a state legislature.82  
In a gem of a letter from the WBA Archives, 1960-1961 Presi-
dent Ruth Joyce Hens83 described the work of the WBA to a 
woman interested in organizing an association of women law-
yers in Kentucky:84 
 
             Because of our proximity to Congress, legisla-
tion affecting the law,  
the rights of women, the impact on the citizens of 
the District of Columbia, 
is important to our Association.  We propose 
legislation, we study legislative proposals es-
poused by other organizations or individuals, and 
we testify  
on those matters before appropriate Congres-
sional Committees, giving  
our views and recommendations.85 
 
Considering that few women possessed the skills to testify in 
Congress in 1950’s America, the fact that this was the primary 
activity of the Association is remarkable when seen in context. 
These skills proved vital when the mass women’s move-
ment resurged in the 1960s and 1970s.  WBA members knew 
how to lobby and exert political influence, and they possessed 
insiders’ knowledge of Washington politics.  When the women’s 
movement was almost ready to erupt again on a mass scale in 
the 1960s, vocal members of the WBA moved it forward.  Al-
though not official business, the original White House Press 
Release regarding the founding of the Federal Committee on the 
Status of Women86 is tucked into the minutes of the WBA be-
cause WBA member Marguerite Rawalt served on the Citizen’s 
Advisory Commission to that Committee.87  There are invita-
tions to a meeting of Women’s Organizations of D.C. in 1966, 
convened by the WBA, to demand that the D.C. Commissioners 
create a Commission on the Status of Women for the District of 
Columbia.88  While not necessarily radical feminist action, this 
activity nonetheless reflects momentum towards women’s equal-
ity that perhaps only professional working women could have 
contributed to, in this era. 
 
3. THE SECOND WAVE AND BEYOND:  1965-PRESENT 
 
There is evidence of continued WBA activity from the 
1960s to the present in the archives.  The WBA continued to 
work on issues pertaining to women and the law, and by the 
mid-1960s, they had gained more allies.  The WBA continued to 
push for legislation that would enhance the lives of women.  The 
mass women’s movement, and the role of lawyers in the move-
ment, shifted into high gear.  The WBA counts among its mem-
bers many legal pioneers, including several of the women who 
founded and staffed some of the most powerful women’s rights 
organizations in the country, including the Women’s Legal De-
fense Fund.89  As litigation assumed a more prominent role in 
movement strategy, the WBA took on the role of drafting and 
signing onto amicus briefs.  The WBA has influenced policies 
on everything ranging from family medical leave to most re-
cently, employment discrimination.90 
 
B. ADVANCING AND PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF WOMEN 
LAWYERS 
 
1. A ROOM OF THEIR OWN AND A SEAT AT THE TABLE:  THE 
WBA’S ROLE IN MEETING THE NEEDS OF  
WOMEN LAWYERS 
 
 Like the early WCL efforts to open the profession to 
women described in Section I, early WBA efforts to advance 
and protect the interests of women lawyers often involved basic 
access to the profession itself – literally opening doors and find-
ing space for women lawyers to practice their trade.  One of the 
WBA’s earliest efforts to support practicing attorneys was the 
creation of a room of their own – the Women Attorney’s Room 
in the District of Columbia Court House.  The WBA women 
discussed stocking, decorating, and cleaning this room regularly, 
and allocated considerable amounts of money to the project.91  
The Women Attorney’s Room created a space for women at the 
courthouse to study, conduct research, meet, and prepare court 
documents.92  A 1936 letter in the WBA Archives describes the 
room as “the only pleasant place in the Court House, besides the 
hall-ways, where women lawyers feel free to wait or meet, pend-
ing the hearing of their cases.”93 
In other cases, the WBA was literally seeking a seat at the 
table.   Another of the WBA’s first official acts of business in 
1917 was a discussion regarding the need to pursue law library 
access for women lawyers, who at the time were not allowed 
into the D.C. Bar Association library.94  A report on the 1919 
ABA meeting notes that WBA members were the first women to 
sit at a banquet of the American Bar Association, despite the fact 
that some pioneering women had been in the legal field for dec-
ades.95 
Early WBA efforts also included securing access to the for-
mal education that was, by that point, practically required for 
entry into the profession.  By the 1920s, several schools in the 
area admitted women and the WBA awarded one full law school 
scholarship every three years and two pre-legal scholarships.96  
The WBA offered both financial support to these students97 as 
well as professional support, staying in active contact with the 
recipients to ensure their success in school.98 
 
 2.  THE NEXT STEP:  PROMOTING FEMALE LEADERSHIP IN 
THE PROFESSION 
 
The WBA Archives tell the story of an unrelenting commit-
ment on the part of the organization to support the appointment 
Special - Fall 2008                                                                                                                                                                                 47  
 
of women to “positions of public trust.”99  Its geographic, politi-
cal, and social location in Washington, D.C. meant that the 
WBA was one of the primary voices for the inclusion of women 
in the federal government.  As early as 1922, the WBA was 
gathering data to survey the representation of women in legal 
positions in the government, investigating problematic depart-
ments and demanding accountability.100  The WBA methodically 
identified open positions, and encouraged members to apply or 
identified people to formally nominate them.101  The WBA sent 
letters and requested meetings with decision-makers, including 
the President of the United States,102 to encourage them to ap-
point or hire the WBA-endorsed candidates.103 
The WBA campaigned “to obtain effective publicity, to 
interest influential persons, and to create a favorable public sen-
timent.”104  Occasionally, the campaigning required public bat-
tles with agency heads who refused to hire women.  In 1934, the 
WBA passed a resolution calling for the resignation of the Dis-
trict Attorney after he went public about his refusal to hire fe-
male Assistant District Attorneys, in part on the grounds that the 
previous female Assistant District Attorneys had spent too much 
time “worrying about canned goods”105 (no doubt prosecuting 
violators of newly enacted food safety laws) and “hunting up 
fleeing husbands for distracted wives”106 (likely attempting to 
enforce support obligations.)107 
For some time, advocacy on behalf of female lawyers oper-
ated on a position-by-position basis.108  In response to the 
WBA’s expanded membership base by the 1960s, it began a 
placement service to act as a “clearing house to advise those 
interested as to where positions are available.”109  The WBA 
also formalized its endorsement proceedings by convening a 
committee and developing a formal Policy Statement Respecting 
WBA Endorsement for Public Office.110 
The Association also lobbied for women to represent the 
United States in international legal proceedings.  After a call by 
WBA representatives at the State Department, the President ap-
pointed a woman to the American Delegation to the Conference 
on the Codification of International Law in the Hague.111  The 
WBA itself also sent delegates to meetings of the Inter-
American Bar Association for many years.112 
 
 3.  EXPANDING ADVOCACY NETWORKS 
 
Following decades of activism for women lawyers, the role 
of the WBA as an advocacy organization in society also evolved 
in important ways.  The founders intended that the WBA pro-
vide professional support to women lawyers.  They also founded 
the Association at a climactic time in the woman suffrage move-
ment.  These dual functions placed the WBA at the intersection 
of at least two distinct and important advocacy networks – advo-
cating as a professional association for lawyers and advocating 
for women’s rights.  In these layered advocacy roles, the WBA 
has a rich history of establishing and cultivating formal and in-
formal connections with other groups to advance professional 
women on certain issues, to advance lawyers and the legal pro-
fession in other settings, and to advance women’s rights in other 
contexts.  For example, since its early years, the WBA has had 
standing committees to work with organizations that shared the 
WBA’s focus on promoting the rule of law and the efficient ad-
ministration of justice, including the D.C. Bar Association, the 
American Bar Association, the Federal Bar Association, and the 
Inter-American Bar Association.113 
The WBA also formed a node in the women’s rights advo-
cacy network, focusing on using legal tools to achieve women’s 
equality and advancement in the profession.  As early as 1920, 
records emerge of the WBA’s involvement in a nationwide con-
ference of women lawyers.114  In 1930, it formally voted to pay a 
group membership to affiliate with the National Association of 
Women Lawyers (“NAWL”), and many WBA members have 
also been active in NAWL throughout the decades.115  WBA 
members often acted in conjunction with the Women’s Business 
and Professional Association of D.C., especially when that or-
ganization was under the leadership of active WBA member 
Marguerite Rawalt.116  Several prominent members of the WBA, 
including Emma Gillett, Rebekah Greathouse, and Judge Burnita 
Shelton Mathews, were also active in Alice Paul’s National 
Women’s Party.117 
 
C.  Professional and Social Support Functions   
 
Today, just as in 1917, it is impossible to separate the social 
support function of the WBA from its goals of advancing 
women lawyers and developing professional skills.  When 
women lawyers interact, whether casually or formally, it serves 
to advance individual lawyers and the profession.  Since its 
founding, one of the WBA’s formal goals has been to promote 
the professional development and social interaction of women 
lawyers.  The 1917 constitution states that the WBA’s purpose 
includes the “mutual improvement and social intercourse” of 
women lawyers in the District of Columbia.118  Interestingly, 
documents in the WBA Archives indicate that this prong of the 
WBA’s mission was likely added as a line-edit to a draft of the 
temporary constitution.119  The WBA’s current constitution ar-
ticulates this continued focus on “promoting [women lawyers’] 
mutual improvement and encouraging a spirit of friendship 
among our members.” 120   
  
 1.  TO BE SIMPLY UNDERSTOOD:  LENDING SUPPORT IN 
MALE-DOMINATED PROFESSIONS  
 
For what can be so refreshing to an aspir-
ing soul that has been stifled under narrow con-
ventionalism, as to be simply understood?121—
Martha K. Pierce (early woman lawyer)   
 
The WBA Archives tell us of the timeless and persistent 
need for social support among women lawyers.  When the roster 
of women lawyers in the WBA tallied thirty-one, this need was 
sharply pronounced, and was for many women a matter of pro-
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fessional survival.  The isolation felt by the first female lawyers 
was likely intense as they negotiated a delicate balance between 
prevailing notions of femininity and their public professional 
role.122 
Embedded in the loneliness of charting a new path for 
women were the more concrete concerns about the practice of 
law, their clients’ expectations, and their family lives that per-
haps only another female lawyer could comprehend.  Early 
women lawyers faced questions about women’s physical fitness 
for the practice of law, appropriate behavior (and dress) in the 
courtroom, and the logistical and social challenges of accommo-
dating children and marriage into a life that also included a pro-
fessional and public career.123 
The early WBA provided women lawyers with the compan-
ionship and support of other women who simply understood.  
The WBA Archives reveal that in its first years, social gather-
ings were an interesting blend of private intimacy and public 
exposure, organic institutional programming and social hosting.  
There was an early tradition of private monthly dinners, a tradi-
tion which emerged formally in the late 1920s, but appears from 
the records to have contin-
ued for some time.124  The 
terse notes and budgetary 
allocations do not reveal 
much about these private 
dinners, their location, the 
attendees, or the discus-
sions had there, but it is 
difficult to overlook their 
vital importance in keeping 
these pioneering women 
connected, informed, and 
supported. 
WCL’s parallel role 
providing social support for women law students and law teach-
ers is evident from the first yearbooks, announcements, and 
newspapers of its early era.  Women who attended other law 
schools were often the only female members of their class, and 
faced years of education with only male classmates and all male 
instructors.  Especially in the hyper sex-segregated world that 
existed around the turn of the century, this meant that women 
studied law in relative isolation, at home with neither their male 
peers, or their female friends and family members. 
Since its inception, WCL has been co-educational, and em-
ployed many male faculty members.125  But, at least in its early 
years, women could feel confident that they would not be sub-
jected to the ridicule or resistance found at other schools.   
 
Many of these women would find female mentors and role 
models at WCL. 
WCL also offered female law teachers a fellowship and 
opportunities that simply did not exist elsewhere.  In her authori-
tative and comprehensive article on the history of WCL, Profes-
sor Mary Clark notes that the presence of more female faculty 
members renders a school more welcoming to its female stu-
dents.126  It follows that the mere presence of other female fac-
ulty members at the turn of the century must have been a source 
of great social support to the first women law teachers. 
In its first four decades, WCL provided an opportunity for 
women to serve as deans of a law school, a position of power 
that was not meaningfully open to other women until recently.127  
Additionally, the early yearbooks show that the women faculty 
members taught in all areas of the law, from common law sub-
jects to international law.  For example, in the 1940s, WBA 
member (and later Judge) Burnita Shelton Mathews taught evi-
dence at WCL.128  This is in stark contrast to the gradual in-
crease of women in other law school faculties (which started 
only very slowly in the 1950s to employ women and did not 
accelerate until the late 1970s), where they tended to cluster 
women in fields such as law librarianship,129 family law, trusts 
and estates, and legal writing rather than offering women oppor-
tunities across the legal curriculum.130 
 
 2.  SOCIAL STATUS AND RECOGNITION 
 
The social events also provided much needed 
public recognition to the women attorneys and 
their work.  By the mid-1930’s, entertainment 
comprised an average of forty-eight percent of the 
WBA’s budget over a six-year average.131  This is 
further evident from the regular Washington Post 
coverage of the WBA social events, especially the 
annual dinner,132 which has always been a public 
occasion.  The women tried to secure the WBA’s 
place in Washington society with invitations to 
the President of the United States, Supreme Court 
Justices, Congressmen and women, and promi-
nent speakers such as Pearl Buck.  While atten-
dance at the dinner was originally limited to women and women 
guests,133 over time, the dinner expanded to include a large 
population of male attorneys.  At the twentieth anniversary of 
the dinner in 1937, the report on the success of the dinner noted 
that fifty of the 250 attendees were men “of whom I am told 
‘came to scoff (or be bored) but remained – to be highly enter-
tained.’”134 
Over ninety years later, the need for “social intercourse” 
among women lawyers and the WBA’s role in filling that need 
seems to have changed very little.  The WBA’s annual dinner 
continues today, including a 2008 address by Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg where she was honored with the 2008 Reno 
Torchbearer Award,135 attended by approximately 800 people136 
and sponsored by dozens of local law firms and businesses.  The 
WBA also hosts annual judicial receptions, a golf classic, and 
specialty dinners for women corporate counsel, women partners, 
and senior women in government.137 
The WBA also played hostess over the years, entertaining 
various delegations of women attorneys, ranging from the ABA 
visits to Washington, to visits by lawyers from the Inter-
These dual functions placed the WBA 
at the intersection of at least two dis-
tinct and important advocacy net-
works – advocating as a professional 
association for lawyers and advocat-
ing for women’s rights.  
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American Commission of Women.138  The hostess function 
eventually yielded a formal Courtesy or Hospitality Commit-
tee.139  In many instances, this often included the role of enter-
taining the wives of visiting officials.140  Minutes from 1931, 
record a discussion regarding whether it was the WBA’s respon-
sibility to entertain the wives of lawyers.  Those present at the 
meeting agreed to “accept the responsibilities for arranging” this 
entertainment – one of many examples where the minutes likely 
do not do justice to the richness of the issue.141 
 
 3.  WOMEN’S SPACE:  CULTIVATING FEMALE LEADERS 
 
The social component of the organization is still thriving 
today, a telling reality when we consider the number of women 
in the profession today as compared to the WBA’s early years.  
In 1920 there were 1,738 women lawyers and 1,711 women law 
students.142  In contrast, women have been graduating law 
school at a rate of 40 percent or higher since 1985.143  Along 
with the entry of more women into the profession, comes the 
opportunity for organic social interaction with other women in 
the traditional office setting as well as formal women’s commit-
tees and initiatives. 
But through these immense changes, the WBA’s social 
functions have survived, which indicates that they serve a more 
complex purpose than contact with other women.  At a mini-
mum, the social interaction of organizations such as the WBA, 
offers modern lawyers a broad network of support, role models, 
mentors, and professional contacts.144  Maybe they offer a space 
where a woman’s femininity and her professional identity are 
reinforced rather than challenged.145 
Even more powerfully, perhaps women professionals bene-
fit from having a unique women’s space where they can develop 
into leaders.  The early members of the WBA faced the familiar 
tension between fighting for inclusion in power structures, while 
recognizing that a separate women’s space was sometimes nec-
essary because women’s voices were often drowned out or de-
valued in those existing power structures.  Even after the admis-
sion of women to the D.C. Bar Association, for example, it was 
many decades before women rose to prominent positions in the 
organization,146 stunting women’s opportunities to gain mean-
ingful leadership experience – as heads of committees, organiz-
ers of campaigns, or officers in the organization. 
In contrast, the WBA provided its members an opportunity 
to cultivate leadership and management skills. As sociologist 
Cynthia Fuchs-Epstein pointed out in her 1981 study of women 
in the legal profession, due to discrimination, women, who could 
often not “easily rise in the male-dominated bar organizations, 
[could] climb to positions of leadership in the women’s bars … 
some of the prestige attached to high office in them may be car-
ried over into the male organizations and into the profession.”147 
It is important to acknowledge and consider, however, that 
the history of social support at the WBA and WCL failed to ex-
tend to women of color in many ways.  As noted above, WCL 
did not accept African-American students until the 1950s.  The 
WBA minutes and notes do not note the race of the membership 
of its leadership, but this organization was certainly not racially 
inclusive, particularly in Jim Crow-era Washington.  For exam-
ple, a volume of the “The Woman Lawyer” from 1935 in the 
WBA Archives, contains simultaneously a proud profile of the 
WBA,148 an advertisement for WCL,149 and a racist joke that 
mocks the intelligence and understanding of the legal system of 
two men of color.150  While there were only a handful of female 
lawyers of color at the time, the WBA and WCL’s tolerance for 
the prevailing prejudice is unacceptable by modern standards. 
 
 4.  TRAINING FOR THE FUTURE 
 
As the WBA membership base expanded, the WBA Ar-
chives tell of an increased emphasis on professional develop-
ment, demonstrating the organization’s adaptability and ability 
to keep the organization relevant to a broader membership base.  
Beginning in the 1930s, the WBA Archives begin to show ex-
plicit professional development components to the meetings, 
merging business meetings with educational programs,151 such 
as a talk on Chinese Women in the Law and a lecture on changes 
to the Federal Rules.152  By the 1940s, the informal dinners that 
began many years earlier also started to include a speaker or 
discussion about a current topic.153  Dinner speakers over the 
years covered topics such as the European recovery effort after 
World War II,154  “Democracy’s Chances in Japan,”155 and in-
vestment strategies for professional women.156  Many of these 
events reveal much about the political tenor of the time.  For 
example, notes from a program on the Labor Relations Board in 
1961 record the speaker telling his audience that lawyers have a 
responsibility to fight communism,157 and topics in the 1980s 
included “work/family balance.” 
 
THE ROAD WINDS UP:  UNFINISHED BUSINESS FOR THE 
WBA AND WCL 
 
Our review of the archives led us to one fundamental, yet 
critical, point.  Women lawyers can, should – and indeed must – 
carry the baton as individuals and in organizations.  In the words 
of Dean Gillett in her address to the Section of Legal Education 
of the American Bar Association in 1921, 
 
I want to say… that the woman’s day is 
here. The women are not yet at the top. 
Does the road wind upward all the way? 
Yes, to the weary end, and we women who 
are studying law and practicing law are not 
at the top yet. It is possibly just as well that 
the road should wind somewhat as we go 
up.158 
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A. THE IMPORTANCE OF EXAMINING THE PAST 
 
Gillett’s words from 1921 still ring far too true today – 
women are not yet at the top of the path.  As the road winds up, 
we look ahead for ideas and behind us for inspiration.  It is our 
hope that this section will ignite that dialogue by highlighting 
why these Archives matter, what they tell us about the current 
challenges facing women in the profession, and where we go 
from there.159 
The value of our shared history is best illustrated by WCL’s 
own winding path.  The WCL Archives have already rescued 
WCL’s feminist history from obscurity once before, fundamen-
tally changing the direction of WCL and perhaps providing a 
blueprint for continued work.  By the 1980s there were no full 
time female faculty members, erasing the history and even mem-
ory of the pioneering women law teachers.  Around this time, 
the then-WCL Director of 
Development was searching 
for a way to connect WCL 
with its alumni base, particu-
larly in light of faculty turn-
over and the school’s location 
on the American University 
Main Campus.  The Director 
of Development went into the 
dusty WCL Archives looking 
for pictures of the old build-
ing.   There, in antique pho-
tos, crumbling newsletters, 
and faded scrapbooks, he 
found the early feminist and internationalist roots of WCL; roots 
that he recognized made WCL a different kind of law school. 
The faculty used this information to position WCL as the 
unique institution that it is today.  They created a strategic vision 
emphasizing WCL programs in international law, clinical legal 
education, and women’s legal studies.  WCL faculty founded the 
Women and the Law Program and the Women and the Law 
Clinic.  They supported the creation of a Journal of Gender, So-
cial Policy and the Law.  Faculty later founded the Center for 
WorkLife Law,160 until recently housed at WCL, as well as the 
Domestic Violence Clinic.  The faculty recruited and hired fe-
male scholars in all areas of the law and bolstered its faculty 
scholarship in the areas of gender and law.  The students joined 
in the resuscitation of WCL’s feminist roots.  The Women’s 
Law Association, with the support of the administration, started 
an annual “Founders’ Day” conference, out of which has blos-
somed an extensive Spring series of over sixty conferences and 
events that form the centerpiece of WCL’s contributions to dis-
course with the broader legal community.  The Archives have 
proved their value once before.   
What lessons do the Archives hold for us today?  The Ar-
chives teach us that women lawyers used every advocacy tool at 
their disposal, primarily lobbying, litigating, and legislating to 
address de jure discrimination.  We also see that the tools that 
our predecessors used have not been as useful in addressing the 
more embedded barriers that exist today.  Today, women face 
discrimination that is more entrenched and subtle.  Traditional 
legal tools have not proven successful in advancing and retain-
ing women in the highest ranks of the legal profession.161  Elimi-
nating cognitive bias, isolation, and the role of “preference” in 
hiring and promotion decisions requires new forms of advocacy, 
as well as new mechanisms of accountability. 
Despite legal protections and great numbers of female law 
school graduates, there is strong evidence of discrimination 
against women in the legal profession. The National Association 
of Women Lawyers (“NAWL”) points out that in the private 
sector “almost one out of two law firm associates is a woman, 
which approximates the law school population but at the highest 
level of law firm practice, equity partner, in the average firm 
only one out of six equity partners is a woman.”162  Within the 
firm leadership structures, NAWL reports that 
women generally comprise only 15% of the 
seats on the law firms’ highest governing com-
mittee, and 15% of firms have no women on 
their leadership committee.163  Only 8% of all 
managing partners are women.164  NAWL data 
also reveals an increasingly widening income 
disparity as women progress to the highest 
ranks of partnership.165  The National Associa-
tion of Law Placement reports that in law firms 
it surveyed, 10.07% of associates are minority 
women.166  1.65% of partners are minority 
women nationally.167  The statistics in Wash-
ington, D.C. are only slightly better, at 10.33% 
for minority associates and 2.11% for minority partners.168  The 
ABA Commission on Women in the Profession’s study, 
“Visible Invisibility,” reported that less than 1% of minority 
women remained at law firms by their eighth year.169 
Women are similarly underrepresented in the senior ranks 
of other legal sectors as well.  According to the ABA’s Commis-
sion on Women in the Profession, in 2006 women comprised 
15.7% of General Counsels in Fortune 1000 corporations, 16.6 
% of General Counsels in Fortune 500 corporations, and 23% of 
district court and circuit judges.170  Women currently make up 
only 20.4% of law school deans, and 26.5% of tenured law 
school faculty around the nation.171 
 These challenges reinforce a continued demonstrable 
need for both the WBA and for the women’s legal studies pro-
gramming at WCL.  And, to paraphrase Judge Burnita Shelton 
Mathews, a reason for women to “band together.”  It is notewor-
thy not only that Mussey and Gillett were women, but also that 
there were two of them.  WCL legend has it that Mussey would 
not even consider opening the first Women’s Law Class if Gil-
lett would not co-teach.172  It is also no coincidence that the 
WBA emerged in the aftermath of the pivotal woman suffrage 
parade in 1913, a classic form of collective action.173  There is 
much rhetoric about the importance of working together, but the 
Archives provide a stark reminder that the women’s movement 
The WBA can leverage its organiza-
tional status to create pressure for 
reform in specific law offices that 
have high attrition, low promotion or 
part-time policy utilization rates, or 
insufficient family leave policies, to 
name just a few.   
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will not survive if we do not build coalitions strategically.  In 
building a modern coalition to address the current needs of 
women in the profession, both the WBA and WCL have unique 
and irreplaceable roles to play. 
 
B.  THE WBA IS AS NECESSARY AS EVER 
 
The WBA remains relevant because it is uniquely posi-
tioned to find the next set of advocacy and accountability tools, 
to train future generations of women lawyers, and to maintain 
the steadfast focus on advancing the interests of women in the 
profession.  The forces faced by women in the legal profession 
— the ones that push them out of law firms at alarming rates, 
and that keep them from entering the highest ranks of the profes-
sion — are not forces that will be changed by individual women 
working independently.  Simply put, women’s advancement in 
the profession is not another project for the WBA.  It is the pro-
ject, the very reason for its continued existence. 
The WBA’s position is unique in several ways, including its 
capacity to leverage the institutional power of the WBA to cre-
ate accountability, the positioning of the WBA as an authorita-
tive voice, and in continuing to build the capacity of individual 
women lawyers. 
 
 1.  LEVERAGING INSTITUTIONAL POWER TO CREATE AC-
COUNTABILITY 
 
Over the past ninety years, the WBA has banked institu-
tional capital to wield for the benefit of women in the profes-
sion.  The WBA can utilize this organizational clout by creating 
new norms for what is acceptable in the legal community.  One 
way to change norms is by better using the publicly available 
data we already have documenting the current situation of 
women in the profession.  While the data detailed above regard-
ing the lack of women in leadership positions in firms are regu-
larly cited as proof that women are not advancing to the highest 
ranks of the profession, their continual repetition may serve only 
to reinforce to employers that maintaining the status quo aligns 
them with the competitive market. 
Instead, the WBA should use the data as an advocacy tool.  
The WBA can leverage its organizational status to create pres-
sure for reform in specific law offices that have high attrition, 
low promotion or part-time policy utilization rates, or insuffi-
cient family leave policies, to name just a few.  On the flip side, 
the WBA can also change culture by celebrating and recognizing 
firms that are identifying new and innovative strategies that 
work to retain and promote their female work force.174 
For example, the WBA can promote and reinforce broader 
definitions of the “ideal worker.”  The traditional model of new 
attorneys following in lock-step to partnership pretends that all 
lawyers, all firms, and all legal jobs are all the same.  In concrete 
terms, the WBA can work to open up the marketplace to attor-
neys who leave the job market for a limited period and return.  
In October 2008, WCL launched a Re-entry Program for law-
yers who have taken time out of the legal profession and who 
are searching for ways to re-enter.  The WBA and NAWL co-
sponsor the program.175  The WBA as an organization and its 
members, particularly senior members and leadership, can advo-
cate employers to hire talented re-entry applicants, and create 
employment policies that enable these workers to use their skills 
and experience.  The WBA could then celebrate and applaud 
those efforts.  The proposal starts with something as simple as 
offering internships to re-entering lawyers; it ends with some-
thing as complex as creating workplaces that value diversity of 
experience.   
 
 2.  USING EXPERIENCE TO SET A RESEARCH AGENDA  
 
The WBA’s ninety year history of fighting for the inclusion 
of women in the legal profession, and the personal experiences 
of all of its members, give it a tremendous well of experience.  
The WBA has unique expertise that it should use to frame a 
complete and strategic research agenda for the collection of the 
empirical research needed to advance the dialogue regarding the 
place of women in the profession.  The WBA is in a unique po-
sition to help researchers discern the right questions and then 
answer them. 
For example, the WBA is well positioned to ask why certain 
existing policies or systems, such as part-time policies imple-
mented by well-meaning employers, are not achieving the neces-
sary results.  The large membership of the WBA is a huge un-
tapped source of knowledge about the lived realities of women 
attorneys, but researchers must pull all of that information to-
gether to help make sense of systemic problems.  Despite a num-
ber of excellent studies, many outstanding research questions 
remain on issues such as the gendered impacts of billable hour 
structures, the practical functionality of part-time jobs, the role 
of unpredictable work hours in job satisfaction, the impact of 
micro-level interactions among personnel, the perceived value of 
specific kinds of labor, the particular ways in which women of 
color, lesbians and women with disabilities are largely marginal-
ized in complex ways, whether men and women approach their 
tasks differently in a way that disadvantages women, and, 
whether women still lag behind in management and business 
development, and if they do, what the implications of this lag 
might be.  The WBA can play a critical role in re-igniting the 
dialogue by communicating with the academic community about 
what the stumbling blocks to success might be.  The WBA may 
also help researchers locate funding for studies to test those 
ideas, and place interested social scientists in contact with re-
search subjects or perhaps even commission the work itself. 
The WBA can also engage with researchers, such as labor 
economists, to improve the arguments needed to convince legal 
employers to change.  For example, the legal community has put 
a lot of stock in the argument that there is a “business case” for 
the retention and advancement of women and women of color.176  
Law firms are inherently bottom-line driven.  If the “business 
case” for diversity were as persuasive as the rhetoric would sug-
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gest, one might assume that the numbers would speak for them-
selves in client’s “voting with their feet.”  The WBA can mar-
shal resources to examine this argument rigorously. 
Of course, being a vocal critic of law firm employment poli-
cies and business models, and advocating for change, may create 
challenges for the WBA as well.  Early WBA documents sug-
gest that the WBA was very reluctant to solicit formal sponsor-
ships because they undermined the ability of the organization to 
take controversial positions on issues.177  To play the leadership 
role in changing the current legal culture, the Association must 
be free to make unconstrained assessments of the field.  Law 
firms support, both socially and financially, the excellent work 
of the Association, especially with regard to professional and 
leadership development.  So, the WBA, like all professional 
organizations, must strike a careful balance between finding 
ways to support the diverse range of programs it offers its mem-
bership base, while still positioning itself to leverage its institu-
tional capacity for advocacy. 
 
3. DEVELOPING LEADERSHIP CAPACITY 
 
The WBA Archives also reinforce the WBA’s unique role 
in the development of women’s leadership capacity.  Much like 
the benefit of pro bono legal work, which is often seen as one 
way for young associates to gain practical experience as well as 
perform a public service, working in the leadership structure of 
the WBA should be seen as a public good as well as of personal 
benefit to the women who develop their talents for networking, 
development, organization and, of course, multi-tasking.  The 
women’s bar remains a critical forum through which active 
women can rise quickly, while working on an issue about which 
they are passionate—their own profession.  Given the alarming 
attrition rates among women of color, development of the lead-
ership talents of women from historically discriminated groups 
is particularly pressing. 
One area of leadership capacity-building that the WBA is 
uniquely positioned to address is the gap—be it perceived or 
real—in the business development skills of women lawyers.  
This subject is nearly invisible in law schools, perhaps because 
law professors generally have little experience or interest in 
managing law practices.  Rainmaking seminars seem to have 
made only a small dent in the perception that women do not rise 
in firms because they do not contribute as much as men to the 
generation of business.  The leadership of the WBA is posi-
tioned well to question the underlying assumptions regarding the 
economic value to firms of various kinds of labor, and to present 
a role model of the business of law to new attorneys. 
 The development of leadership should extend to law stu-
dents—and cover the concept of civic leadership and profes-
sional responsibility as well.  The recent Carnegie Report on 
Legal Education178 points out that law schools do an excellent 
job of training students in the substantive knowledge of law, yet 
a poor job of training students in what they call the 
“apprenticeship of professional identity and purpose.”  The con-
cept goes beyond legal ethics as tested for admission to the bar.  
The concept instead stretches to what the identity of a lawyer—a 
professional—entails in the sense of personal, community and 
civic responsibility.  The WBA and similar organizations can 
step into this breach by working directly with students, modeling 
for them what it means to engage in a self-reflexive law practice 
that includes not only their billable work, but also work for the 
larger community.  Even better, it could more actively engage 
law students concretely in the work of the Association, helping 
them to learn not only about women in the profession, but also 
to absorb the business development, organizational and social 
skills a great lawyer needs. 
 
B.  ACADEMIA PLAYS A ROLE IN SUPPORTING WOMEN IN THE 
PROFESSION 
 
With women making up half of all law school graduates, the 
Archives also reinforce the ongoing role of women’s legal stud-
ies.  Legal education in most U.S. law schools looks remarkably 
like it did in Mussey and Gillett’s day.  While many law schools 
offer limited courses in sex-based discrimination, the needs and 
concerns of women remain largely invisible or unexplored in 
mainstream law school classes.179  Notably, the young lawyers 
who exit law firms were also recently students, and it is likely 
that law schools have a part to play in the advancement of 
women in the profession.  In all of these areas, there is still a 
strong role for WCL and similar academic institutions. 
Legal academics have a role in changing the nature of law 
itself—in this case making sure it is not used as a tool to per-
petuate gender inequality, questioning its foundations to ensure 
that they do not rest on outmoded stereotypes, and ensuring that 
it meets the needs of today’s women.  But, changing the culture 
of legal academia to open law up to this kind of inquiry is diffi-
cult and complex.  While scholars have written on these topics 
extensively for the past forty-five years, and there has been im-
provement in many case books, there are some aspects of the 
law school curriculum (such as the basic content of the first year 
of law school, or the use of the Socratic method) that appear to 
have changed little in response.  Academics with institutional 
support have a better chance at changing curricula, publishing 
research, and changing law school pedagogy to better account 
for the needs and experiences of women.  There is still much 
room for improvement, even in schools such as WCL, who have 
made enormous efforts to integrate gender across the curricu-
lum.    
Law schools shape the expectations and experiences of 
young lawyers.  Mussey took a long-term interest in the careers 
of her “girls,”180 and law schools today must do the same.  To-
day, law schools’ interest must extend to understanding the rea-
sons why their women alumni are leaving the private practice of 
law.  Many lawyers, particularly female lawyers, report that they 
leave law firms because they simply cannot make law firm life 
square with the rest of their life.181  Law schools can play a role 
in teaching their students how to identify the firms, jobs, and 
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fields that will lead to a satisfying life as well as a career in law.  
Students who can discern what law firms put genuine resources 
into promoting and retaining women, and women of color in 
particular, will probably fare better in finding wonderful oppor-
tunities for a satisfying career that do exist in practice. 
 
CONCLUSION 
  
 Mussey and Gillett founded these two organizations – 
one to train lawyers, one to support them in their practice.  But 
their work is not nearly complete.  The archives tell us that our 
“mothers-in-law” succeeded in opening doors to every legal 
sector for women, obtaining the vote, securing fair pay legisla-
tion, and training generations of women lawyers.  Ninety years 
later, we can be certain that Mussey and Gillett would be proud 
of the partnership that continues between these two institutions.  
For this project, we have gone back to the proverbial well, look-
ing into the legacy of Mussey, Gillett, and the women they 
worked and struggled with for inspiration and ideas.  We hope 
that with the availability of these Archives, others will do the 
same and wind up the unfinished business of Mussey and Gillett. 
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W hile the women I interviewed have distinct racial and ethnic backgrounds, unique legal careers, and a wide array of perspectives, each is an in-spirational trailblazer who overcame multiple 
obstacles in order to achieve success. The women shared with 
me their distinguished histories and revealed how differences in 
gender and culture impact one’s legal experiences. As a current 
law student, I was impressed by their passion for the law and 
their remarkable contributions to the legal field. As a female 
minority law student, I was able to identify with their battles and 
left each interview with a new appreciation for my own history, 
gender and ethnicity.  
As a young Hispanic attorney, Mayda Colón Tsaknis no-
ticed a significant need to deal with legal issues unique to the 
Hispanic community, and so founded the Maryland Hispanic 
Bar Association in 1993. She quickly became its first president. 
Colón Tsaknis was born and raised in Puerto Rico and attended 
St. Mary’s University School of Law in Texas. Soon after 
graduation, she joined the US Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission’s first trial team. She then became General Counsel 
for the Puerto Rican Federal Affairs Administration (“PRFAA”). 
Colón Tsaknis now practices in Rockville, Maryland, at the fully 
bilingual women’s law firm she created in 1992 .  
When The Honorable Jeannie J. Hong was sworn in on 
August 14, 2002 to the District Court of Maryland in Baltimore, 
she became the first female Asian American judge in Maryland. 
She was born in Seoul, South Korea and immigrated to the 
United States at age 2.   After growing up in Centreville, Vir-
ginia, she graduated from American University, Washington 
College of Law in 1992.  Hong spent eight vibrant years as an 
Assistant State’s Attorney for the Baltimore City State’s Attor-
ney’s Office in the Juvenile Division before taking her seat on 
the bench.  
 Jennifer Maree, an Associate Attorney at Patton Boggs 
LLP, is the current President of the Women’s Bar Association of 
the District of Columbia, which is now celebrating its 91st anni-
versary.  After having spent her childhood moving throughout 
the Western United States, she received her Juris Doctorate from 
American University, Washington College of Law in 2001. Be-
fore joining Patton Boggs, Maree was an Honors Attorney at the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.  
 
MAYDA COLON TSAKNIS 
 
When did you decide that you wanted to pursue a career 
in law, and what were some of the motivational forces be-
hind that decision? 
 My family raised my three siblings and me to believe that 
men and women were identical in terms of professional capabil-
ity.  While I was growing up, it was unusual to see many female 
lawyers in the states, however that was not the case in Puerto 
Rico; I was used to seeing female lawyers around.  For a long 
time I envisioned myself becoming an attorney because I be-
lieved that profession really fit my personality.  I was deter-
mined to go to law school either in my country or elsewhere.  
 
Could you recall a professional experience when you 
were particularly self-conscious of or inhibited by your sex 
and/or race?  
In regards to gender, not so much.  But race, yes.  The other 
attorneys on the first trial team of the US Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) consisted of six or seven 
Caucasians and African Americans.  Regardless of the fact that 
it was racially diverse, I felt like I was treated as an unequal.  I 
also stood out for my accent.  To compensate for that, I was al-
ways very well-prepared.  This made me not feel intimidated 
even when, for example, I represented the government by myself 
against corporations who hired ten or so attorneys.  I carried the 
confidence I gained from that experience into my future endeav-
ors. 
 
You mentioned that your accent influenced how you 
were received in court.  Would you mind elaborating?  
One of my law school professors once told me, “I believe 
your accent will be an asset with a jury.”  I have found that to be 
very true.  The fact that it is something different makes people 
listen more carefully to me.  Once, however, a federal judge in 
D.C. stated, “Speak English.  I don’t understand you.”  This was 
very offensive so I asked, “Your Honor, I would like to please 
know whether your saying this is going to be prejudicial to my 
client because you have a bias.”  He was totally taken aback and 
apologized, claiming he didn’t mean it that way.  We have since 
become very good friends and he hasn’t asked me about my 
accent again!  
 
Would you please briefly outline the history of 
Maryland’s Hispanic Bar Association (MHBA)--particularly 
your role in its foundation and as its first president?  How 
did you deal with some of the challenges you faced?   
I went through the Maryland Lawyers’ Manual to iden-
tify some Hispanic attorneys, wrote letters asking them to be the 
first members of the MHBA, and explained the need for a His-
panic Bar Association in our state to protect the rights of our 
people.  Our first agenda in 1993 focused on the issue of the 
interpreters.  There had previously been no minimum qualifica-
tions for Spanish interpreters in Maryland so courts could not 
always distinguish which ones were credible.  The Washington 
Post’s coverage of the MHBA’s initiative to make some mini-
mum qualification requirements generated a lot of publicity and 
our testimony to Congress helped us eventually achieve our goal 
of having very good interpreters in court.   
There were some non-Hispanics who felt that there should-
n’t be a separate bar association for Hispanics because general 
associations were sufficient.  I disagreed and told them that we 
have certain needs particular to us.  A group of people in the 
larger community greatly benefit from our (the MHBA’s) inter-
pretation of legal issues.  
 SPOTLIGHT: FINDING UNITY IN DIVERSITY 
MAYDA COLON TSAKNIS, THE HONORABLE JEANNIE J. HONG, AND JENNIFER MAREE 
By  
Sabrina Khan 
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Famous scholars, perhaps most notably Samuel 
Huntington, have asserted that the Latino/Hispanic popula-
tion in our country is severely insulated due to linguistic and 
cultural differences, and therefore, unlike past immigrant 
populations, will not integrate well into American society.  
Do you agree or disagree, and why? 
People should not lump all Hispanics together.  There are 
professional Hispanics, and Hispanics who have not had the 
opportunity to be educated to the same degree.  There is a large 
group of Hispanic immigrants, the first generation, who only got 
the chance to complete up to fifth or sixth grade levels of educa-
tion in their mother countries.  They deserve a lot of credit be-
cause in an effort to provide their children with the best opportu-
nities possible, they have come to a country which primarily 
uses English, one of the most difficult languages to learn, and 
often work multiple menial jobs that nobody else wants.  They 
are so busy trying to maintain their families that they have no 
time or means by which to improve their English.  After all 
every first-generation population is a little isolated, not because 
they want to be, but because the general population forces them 
to be isolated.  However I think people in the general population 
are increasingly willing to take the time to not only understand, 
but even embrace, the Hispanic culture.  We are a very warm 
people who take well to this.   
 
THE HONORABLE JEANNIE J. HONG 
 
 As a first-generation Asian American woman, did 
you feel pressure from your community and/ or family to 
pursue certain professions?   
Around the time I was born, there weren’t many career op-
portunities available to women in Korea.  Their expected aspira-
tions were mainly to get married.  My parents had two daughters 
for whom they wanted to provide better opportunities so we 
came to the States.  That’s why they sometimes acted like the 
stereotypical Asian parents who pushed their children to become 
professionals.  
 
  Why did you choose this career path? 
My father always aspired to become a judge and was in-
trigued with the law so during my first year as an undergraduate 
student at The University of Virginia, he handed me an LSAT 
book and said, “Start studying!”  I think it was always engi-
neered into me to pursue this career.  But after all that I’ve 
learned and done, I am very glad that I did.  
 
As the first Asian-American female judge in Mary-
land, were you constantly reminded of your racial and cul-
tural background in the courthouse?   
Oh yes, very much.  In Maryland I am one of only two 
Asian American judges, the other being Judge Brian Kim in 
Montgomery County.  When I first got on the bench, I felt like I 
wasn’t just Jeanie Hong, but really Jeanie Hong the representa-
tive of my entire group of people.  There was a lot of pressure 
for my actions, demeanor, and the way I dressed not only reflect 
me, but all Asians in general.  That’s why especially in the be-
ginning, I really made an assertive effort to be professional, re-
spectful, and dress very nicely because I felt like I was being 
observed under a microscope.  It didn’t help that the stereotype 
that Asians look younger than their age actually applied to me.  I 
was thirty-six years old when I began this job so when I entered 
the courthouse my first day, the people at the entrance pointed 
me in the direction of the law clerks’ office!  I’ve been doing 
this for six and a half years now so I think everyone is used to 
seeing me around.  However I think there are always some hur-
dles, especially as a young woman trying to gain a reputation for 
herself, and this is regardless of race.  
 
Do you think your heritage influences your work?  If so, 
how? 
Even though I have to evaluate everyone equally, I come 
from a different cultural perspective which helps me understand 
the dynamics of certain cases well. For example, it’s rare but 
every once in a while I hear a criminal case involving Koreans 
pooling their money together in what is called keh, a practice 
that has been in our culture for generations.  In one situation, 
somebody cheated everyone else out of the money, so another 
member of the group assaulted him.  Because I understood the 
culture, I believe I understood what happened in a different way 
than someone who may not have ever been familiar with that 
idea beforehand.  Also in regards to domestic violence cases, I 
think I understand why Asian women can often be more reticent 
to come to court.  They often fear losing face for the family.     
 
  You have two children and an intense job as a fed-
eral judge in a bustling metropolis with very busy dockets.  
How do you balance all your obligations, whether they be 
familial, professional, personal, etc.? 
Prioritizing is key.  I could not do this without the support 
of family.  As you embark on your legal career, you’ll see that 
through periods of your life, things will ebb and flow.  For ex-
ample, when women have children, the brunt of child-rearing, 
overseeing homework, and similar things may make them feel 
like they cannot participate in as many associations as they’d 
like.  You will always have to balance multiple commitments 
but like I said, prioritizing them and keeping the ebb and flow 
idea in mind is important.  
 
JENNIFER MAREE 
 
You have been an active member of both the Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA) and the Women’s Bar Associa-
tion (WBA).  Besides that the WBA caters specifically to 
women, how would you distinguish its culture from that of 
the ABA?   
I appreciated the fact that the ABA promoted networking 
and career-building experiences.  However as a woman, I didn’t 
really feel like my voice was heard as well as it should have 
been.  Sometimes at ABA events, guys would approach me and 
speak to me in ways that probably weren’t the most professional.  
That’s why I joined the WBA.  I felt much more comfortable in 
that setting, like everyone was on an even playing field.  We 
were there to progress causes particular to women in our field 
about which I felt strongly.  It was nice to be treated completely 
as an equal. 
 
Today, while the U.S. bans gender discrimination, 
glass ceilings and other mechanisms used to suppress women 
remain prevalent throughout many professions, including 
the law.  Have you or any of your female colleagues faced 
professional challenges due to your gender?   
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Absolutely.  Of course it’s in subtle ways.  Even firms and 
other legal organizations which especially pride themselves on 
diversity in terms of numbers, that’s both racial and gender-
wise, have it built into their inner workings.  
 
How would you advise women to deal with such 
situations in their legal careers? 
My advice is to be persistent, be patient, and assertive 
while maintaining a sense of humor about any awkward or frus-
trating situation into which you’re put.  It’s important to espe-
cially remember to be assertive so that we may dispel stereo-
types of us being quiet and submissive, and convey to our male 
colleagues that we notice if we are not being treated as equals.   
 
True or false: Women have it harder than men in 
the working world.  How about the legal world?   
It’s difficult to generalize but I feel that women definitely 
have it harder than men in the working, including the legal, 
world.  Typically, though not always, women have to balance 
taking care of children and managing the household activities 
with work.   If your schedule is like mine, which is the average 
at a large law firm, you spend most of your time at work!  This, 
combined with the fact that women have to work harder to assert 
ourselves, can sometimes transform work into quite an uphill 
battle.  However it’s one definitely worth fighting.  
 
 The term ‘feminist’ has been both celebrated and 
stigmatized.  Do you consider yourself a feminist?  How 
would you define the term? 
Oh yes, I’d definitely say I’m a feminist and I’m proud 
to call myself one.  Too often women shy away from claiming to 
be feminists because they may fear that guys will think they are 
the types to take issue with every single innocent thing they say 
and turn their statements into sexist remarks.  What I think is the 
true definition of feminist, however, is simply someone who 
stands up for the equal rights of women.  There’s nothing any-
one should ever be ashamed of in that.  Keep in mind that I’ve 
also met quite a few male feminists.   
 
You graduated from WCL, founded by the same 
women who played a large part in the creation of the Na-
tional Women’s Bar Association--do you believe this history 
helps strengthen women’s ability to assert themselves in the 
legal profession? 
WCL, more so than probably many other law schools, 
offers so many courses, extracurricular activities, and clinical 
programs which specifically promote women’s rights.  I’m not 
saying that just because a female law student doesn’t participate 
in them does not mean she does not do so in her own way out-
side of school.  But I certainly suggest that everyone, not only 
the female students, check them out.  I feel the same way about 
any other law school experiences, like clubs, which enhance our 
understanding of diversity issues.  I can’t emphasize how impor-
tant it is to always be cognizant of the different perspectives 
people bring to the table in our everyday and professional dis-
cussions. 
(from left to right)   Teresa Godwin Phelps (Director of Legal Rhetoric, Professor at the Washington College of Law), Jamie Abrams 
(Professor at the Washington College of Law and author of Banding Together: Reflections of the Role of the Women’s Bar Associa-
tion of the District of Columbia and the Washington College of Law in Promoting Women’s Rights), and Erica Lounsberry (law stu-
dent at the Washington College of Law).  
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THE UPBRINGING OF A CREATURE: THE SCOPE OF A PARENT’S 
RIGHT TO TEACH CHILDREN TO HATE 
By  
Brooke A. Emery* 
There is no absurdity so ob-
vious that it cannot be firmly 
planted in the human head if 
you only begin to impose it 
before the age of five, by 
constantly repeating it with 
an air of great solemnity.1 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE BIRTH OF A CREATURE 
 
 This paper examines racist2 speech that is passed down 
from parent to child and asks whether the State can constitution-
ally impose regulations3 on such speech.4  The regulation of par-
ent-to-child racist speech implicates 
two distinct constitutional rights: 
one’s right to free speech and a par-
ent’s right to control the upbringing 
of her child.   
 The United States Consti-
tution contemplates that its citizens 
be free to “think as [they] will and 
speak as [they] think.”5  The First 
Amendment protects this freedom 
by prohibiting laws that limit or 
punish speech.6  Perhaps because of 
its prominence as the first of all 
enumerated rights7 or because of its 
simple but magnanimous message,8 
the First Amendment has captured 
the hearts and minds of its citizens:9 it is romanticized by the 
avant-garde as a protector of art and intellectual freedom,10 it 
reverberates throughout suburban lunchrooms as irreverent re-
buttals to schoolhouse teasing,11 and it is proclaimed a tool for 
political and social change by the downtrodden and oppressed.12  
There is no doubt that its tenets, secured by our country’s foun-
ders, have allowed American culture to breathe unorthodox air,13 
a communicative freedom that is often stifled by less expansive 
speech protections in other countries.14  Lurking in the shadows, 
however, is speech’s power to harm.15  Speech, capable of much 
more than mere offense, can cause psychological16 and physi-
cal17 harm to its intended targets, as well as message recipients.18  
 There has been much debate over the legitimacy and 
propriety of regulating racist speech.19  This debate has typically 
focused on racist speech made in a public setting that causes 
harm to the target of the hate speech.  Efforts to regulate such 
speech have largely failed20 because of the doctrinal prohibition 
on regulating speech based on the ideology of its message.21  
 This article argues that the unique nature of parent-to-
child racist speech allows it to be regulated under the present 
First Amendment framework, notwithstanding the failed at-
tempts to regulate other racist speech.  The article further argues 
that such speech should be regulated because the core principles 
that underlie speech protection are not applicable to parent-to-
child racist speech.  By focusing on the child as the hearer of 
hate speech, First Amendment roadblocks that typical hate 
speech regulations run into may be bypassed.  After showing that 
First Amendment principles such as “marketplace” theory and 
autonomy theory are unpersuasive when applied to a child, this 
article will show that the captive audience doctrine allows the 
State to regulate a parent’s decision to raise her child as a racist.   
Parent-to-child racist speech also implicates the consti-
tutional right of a parent to raise her child as she sees fit.  Al-
though a parent has the right to control the upbringing of her 
child, she does not have a right to raise her child as a racist.  The 
Supreme Court has long recognized a parent’s fundamental right 
to control the upbringing of her child as a liberty interest pro-
tected under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  The Fourteenth Amendment, in 
turn, requires that courts show deference 
to a parent’s decisions.22  Underlying this 
right is the presumption that most parents 
act in the best interest of their children.  In 
reality, however, a parent’s decision is not 
always in the best interest of her child.23  
To accommodate this reality, a parent’s 
fundamental right is limited by the rights 
of the child and the State’s interests in 
protecting children from harm and promot-
ing societal well-being.24  
 When a child’s “physical or men-
tal health is jeopardized,” the State has the 
power to abrogate the parent’s rights if it 
is in the best interest of the child.25  Teach-
ing racism to a child jeopardizes a child’s mental and physical 
health.26  Once the harm to a child is established, the State can 
potentially limit a parent’s fundamental right.  In sum, parent-to-
child racist speech can be regulated without violating either a 
parent’s right to free speech or a parent’s right to control the 
upbringing of her child.  
 Part I begins with a discussion of the legal proceedings 
through which the State has the opportunity to regulate parent-
to-child racist speech.  It then discusses how the transmission of 
racist speech from parent to child harms the child.  Part II ad-
dresses the substantive due process analysis.  This Part discusses 
the scope of the parental rearing right, and it shows that the 
State’s interest in protecting the welfare of the child and promot-
ing societal well-being may allow the State to interfere when a 
racist upbringing exists.  Part III begins with an examination of a 
child’s speech rights.  It moves into an explanation of the under-
lying justifications for free speech and argues that they are inap-
posite to parent-to-child racist speech.  Finally, it introduces the 
captive audience exception and shows that parent-to-child racist 
speech is not protected because a child is essentially “captive” to 
her parent’s racist speech.  Part IV concludes with a discussion 
of the obstacles and implications of regulating parent-to-child 
racist speech. 
parent-to-child racist speech can be 
regulated without violating either a 
parent’s right to free speech or a par-
ent’s right to control the upbringing 
of her child.  
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CHILDREN AND RACISM IN THE REAL WORLD 
   
 At a county fair, a young girl sings sweetly in front of a 
small crowd: 
 
Well sit down and listen, to what I have to say.  
Soon will come a great war, a bloody but holy 
day.  And after that purging our people will be 
free, and sing up in the bright skies, a sun for 
all to see. 
 
Times are very tough now for a proud White 
man to live.  And although it may appear that 
this world has no life to give.  Times are soon 
changing, this can[’]t go on [f]or long.  And 
on that joyful summer’s day, we’ll sing our 
Victory song.27  
 
In another part of the country, a young boy comes 
home after school and becomes a virtual Klansman, killing 
Blacks, Latinos, and Jews in an “ethnic cleansing” video game. 
28  Somewhere else, a child creates a kid’s page for his father’s 
hate group’s web site.29  A six-year-old African-American boy 
riding on a school bus sees a group of white men and women 
through the window and proclaims, “I hate white people.”30  
Somewhere else, a group of middle-school children paints swas-
tikas on cars in a predominantly Jewish neighborhood.31  A 
group of high-school students is on trial for brutally beating a 
young girl because of her race.32  
 The aforementioned acts, based on real events, invoke a 
response of sadness for the child, rather than revulsion.  This 
response to children exhibiting racist tendencies stems from a 
sense that the racist child has been robbed of the innocence of 
childhood, and that the adult that she becomes will have been 
robbed of opportunities as she matures down a path already 
paved for her.  Although there are many factors that cause a 
child to hate another based on race, 33 this article addresses only 
parental influence.34  This article sets out to determine whether 
the State may prevent harm to a child and to society from par-
ents who pass racist hatred down to their children.  This section 
begins with a description of the legal arenas in which the State 
may wield its power to restrict racist parental indoctrination.  
 
SOCIAL CONTEXT: INHERITING RACISM 
  
Parents pass down many things to their children: genes, person-
ality traits,35 values, oral histories.36  Some parents pass down 
racism to their children through racist speech.37 
 For the purposes of this article, racist speech is hate 
speech that targets groups or individuals based on race.  There 
are several defining characteristics of hate speech.38  First, hate 
speech sends a message of hatred or contempt. Second, hate 
speech usually conveys a message of inferiority.  Third, its mes-
sage targets a specific group or an individual because she is a 
member of that group.  Racist speech includes racial threats, 
slurs, epithets, symbols, depictions, and “sanitized racist com-
ments.”39  
 The effect on a child of growing up in a racist home has 
not generated much scholarly work and a need exists for a larger 
body of social science and legal research on this topic.  How-
ever, some observations can be gleaned from the field of devel-
opmental psychology and research on racism in general.  Avail-
able research indicates that “[a]ttitudes of prejudice begin to 
form between the ages of 3 and 4 years, with immediate family 
members having the most profound effect on the development of 
attitude and values.”40  Moreover, younger children have a de-
creased cognitive ability to discern reasonable from unreason-
able information, making them more susceptible to racist 
speech.41  Thus, racism should have a more profound effect on 
children, especially younger ones, than on adults.  It is with an 
eye sensitive toward this impressionability of young children to 
racist speech that we turn to discuss racism’s effect on the racist 
speaker. 
 Hate is a defining characteristic of racist speech.  Hate 
is a “complex, affective state alloyed with aggression.  It is 
aroused by the experience of frustration and, in its most stark 
and uncompromising manner, by events that are felt to threaten 
life.”42  Within the psychiatric community, there has been debate 
over whether extreme racism is a serious mental illness. Some 
psychiatrists propose its inclusion in the Diagnostic and Statisti-
cal Manual of Mental Disorders.43 
 Those who argue that racism is a mental illness explain 
that “[extremely racist] patients experience problems of impulse 
disturbance.  This disinhibition may activate inculcated, socially 
learned, biased beliefs; adverse cognitive appraisals and stereo-
types; hostile behaviors toward out-group persons; or some com-
bination of these things.”44  Children, who have lower impulse 
control relative to adults, are therefore more prone to act upon 
racist beliefs.  Researchers have also discovered psychological 
and physiological problems associated with clinical racism: “[f]
requent clinical problems include lability, hypo-mania, and 
marked anxiety.  Additionally, these patients evidence relational 
deficits.  Psychotherapy patients who expressed biased attitudes 
toward members of cultural out-groups . . . also had higher rat-
ings for . . . paranoid, borderline, and antisocial personality dis-
orders, when compared with other psychotherapy patients.”45 
 While there is no conclusive evidence that learning 
racism causes psychological or physiological harm to the racist, 
the law does not always require conclusive evidence in order to 
protect children from likely harm.46  Moreover, racial bias has a 
severe impact on the social competence of the racist:  
 
For patients who evidence severe forms of bias, inter-
group contact is predictably aversive.  For these pa-
tients, out-group persons are often seen as threatening.  
For some clinically biased patients, the solution is 
avoidance.  Other patients experience marked anxiety, 
and yet others express overt hostility. . . Pathologically 
biased patients may engage in overtly hostile behaviors 
in benign intergroup situations.47 
 
 An inability to engage in culturally diverse interactions 
is also a practical disability.  It prohibits the child and future 
adult from fully participating in society, inhibiting even the most 
basic activities, such as going to the grocery store, workplace, or 
voting booths.   
 Parents who instill racist beliefs in their children con-
tribute to their children’s feelings of threat, anxiety, and fear.  
For example, most members of the American white racist move-
ment believe that “they, as White men, are members of an en-
dangered species.”48  Racist parents strip their child of any sense 
of personal security.49  The fear instilled by racist parents goes 
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beyond teaching a child to be cautious about talking to strangers 
or crossing the street.  Whereas there is a rational basis to fear 
crossing the street, the fear of people of another race is irra-
tional.50  Further, racism not only instills fear, but also creates 
contempt and hatred.  It is the combination of both fear and ha-
tred that harms the child. 
 Some members of the psychiatric community have ar-
gued that teaching racism to a child is a form of psychological 
abuse, which constitutes child abuse in some States.51  Psycho-
logical abuse is “sustained inappropriate behaviour which dam-
ages, or substantially reduces, the creative and developmental 
potential of crucially important mental faculties and mental 
processes of a child . . . [including] intelligence, memory, recog-
nition, perception, attention, language and moral develop-
ment.”52  
 One reason offered to show that racist indoctrination is 
psychological abuse is that it adversely affects a child’s moral 
development.  For example, “children taught to hate are pre-
vented from incorporating the desirable virtues of tolerance, 
reverence for life, respect for individual differences and mutual 
understanding,” causing these children to “suffer an arrest in 
their moral development.”53  Recent neurobiology studies have 
also linked early childhood psychological abuse to abnormalities 
in brain development.54  Thus, parent-child hate indoctrination 
may have an irreversible effect on a child’s developing brain. 
 A related concern is that children who are taught to 
hate will later commit hate crimes.  While no definitive link has 
been shown between racist indoctrination during childhood and 
hate crimes, it is estimated that 70% of all hate crimes are com-
mitted by juveniles.55  One possible reason for this statistic is 
that young people are more likely to act on racist beliefs than 
adults.56 
 The power of the State to interfere with a parent’s deci-
sion to raise her child as a racist person rests on the availability 
of legal forums in which the State can exercise its power, the 
type and degree of the parent’s racist behavior, and the extent of 
harm the behavior has on the child.  The next section discusses 
the jurisprudence that has developed around the State’s ability to 
interfere with the family. 
 
LEGAL CONTEXT 
 
 The State plays several substantial roles in protecting 
and supporting children.57  Under the child protection umbrella, 
the State provides services ranging from family counseling to 
parenting education,58 and it governs the removal and termina-
tion of parental rights.59  Under the family dissolution umbrella, 
the State may determine custody of a child, limit visitation 
rights, and order a parent to behave in a specific way to retain 
custody of a child.  Through public assistance, the State aids a 
parent in supporting her child.  In addition, the State influences a 
child’s upbringing by providing public education and mandating 
medical care.60  Each of the aforementioned roles potentially 
provides the State with the opportunity to interfere with a par-
ent’s decision to teach racism to her child.61  However, as State 
intervention is often tied to family failure or dysfunction,62  par-
ents of intact families may be granted more freedom to teach 
racism to their children, and children of intact families may not 
be appropriately protected from racist indoctrination. 
 Today, some courts consider a parent’s use of racist 
speech as a factor in determining custody and visitation rights.63  
In In re Bianca W.F.,64 the Superior Court of Connecticut found 
that “the father’s use of racial slurs or derogatory racial refer-
ences” in front of the children constituted a “continuing form of 
neglect of the children’s educational and moral needs.”65  Courts 
have also ordered parents not to use specific racist language in 
front of their children.66  While this practice has largely escaped 
the notice of all but a few First Amendment scholars,67 this arti-
cle argues that prohibiting or restricting a parent from teaching 
her child to hate is constitutionally permissible.  The contrary 
view is that the consideration of speech in such proceedings is 
impermissible because it violates free speech and substantive 
due process.68  The debate survives partly because of the little 
attention paid to family law proceedings.69  
 Today, amidst war, increasing intolerance of immigra-
tion, and rising hate crime statistics, racist indoctrination of chil-
dren by parents must be examined.  The State can and should 
use its power to protect children from such indoctrination. 
  
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS:  
BALANCING RIGHTS 
 
 Three interests are implicated when the State interferes 
with a parenting decision: (1) the parents’, (2) the State’s, and 
(3) the child’s.70  A court will weigh these interests to determine 
whether a State statute or action infringes on a parent’s constitu-
tional right.    
 The ability of the State to interfere with a parent’s right 
to teach her child racism depends, first, on the relative impor-
tance assigned to the parent’s right to control the upbringing of 
her child.  The United States Supreme Court has found that a 
parent’s right to raise her child is a fundamental right.71  This 
fundamental right of the parent to raise her child as she sees fit 
rests on a presumption that parents act in the best interests of 
their children.72  The parental right in part derives from the 
child’s interest in being taken care of properly; however, real 
world experience calls into question the validity of the presump-
tion that parents always act in their children’s best interest. 
 The Court has also recognized that the State has the 
authority to intervene when a child’s welfare is at stake.  The 
State has greater power over children than it has over adults be-
cause “[a] democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the 
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity 
as citizens, with all that implies.”73  The State may interfere with 
the parent-child relationship where necessary to protect the wel-
fare of the child or to educate future citizens.74 
 The State’s ability to impose itself into the parent-child 
relationship derives not only from its own interest in protecting 
its citizens, but also from the unique constitutional status of the 
child.  A child has constitutional rights, but not to the extent that 
adults do.75  The limitations on a child’s rights are explained by 
the unique characteristics of childhood.  For example, the child’s 
underdeveloped cognitive processes limit a child’s ability to 
make appropriate decisions about her life.  Young children “are 
not able to think abstractly, have a limited future time sense, and 
are limited in their ability to generalize and predict from experi-
ence.”76  For this reason, the law restricts a minor’s choice to 
marry,77 engage in sexual activity with adults,78 consume alco-
hol, and vote in elections.  
 It is often unclear how a parent’s right to control the 
upbringing of her child ought to be balanced against the State’s 
interest in protecting the well-being of the child and the child’s 
individual rights.  The Supreme Court has failed to define the 
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scope of the parental right to control the upbringing of chil-
dren.79  States have largely filled in this gap on a case-by-case 
basis.80  Legal scholars and social scientists have also weighed 
in. One view is that a parent should not have a fundamental right 
to control the upbringing of her child at all.81  A more common 
view—that a parent should have some rights—stops short of 
relegating the child to parental property.82  Under this view, a 
parent should make decisions about her child with limited State 
interference for several reasons: (1) a child cannot support her-
self or make important decisions; (2) optimal child rearing in-
cludes intimate and continuous relationships; (3) parents are in 
the best position to know what is best for the child, and they care 
more about their child than anyone else; and (4) parents have 
traditionally held these rights.83  Additionally, some commenta-
tors justify parental rights by noting 
that parents have a personal interest 
in molding their children in accor-
dance with their desires and ideals.84  
The issue of parent-child racist 
speech falls into the gray area of 
parent-child-state jurisprudence.   
 
SCOPE OF PARENTS’ FUNDAMEN-
TAL RIGHT 
 
 Two of the earliest cases to 
recognize the right to parent were 
Meyer v. Nebraska85 and Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters.86  Both cases in-
volved parents’ right to educate 
their children as they see fit.  Meyer addressed a Nebraska stat-
ute that prohibited the teaching of foreign languages, with the 
exception of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, to school children below 
the eighth grade.87  The purpose of the statute was to “promote 
civic development” by ensuring that children “learn English and 
acquire American ideals” before they are educated in foreign 
languages and ideals.88  The plaintiff, a parochial school teacher, 
was convicted under the statute for teaching a ten-year-old stu-
dent to read German.89  The Court struck down the statute as 
unconstitutional for unreasonably interfering with three inter-
ests: the “calling of modern language teachers,” the 
“opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge,” and the “power 
of parents to control the education” of their children.90  The 
Court was also concerned that the statute would disadvantage 
the foreign-born segment of the population91 absent proof that 
learning foreign languages harmed the health or well-being of a 
child.92  In Meyer, the Court noted that teaching a child German 
was not in fact harmful and that there was some evidence that it 
was actually helpful to a child.93  
 Pierce v. Society of Sisters also recognized a parent’s 
right to control the upbringing of her child.94  In Pierce, the 
Court struck down an Oregon statute that required all parents 
and guardians of children between the ages of eight and sixteen 
to send their children to public school.95  Two private schools 
challenged the statute on the basis that compulsory public school 
attendance threatened business.96  The Court rested its decision 
on the statute’s impermissible interference with the plaintiff’s 
property rights.97  In reaching its decision, however, the Court 
found the statute was not a proper exercise of State power be-
cause it unreasonably and arbitrarily interfered “with the liberty 
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education 
of children under their control.”98  The Court reasoned that the 
underlying purpose of the parental right is “to recognize and 
prepare him for additional obligations.”99  According to the 
Court, “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State.”100  The 
State thus has a limited role in raising a child. 
 Meyer and Pierce both suggest that the parent’s interest 
in controlling the upbringing of her child can outweigh the 
State’s interest.  Later cases reinforced the fundamental right of 
a parent to control the upbringing of her child.101  In 2000, in 
Troxel v. Granville, the Court struck down a Washington statute 
that allowed a judge to override a parent’s decision not to allow 
third-party visitation with her child.102  The plurality reaffirmed 
the presumption that fit parents act in their children’s best inter-
est.103  The Court recognized the parental interest in the care, 
custody, and control of their children as “perhaps the oldest of 
the fundamental liberty interests recog-
nized by the Court.”104  The broad nature 
of the statute105 and the failure to accord 
deference to the parent’s choice made 
this statute unconstitutional.106  
So long as a parent adequately cares for 
his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will 
normally be no reason for the State to 
inject itself into the private realm of the 
family to further question the ability of 
the parent to make the best decisions 
concerning the rearing of that parent’s 
children.107 
  
LIMITS ON PARENTS’ RIGHT 
 
 The parental right is not without limits.  The State’s 
power to limit a parent’s child rearing discretion is at its highest 
when the child’s physical or mental health is jeopardized.108  
The State, however, has the power to interfere even if the par-
ent’s decision does not severely jeopardize the child’s health.  
An early case to recognize the limits on parental rights was 
Prince v. Massachusetts.109  In Prince, the Court held that the 
State’s power to ensure that “children be both safeguarded from 
abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and inde-
pendent well-developed men and citizens” outweighed the par-
ent’s interest.110  The statute in Prince imposed criminal sanc-
tions on guardians who permitted their minor children to sell 
newspapers or other literature on the street.111  The plaintiff, a 
Jehovah’s Witness, was charged with violating the statute when 
she and her niece were distributing religious pamphlets for a 
suggested donation of five cents.112  The Court concluded that 
while the “custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in 
the parents,” the State can override the parent’s right in order to 
guard the child’s well-being,113 which may include “matters of 
conscience and religious conviction.”114  State power over mat-
ters of conscience strengthens its ability to regulate parent-child 
hate indoctrination, which is largely a matter of conscience.   
 Thus, the limit on a parent’s fundamental right and the 
State’s powerful interest in protecting the well-being of its chil-
dren leaves room for the State to intervene when a parent’s racist 
speech harms the child’s mental health, public safety, or peace 
and order.  Even so, before the State may intervene it must over-
come a separate constitutional concern: the parent’s and the 
child’s right to free speech.  This constitutional concern is the 
focus of the following section. 
 
 
the limit on a parent’s fundamental 
right and the State’s powerful interest 
in protecting the well-being of its 
children leaves room for the State to 
intervene when a parent’s racist 
speech harms the child’s mental 
health, public safety,  
or peace and order.   
   64                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           THE MODERN AMERICAN 
 
III.FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
 
 Under the First Amendment, regulating parent-to-child 
racist speech implicates both the parent’s right to speech and the 
child’s right to access speech.   
 
 
CHILDREN AND FIRST AMENDMENT COMMENTARY 
 
The cognitive, moral, and emotional immaturity of  
children can render them especially vulnerable to some forms of 
expression that they are ill equipped to protect themselves from. 
They depend on others to advance their crucial interests and 
protect them from harm.115 
 
 Over the course of a lifetime, welfare interests wane 
and liberty interests wax.  When a person is born, she cannot 
care for herself and therefore has the greatest interest in being 
cared for.  As she matures, she becomes better able to take care 
of herself, so her welfare interest decreases.  Liberty interests, or 
interests in being free, increase as a child grows into an autono-
mous being.  Paternalism is thus less offensive to a child than to 
an adult.116  
 The scope of the child’s right to free speech depends on 
a balancing of welfare or developmental interests and liberty 
interests.117  Developmental interests are comprised of two types 
of interests: those interests that affect the present well-being of 
the child and those interests that are held in trust.118  Describing 
the present developmental interests of a child, one commentator 
suggests: 
 
[B]ecause we must show concern for the quality of the 
experience of childhood, we have reason to insulate 
children from unsettling materials even if exposure 
does not result in significant harm . . . We do not aug-
ment the quality of children’s lives by exposing them to 
materials that they cannot grasp, but which nonetheless 
elicit strong unsettling responses 
from them.119  
 
The developmental interests of a child are 
harmed by racist indoctrination.120  If a 
child manifests the psychological and 
physical effects of clinical racism,121 her 
quality of life during childhood is low.  
 Future-oriented interests are 
those that “equip children with the habits 
and capacities for reflective deliberation and self-direction that 
will permit them to live successful and responsible adult 
lives.”122  If an activity harms a child’s ability to develop a sense 
of justice or hinders growth of deliberative faculties, then the 
child’s developmental interests are harmed.123  It is in this sense 
that it can be said that hate speech indoctrination has a 
“silencing effect” on the child.  “If children are to become the 
sort of beings for whom full rights of free expression are valu-
able, then the moral capacities on which the value of these rights 
depends must be suitably nurtured and developed.”124  Indoctri-
nating a child with racist hate or fear of race extinction silences 
future speech, thus degrading the interest that the First Amend-
ment was meant to protect.  While most of the scholarship dis-
cussing First Amendment rights during childhood primarily ad-
dresses children’s access to obscenity and violence, much of the 
argument is applicable to hate speech.  There is a presumption in 
much of the scholarship that the State and parents agree that 
children should not be subject to obscenity and violence, or that 
the State can regulate only in situations where the parent invites 
such intervention.   
Kevin Saunders discusses the effect on a child of learn-
ing hate speech,125 arguing that “a racist child is of questionable 
psychological health, and the existence of hate-based crime 
demonstrates the danger of racism to community safety, so at-
tempts to teach racism to children harm both the psychological 
health of children and the physical safety of society.”126  Saun-
ders focuses on the constitutionality of prohibiting third parties 
from teaching racism to a child.  In developing his thesis, how-
ever, he states without analysis that the State would have no 
right to interfere if the parent wanted the child to receive hate 
material from a third party.127  This article rejects that argument 
because it fails to consider the State’s two distinct interests in 
protecting a child: a parens patriae interest and an interest in 
aiding the parent.  Saunders thus overlooks the ability of the 
State, as parens patriae, to protect the child from receiving rac-
ist information even when the parent wants the child to receive 
the information. 
 The Supreme Court recognized the two interests of the 
State in Ginsberg v. New York, in which the Court upheld the 
conviction of a luncheonette owner for selling sexually explicit 
magazines to a minor, in violation of New York law.128  The 
Court identified two legitimate interests that granted the State 
the power to restrict children’s access to speech.  The first inter-
est is the State’s “independent interest” in fulfilling its parens 
patriae function—in protecting the well-being of its youth and 
in seeing “that they are safeguarded from abuses which might 
prevent their growth into free and independent well-developed 
men and citizens.”129  The second interest is the State’s function 
in aiding parents in their role of parent.130  The first interest is 
most salient in determining the State’s power to interfere with 
parental discretion.  
 Restricting a parent’s ability to transmit racism to their 
children serves the State’s parens 
patriae interest when the child’s 
well-being is harmed and her abil-
ity to grow into an independent, 
well-developed citizen is hindered 
by the parent’s racist ideas.  For 
example, the parens patriae inter-
est is served by protecting a young 
child from being taught songs that 
call for a racial holy war and pro-
claim the inferiority of other races.  The developmental effects 
of racism on a child, which support this assertion, are discussed 
in Part I. 
 Modern cases that restrict a child’s access to harmful 
information must deal with the effect that any restriction may 
have on adult access to information.131  FCC v. Pacifica Foun-
dation recognized that children can be protected from offensive 
speech by restricting broadcasting of offensive speech to hours 
when children will not likely be listening.132  Unlike restricting a 
radio broadcast to certain hours, which may potentially affect a 
large number of willing adult radio listeners, restricting a parent 
from teaching racism to her children will have only a nominal 
effect on third-party adults.  Any restrictions would affect only a 
parent’s speech to her own child.  It is likely that no one but the 
parent and child will be affected by the restriction.  
Indoctrinating a child with racist 
hate or fear of race extinction si-
lences future speech, thus degrading 
the interest that the First Amendment 
was meant to protect.   
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NO MARKET PLACE FOR CHILDREN 
 
 An abundance of scholarship has been dedicated to 
explaining why speech must be protected from government 
regulation.  The first justification is that free speech unearths the 
truth.133  Justice Holmes argued that free speech is essential to 
finding truth and that only through a clash of ideas can truth be 
attained.134  According to Holmes, “the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market.”135  John Stuart Mill, British philosopher and politi-
cal economist, provided a similar justification for protecting 
speech:  
 
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing expression of an opin-
ion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as 
well as the existing generation; those who dissent from 
the opinion, still more than those who hold it.  If the 
opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of 
exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is 
almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and 
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision 
with error.136  
 
Suppressing speech would have the unin-
tended ramification of driving speech underground and 
effectively allowing bad ideas to “smolder,” rather than 
being ousted through opposition.137  Consistent with the 
marketplace of ideas is the argument that offensive 
speech should be combated with more speech rather 
than with censorship.138  
 
 The marketplace of ideas argument has been criticized 
on several grounds.139  First, proponents of the market-failure 
model argue that there are inequities in the speech market, such 
as lack of media access, that create a need for market interven-
tion.140  Second, critics argue that absolute protection of speech 
is unjustifiable even though “truth” may eventually prevail be-
cause the harm caused in the short term is too great.141  
 In the context of speaking to a child, the marketplace of 
ideas is untenable.  First, children “lack the experiential basis of 
adults and are more likely to be led astray.”142  They often lack 
the capacity to distinguish poorly reasoned ideas from well-
reasoned ideas.143  The marketplace theory presupposes that the 
“buyers” of ideas will have the capacity to reason.  Thus, where 
the “buyers” in a market are children, the truth is less likely to 
surface, if at all.  Our society acknowledges that a child has no 
real bargaining power and cannot be counted on to make serious 
decisions responsibly.  This is exemplified by the fact that chil-
dren are shielded from other free markets as well (e.g., children 
may not work, buy cigarettes or alcohol, or obtain a credit card).   
 Second, with respect to children, the marketplace of 
ideas is not competitive.  Parents are the major source of ideas 
for young children, especially those who are home-schooled or 
isolated.  If prejudices begin to form around three or four years 
of age, being exposed to different ideas in school after age three 
or four will not successfully correct the bias.144  Just as there is 
skewed access to media for adults,145 parents occupy a dispro-
portionate market share when it comes to their children. 
 The second justification for free speech is that it acts as 
a check on abuse of governmental authority by enabling people 
to speak out against the government and reveal truths about 
those who have political power.146  One view is that this justifi-
cation survives when applied to parent-to-child speech: 
“Government power to coercively restrict parental speech, on 
top of its power to engage in its own speech in public schools, 
would tend to cement existing orthodoxies and suppress poten-
tially valuable but unpopular ideas.”147  This argument misses 
the point that whatever value the expression of potentially valu-
able but unpopular ideas may have, this value is lost on children 
who are unable to comprehend the information.  When a child 
reaches maturity, a parent’s racist speech will be less harmful to 
the child, and thus such “unpopular ideas” will not be absolutely 
prohibited.  
 The third justification for free speech is that a democ-
racy relies on the ability of its members to debate political issues 
and make informed choices.  Free expression must be the center-
piece of self-government.  The self-governance argument148 sug-
gests that “[s]elf-government can exist only insofar as the voters 
acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous de-
votion to the general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is 
assumed to express.”149  When we are speaking of those who do 
not participate in the political process, however, this argument is 
not persuasive.  Because children are not allowed to vote, the 
political process is not weakened by restricting adults from ex-
pressing political ideas to children.  This is especially true for 
very young children who do not possess the cognitive ability 
even to understand political ideas.  Of course, children become 
future voters, so there is an interest in preparing them for their 
political role by exposing them to diverse beliefs when they are 
capable of understanding them.  However, these goals are fur-
thered by preserving the autonomy of future generations of vot-
ers, not by indoctrinating with racist hate.  Where a child has 
been taught to hate, she will not be in a position to make in-
formed choices, for her ability to make choices based on reason, 
rather than on preprogrammed fear and contempt, will have been 
impaired.   
 A non-instrumental justification for protecting speech 
is that it respects individual autonomy and nurtures certain be-
neficent character traits.150  According to this view, the practice 
of tolerating offensive speech rather than punishing it serves the 
individual and society by providing a forum for people to exer-
cise their “capacity for tolerance,” which translates generally 
into a disposition of restraint and self-denial.151  For example, 
“[s]imply coexisting and overcoming the wish to establish an 
overly homogenized society are important goals,” and “free 
speech may simply function as a zone of extreme tolerance, not 
because the behavior tolerated is important to human self-
realization or to truth, but because as a practical matter living 
with divergent behavior is necessary.”152  It is inapposite, how-
ever, to argue that teaching children to hate based on race cre-
ates a general atmosphere of tolerance on the playground.  An 
adult racist arguably has chosen to be racist.  Thus, it makes 
sense to suggest that forcing one to hear another’s racist beliefs 
may create a more tolerant society.  Unlike racist speech among 
adults, allowing children to be indoctrinated for the sake of nur-
turing a tolerant society sacrifices the well-being of the child for 
the mere possibility that a tolerant society will emerge.  This 
sacrifice is too costly.  
 One argument against the absolute protection of hate 
speech that is relevant to parent-to-child hate speech focuses on 
the expressive function of the law.  In the hate speech context, 
the proponents of this view argue that by protecting hate speech, 
the law endorses of hate speech.  This argument is even more 
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persuasive when applied to parent-to-child hate speech.  A child, 
with a developing identity and a developing sense of self, may 
look to the law as guidance on what society approves.  By per-
mitting a parent to teach racist hate to a child, the law implies 
societal approval and even suggests encouragement of prejudi-
cial ideas.153 
 
CONTOURS OF FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE 
 
 The most basic and inaccurate interpretation of the First 
Amendment is that it is absolute, that it protects all speech.154  
Until 1931, the First Amendment applied only to Congress.155  
Thus, free speech protections were once much more limited than 
most people have come to expect.156  The key to assessing and 
predicting the constitutionality of certain speech regulations lies 
in navigating the turbulent waters of free speech rules and ex-
ceptions.  One of the most important rules in First Amendment 
jurisprudence is that speech restrictions must be both content 
and viewpoint neutral:  
 
[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that gov-
ernment has no power to restrict expression because of 
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content . . 
. [T]here is an ‘equality of status in the field of ideas,’ 
and government must afford all points of view an . . . 
opportunity to be heard.157  
The regulation of parent-to-child racist speech 
violates the content-neutral requirement. One could 
argue that the restriction derives from the harm it 
causes to children and not its message, but that argu-
ment masks the true motivation.158  Even if the regula-
tion is content-based, the captive audience doctrine 
may allow the speech to be regulated. 
 
 The Supreme Court has identified a hierarchy of pro-
tected speech based on the value of the speech.159  The speech 
with the highest value is political speech because there is 
“practically universal agreement that a major purpose of the 
First Amendment was to protect the free discussion of govern-
mental affairs.”160  Political speech “includes discussion of can-
didates, structures and forms of government, the manner in 
which government is operated or should be operated, and all 
such matters relating to the political process.”161  Restrictions on 
this category receive strict scrutiny, the most stringent protection 
under the First Amendment.  Speech with lower value, such as 
obscenity162 and commercial speech,163 is easier for the govern-
ment to regulate.   
 Thus, a relevant question is whether parent-to-child 
racist speech is high-value or low-value speech.  Some racist 
speech carries a political message and therefore should be con-
sidered high-value speech, although perhaps not as valuable as 
speech directly concerning a political campaign.  On the other 
hand, some parent-to-child racist speech (e.g., speech regarding 
the social characteristics of a race and degrading speech) may 
not be political speech and should receive lesser status.  How-
ever, a viable argument may be made that no speech to a child is 
political speech because a child cannot comprehend such politi-
cal ideas.  Even if parent-to-child racist speech is considered to 
be of lower value, the Supreme Court has held that content-
based regulations of unprotected speech must still meet strict 
scrutiny.164  In sum, parent-to-child racist speech regulations that 
restrict political speech based on content place an extremely 
high burden on the government to overcome.  That burden may 
be overcome by the captive audience doctrine. 
 
FREEDOM FROM BEING CAPTIVE TO RACIST SPEECH165 
 
[A]child—like someone in a captive audience—is not possessed 
of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presuppo-
sition of First Amendment  
guarantees.166  
 
 Under the captive audience doctrine, speech is ex-
empted from First Amendment protection if it is delivered to a 
captive listener.167  The exception potentially allows the Court to 
sidestep the content-neutrality requirement of the First Amend-
ment and to curtail political expression.168 
 A captive audience, in the First Amendment sense, de-
scribes listeners who, under certain circumstances, cannot es-
cape offensive language.169  The degree and type of captivity 
necessary to invoke this doctrine is often a central point of con-
tention and confusion.170  Critics first point to the ambiguity of 
the word “captive,” arguing that “[w]e are always captive in 
some senses, and never captive in others . . . [W]e are virtually 
never captive, because there is almost always something we can 
do to avoid exposure to whatever we find most offensive.”171  
The more central problem in employing this doctrine, 
however, is that the Court has been unclear in its application of 
the doctrine.172  It is difficult to find guiding language in case 
law or a common thread among cases that apply the captive au-
dience doctrine.173  For example, the Court has found people 
entering health facilities captive to anti-abortion protests.174  It 
has also found a person riding in a car or at home listening to the 
radio captive to an offensive radio broadcast;175 a homeowner 
captive to focused residential picketing;176 a homeowner captive 
to sexually oriented mailings that she has requested not to re-
ceive;177 and a public bus rider captive to political campaign 
advertising on the bus.178  It is difficult to discern an identifiable 
pattern from which a person can determine whether the captive 
audience doctrine should apply in a specific case. 
 Several concepts have been offered to make sense of 
First Amendment captivity.179  The first basic concept is that the 
captive audience doctrine is founded upon preserving “the right 
to be let alone” or “the right to privacy.”180  Two principles un-
derlie this right: an autonomy interest and a right to repose.181  
The second concept is that the State has an interest in protecting 
the privacy rights of an unwilling listener. 
The autonomy principle is common to both the right to 
free speech and the right to privacy.  Being free to speak one’s 
mind nurtures and preserves individual autonomy.182  Likewise, 
being able to choose the ideas and thoughts to which one is ex-
posed nurtures and preserves individual autonomy.183  Despite 
the various plausible definitions for the word “captivity,” at its 
core, captivity suggests that a captive person is one who is de-
prived of autonomy or meaningful choice.  With that definition 
in mind, the captive audience doctrine can be understood as a 
tool that balances power between the captor and the captive in 
order to restore individual autonomy.184  
These underlying principles reveal that the goals of the 
First Amendment and the right to privacy are not in conflict: by 
placing a premium on autonomy, both require protection of the 
child from racist indoctrination.  Because the young mind is so 
easily, and often irreversibly, shaped, parent-to-child racist 
speech disturbs the autonomy of the future adult.  The State has 
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an interest in protecting the autonomy rights of the future adult 
disturbed by such speech. 
 In addition to the right to make individual choices, the 
right to be let alone is concerned with the right to repose or to be 
at peace.  This right is most often violated when a person is be-
ing disturbed at home.  This is so because if she cannot retreat to 
her home, there may be nowhere to retreat at all.  Consequently, 
the home has a special status in captive audience jurispru-
dence.185  The right to repose in one’s home has a strong impli-
cation for parent-to-child racist indoctrination because such 
communication likely occurs in the home.  Thus, the child has 
nowhere to retreat from unwanted racist inculcation.  In sum, 
both the child’s autonomy interest and the child’s right to repose 
the two interests the captive audience doctrine endeavors to pro-
tect will be served if the captive audience doctrine is applied to 
the parent-to-child hate speech paradigm.  
The State also has an interest in protecting the unwill-
ing listener.  In the parent-to-child hate speech paradigm, the 
child may seem to be a willing listener.  Being willing, however, 
presupposes that the listener has a choice.  In the parent-to-child 
model, the child has no choice and is therefore presumptively 
unwilling.  A young child is truly captive to her parents.186  She 
cannot decide to be born, to be born into a particular family, or 
to be provided with a particular level of care.187  In addition, 
“[w]hatever chance [she] may have at achieving autonomy de-
pends on the emotional and material resources invested during 
[her] childhood.”188  Because a child is dependent upon her 
guardian189 for everyday necessities, a child has no choice but to 
listen.190  In that sense, a child is powerless to turn off harmful 
speech.   
 
 
CONCLUSION: WAIT UNTIL THEY’RE OLDER 
 
 Free speech and a parent’s right to control the upbring-
ing of her child are two of the most important rights granted by 
the United States Constitution.  Both rights protect and reflect 
autonomy and privacy.  They secure a profound sense of liberty, 
under which this country has flourished.  At the same time, both 
rights have limitations founded on a basic principle of collective 
well-being.  Those limitations are at its strongest when the well-
being of a child is at stake.  While a child is not a mere creature 
of the State, neither is a child a mere creature of her parents.  
The reality is that some parents do not act with the best interests 
of their child in mind.  As social science research suggests, a 
parent who raises her child as a racist does not act in the best 
interests of her child.  Therefore, a parent’s right to control the 
upbringing of her child may be limited by the State’s power to 
protect the child’s well-being.   
 The State’s power to restrict a parent from indoctrinat-
ing her child is governed by both the free speech doctrine and 
the substantive due process doctrine.  Under the best-interests-
of-the-child standard, the State may interfere with a parent’s 
right to control the upbringing of the child, though the State ac-
tion must meet strict scrutiny to prevail on constitutional 
grounds.  The precise scope of the State’s power under this stan-
dard is unclear and is largely within the court’s discretion.  Wide 
discretion in this area may be problematic because it leaves it up 
to a judge, with little guidance, to decide what is best for the 
child.   
 Under the captive audience doctrine, a state may have 
the power to limit a parent’s racist speech to her child because 
the child is captive to her parent’s speech.  The main theoretical 
obstacle to regulating parent-to-child hate speech is that it inter-
feres with one of the central tenets of free speech: the content 
and viewpoint-neutrality requirement.  It is not up to the govern-
ment to prescribe orthodoxy.  Proscribing parent-to-child hate 
speech can be considered a viewpoint-neutral restriction—that 
is, no one can teach their children to hate.  Even if the neutrality 
requirement is not met, the captive audience doctrine may allow 
the State to bypass the requirement when the child is deemed 
captive to her parent’s hate speech. 
 There are also several practical obstacles that must be 
addressed if the State is to regulate parent-to-child hate speech.  
First, the State may not be in a position to know what a child is 
learning in the home.  A possible answer to this obstacle would 
be to treat parental racist indoctrination as akin to child abuse.  
Like child abuse, there are physical and verbal manifestations of 
racism.  A second related obstacle is finding a plaintiff to assert 
the child’s rights in court.  A possible solution is that, as in child 
abuse cases, the State could assert the child’s rights.  A next 
friend or a guardian ad litem can be assigned.   
 Even if a way to enforce a regulation or rule is found, 
there is the potential that the restrictions will disproportionately 
affect divorced parents, single parents, or African-American 
parents because of their overrepresentation in the legal system.  
Affording a judge broad discretion may also lead to inconsistent 
application.   
 Another obstacle to regulating parent-to-child hate 
speech is the ability to find an appropriate remedy.  Absent other 
evidence of abuse, separating a child from her parent may be too 
extreme, especially when such separation is based on inconclu-
sive science and inconsistent application of the law.  A practical 
response would instead be a judicial order not to use specific 
language in front of the child or mandatory enrollment in a toler-
ance workshop for the parent and child. 
 This article is just a small step toward the goal of pro-
tecting children from their parents’ racist indoctrination.  It sets 
forth a possible goal, though one with many well-intentioned 
legal obstacles in the way.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   68                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           THE MODERN AMERICAN 
 
ENDNOTES  
 
*J.D., Emory University School of Law (2008). Thanks to Alissa Jones, Julie 
Seaman, and the participants of the Spring 2007, Emory University School of 
Law Seminar on the Intersection of Free Speech and Equality for encouragement 
and helpful comments. 
1Arthur Schopenhauer, Psychological Observations, in STUDIES IN PESSIMISM: 
THE ESSAYS OF ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER 29 (T. Baily Saunders trans., London 
Swan Sonnenschein & Co. 3d ed. 2004). 
2 The focus of the paper is racist hate speech. A similar argument could be made 
for other forms of hate speech, such as that based on gender, religion, national-
ity, and sexual orientation. Some examples used in this paper include other 
forms of hate speech. 
3 Throughout this paper, “regulations” will refer to statutorily and judicially 
imposed prohibitions, limitations, and restrictions.  
4 Racist speech passed on from parent to child encompasses a wide range of 
activity.  See discussion infra Part II. 
5 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
6 The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging 
the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The First Amendment applies to 
States as well as to Congress.  See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 
(1925) (“For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech 
and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment 
by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ pro-
tected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment 
by the States.”). 
7 OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 12 (1996) (“The First Amendment 
should be first, they argue . . . [But] [t]he firstness of the First Amendment ap-
pears to be little more than an assertion or slogan.”). 
8 Id. at 5 (“The First Amendment —almost magisterial in its simplicity . . .”). 
9 Henry Louis Gates, Jr., War of Words: Critical Race Theory and the First 
Amendment, in SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX: HATE SPEECH, CIVIL 
RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 17, 18 (1994) (“[I]f America has a civic religion 
today, the First Amendment may be its central credo.”); CATHARINE 
MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 76-77 (1993) (“[T]hose who embrace [free speech] 
think it is their own personal faith, their own original view.”). 
10 See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND RO-
MANCE (1990).  Other commentators have rejected the romanticized notion of 
free speech.  See Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public 
Choice and the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 555 (1991). 
11 American children, at least where the author grew up, defend their words by 
invoking the First Amendment. Two typical retorts are “It’s a free country” and 
“Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words can never hurt me.”  See 
GATES, supra note 9, at 18; MACKINNON, supra note 9, at 76 (“Americans are 
taught this view by about the fourth grade and continue to absorb it through 
osmosis from everything around them for the rest of their lives.”). 
12 See Chris Demaske, Modern Power and the First Amendment: Reassessing 
Hate Speech, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 273, 273 (2004) (“By protecting dissident 
speech, the First Amendment purports to offer a way for subordinate social 
groups to participate in political discourse, to hold and exercise power through 
communication”).  Free speech advocates credit the advancement of the civil 
rights movement to free speech.  These advocates point to protesting and prohib-
iting States from curbing such protests.  But see FISS, supra note 7, at 12 (“Those 
favoring liberty often refer to the role that free speech played in securing equal-
ity during the 1960s, suggesting that free and open debate is a precondition for 
achieving a true and substantive equality. But certainly the converse may also be 
true: that a truly democratic politics will not be achieved until conditions of 
equality have been fully satisfied.”). 
13 See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941) (“[The First Amendment] 
is a prized American privilege to speak one’s mind, although not always with 
perfect good taste.”); MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF 
DEPENDENCY, at xiv (2004) (“[Americans] have a historic and highly romanti-
cized affair with the ideals of the private and the individual, as contrasted with 
the public and the collective, as the appropriate units of focus in determining 
social good.”). 
14 European speech laws more strictly regulate hate speech.  See, e.g., Karen L. 
Bird, Racist Speech or Free Speech? A Comparison of the Law in France and 
the United States, COMP. POL. 399, 400 (2000) (“Freedom of speech is more 
widely protected in the United States than in any other country.”); Kevin Boyle, 
Hate Speech—The United States Versus the Rest of the World?, 53 ME. L. REV. 
488 (2001) (discussing the differences between American and foreign govern-
ments’ reactions to hate speech); Claudia E. Haupt, Regulating Hate Speech—
Damned If You Do and Damned If You Don’t: Lessons Learned from Comparing 
the German and U.S. Approaches, 23 B.U. INT’L L. J. 299 (2005) (providing an 
in-depth analysis of German and U.S. hate speech regulation and discussing the 
utility of comparative analysis as applied to hate speech regulations); Michel 
Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analy-
sis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523 (2003) (providing a comparative analysis of hate 
speech jurisprudence); Robert A. Sedler, An Essay on Freedom of Speech: The 
United States Versus the Rest of the World, 2 MICH. ST. L. REV. 377 (2006) 
(exploring the differences between American and foreign governments’ treat-
ment of hate speech). 
15 Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: A Response To Critics, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 979, 980 (1990) (“Some speech, in fact, has a great capacity for harm.”).  
16 Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s 
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2336 (1989). Psychological harms of being the 
target of racist speech include feelings of worthlessness, humiliation, isolation, 
and self-hatred. It may also cause psychological disorders and cause a person to 
turn to drugs and alcohol as a way of coping with low self-esteem.  Id. at 2336 
n.84. See also Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial 
Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982) 
(discussing social science research on harms caused by racist speech). 
17 Victims of hate propaganda experience fear, which may manifest as pain in the 
stomach, rapid pulse rate, difficulty breathing, nightmares, hypertension, and 
suicide. Matsuda, supra note 16, at 2336.  
18 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
19 Many scholars have argued that hate speech should be regulated.  See, e.g., 
Charles R. Lawrence III, Crossburning and the Sound of Silence: Antisubordina-
tion Theory and the First Amendment, 37 VILL. L. REV. 787 (1992) (proposing 
to inject the principle of antisubordination into First Amendment jurisprudence 
in order to give a voice to targets of racist speech); Matsuda, supra note 16, at 
2380 (arguing for a recognition of harms to victims of hate speech caused by 
both the racist speech itself and by State authorization of such harmful speech).  
But see Bollinger, supra note 15, at 980 (arguing that protecting even the worst 
and most appalling speech is beneficial to society). For a catalog of neoconserva-
tive arguments against regulating hate speech, see Richard Delgado & David 
Yun, The Neoconservative Case Against Hate-Speech Regulation—Lively, 
D’Souza, Gates, Carter, and the Toughlove Crowd, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1807 
(1994). 
20 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down a hate 
speech ordinance on the ground that it was not content neutral). 
21 Content neutrality is a key principle of First Amendment jurisprudence. The 
Supreme Court has consistently held that the First Amendment must protect 
citizens from speech regulations based on the ideology of its message. See id. at 
382 (holding that “[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid”).  Hate 
speech regulation is considered content based because it favors non-racist ide-
ologies over racist ideologies. The implication of this rule is that a content-
neutral hate speech regulation would require a regulation that regulates anti-hate 
speech to the same extent as it regulates racist speech in order to pass constitu-
tional muster.  Anatole France illuminates the absurdity of this application: “The 
law, in its infinite majesty, forbids rich and poor alike from sleeping under 
bridges.” Quoted in GATES, supra note 9, at 32.  
22 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“[T]he interest of 
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest 
of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”). Technically, the 
First Amendment applies to State action through the Fourteenth Amendment 
liberty interest.  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). To avoid confu-
sion in this article, the Fourteenth Amendment and substantive due process will 
refer only to the right of a parent to control the upbringing of her child and not to 
free speech. 
23 For example, Judge Nanette Dembitz reveals that “mothers who opposed their 
daughters’ abortions have expressed a vengeful desire to punish the daughter for 
her sexual activity by making her suffer [an] unwanted child, a fervor to impose 
a religious conviction the mother has failed to instill in her daughter, a hope of 
caring for her daughter’s baby as her own because of an inability or unwilling-
ness to bear another child herself, a defensive or resentful attitude because she 
bore illegitimate children without seeking or being able to secure an abortion, or 
a general distaste for abortion.”  Katheryn D. Katz, The Pregnant Child’s Right 
to Self-determination, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1119, 1161-62 (1999) (quoting Nanette 
Dembitz, The Supreme Court and a Minor's Abortion Decision, 80 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1251, 1255 (1980)). 
24 See Parnham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (“Nonetheless, we have recog-
nized that a state is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in 
dealing with children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized.”). 
25 See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Spiering v. Heinman, 448 F. Supp.2d 1129 
Special - Fall 2008                                                                                                                                                                                 69  
 
(2006) (holding that a State law requiring parents to get metabolic testing for 
their infant does not violate the parents’ fundamental liberty right to control the 
upbringing of their child). 
26 Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637 
(2006). 
27 This example is based on Prussian Blue, a blond-haired, blue-eyed teenage 
neo-Nazi singing duo. PRUSSIAN BLUE, Victory Day, on FRAGMENT OF THE 
FUTURE (Resistance Records 2004), available at http://www.lyrics007.com/
Prussian%20Blue%20Lyrics/Victory%20Day%20Lyrics.html. 
28 Ethnic Cleansing is a video game created by Resistance Records, in which the 
player can choose to be a skinhead or Klansman. The player runs through the 
ghetto, killing blacks and Latinos, until finally reaching the “Jewish Control 
Center.”  To win the game, the player must assassinate former Israeli Prime 
Minister, Ariel Sharon.  Anti-Defamation League, ADL Report: Growing Prolif-
eration of Racist Video Games Target Youth on the Internet (2002), available at 
http://www.adl.org/PresRele/Internet_75/4042_72.htm.  The game’s website has 
posted the following reviews, which I reproduce here without alteration:  
 
Just got my game, E.C. and wanted to say thank’s com-
rades! You have made me so fuckin happy, tear’s are 
rollin off my white face and on to my assault rifle which I 
must now clean to prevent rust! You bastard’s(lol)......I 
dont want to seem ungrateful but is there any chance of a 
patch, that can include new’s reporter’s or gook’s? – 
Nolan   
 
I got a beta test version 4.01 and it was a scream! . . . I 
made my way down some stairs and went outside, at once, 
I was being shot at by ghetto groids, I swung into action 
and blasted the nig, copius amounts of blood spewed from 
the nig and the sound of the nigs death left me in stitches! 
The sound is like a monkey being killed by asians for a 
meal of brains! I proceeded to shoot niggers and spics 
slowly cleansing the street and vacant lot. I found an 
ammo store hidden in one of the rooms. . . . I finished 
cleansing all of level one and destroyed “Big Nig”, I made 
my way to the subway and entered level 2. The place is 
full of jews, I shoot one of the foul pigs and it said “Oy 
Vey!” I continued to shoot them, they seem a lot harder to 
kill than niggers. After cleansing part of the subway I 
began searching for more life and ammo. I found some in 
a bathroom but I had to kill 6 or 7 niggers to get to it, and 
no sooner than the bathroom was cleansed, a jew was in 
my face with a machine gun! I blasted the kike and made 
my way back to the platform, I would write more but I 
need to get back to the game! – Bob. H.  
 
Resistance Records, Reviews of Ethnic Cleansing: The Game, http://
www.resistance.com/ 
ethniccleansing/reviews.htm (last visited May 16, 2007). 
29 This example is based on a well-known leader in the white supremacist move-
ment and his son, who is rumored to have managed a children’s website for his 
father’s white supremacist organization. 
30 This event is based on the author’s personal experience in Atlanta, Georgia. 
31 This event is based on the author’s personal experience in Long Island, New 
York.  
32 Nine teenagers were convicted in California for the hate-based beating of three 
women on Halloween night. Greg Risling, 9 Youths Convicted in SoCal Hallow-
een Beating Hate-crime Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS ST. & LOC. WIRE, Jan. 27, 
2007. 
33 There is a wealth of scholarship on factors influencing child development. For 
a good discussion on such influences, see Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home 
and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 839-840 (2007) (arguing that while influ-
ences outside the family and the school contribute to the development of a child, 
they are “legally invisible”). See also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Reframing 
the Debate About Socialization of Children: An Environmentalist Paradigm, 
2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85 (2004); Kenneth L. Karst, Law, Cultural Conflict, and 
the Socialization of Children, 91 CAL. L. REV. 967 (2003) (discussing influences 
of schools and mass media on children). 
34 A parent’s influence on a young child’s mind is supported first by common 
sense and ordinary experience. Although there are arguments to the contrary, this 
common-sense theory is supported by scientific and psychological research.  See 
discussion infra Part II.B. 
35 There is a general consensus that environmental influences, such as parent-
child interaction, affect the development of a child. Diane Scott-Jones, Family 
Influences on Cognitive Development and School Achievement, 11 REV. OF 
RESEARCH IN EDUCATION 259, 260 (1984). 
36 See LINDA TATE, A SOUTHERN WEAVE OF WOMEN: FICTION OF THE CONTEM-
PORARY SOUTH 280 (The University of Georgia Press) (1994) (“Many voices are 
in my mouth . . . those of my mothers and grandmothers; and finally my own. 
The matrix and the voice, the womb and the loom, become one.”).  
37 My use of “speech” refers to speech as defined by the First Amendment.  See 
discussion infra Part II.B.  Jeffrey Evans Stake proposes a “memetic” or evolu-
tionary approach to ideas, which fits nicely into the subject of parent-to-child 
racist speech.  Jeffrey Evans Stake, Are We Buyers or Hosts? A Memetic Ap-
proach to the First Amendment, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1213 (2001). Stake suggests 
that ideas, like memes, have the power to replicate. Id. at 1214. A memetic ap-
proach aims to “prevent memes [ideas] from using harm and threats of harm to 
their human vessels.” Id. In the case of parent-to-child racist speech, a parent is a 
host, intentionally or unintentionally passing harmful memes to her young child. 
Once passed, those memes draw on the resources of the child, harm her psyche, 
and continue to replicate. 
38 Demaske, supra note 12, at 290 (citing as characteristic of hate speech any 
message “directed to a historically oppressed group” or “persecutorial, hateful, 
and degrading”). 
39 Sanitized racist comments are those made by people who are educated or 
economically advantaged that are less vulgar sounding than outright racist 
speech, but have the same sting (e.g., off-hand comments that members of cer-
tain ethnic groups are welfare cheaters).  Matsuda, supra note 16. 
40 Annie Steinberg, Jane Brooks & Tariq Remtulla, Youth Hate Crimes: Identifi-
cation, Prevention, and Intervention, 160 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 979, 984 (2003). 
41 Id.  One study that focused on parents of juvenile offenders indicated that 
“children tended to identify with their parents’ beliefs, thus demonstrating some 
of the same beliefs, including tolerance of certain groups.” Id. 
42 Id. at 979. 
43 For a discussion of the bias-as-mental-illness debate within the mental health 
community, see Shankar Vedantam, Psychiatry Ponders Whether Extreme Bias 
Can Be an Illness, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2005, at A01. Some psychiatrists have 
cautioned against classifying extreme racism as a psychological disorder because 
it may allow perpetrators of hate crimes to claim not guilty by mental insanity at 
trial.  See, e.g., Michael J. Grinfeld, A Tale of Two Atrocities: Can Psychiatry 
Handle the Controversy?, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Oct. 1999, at 32. 
44 Edward Dunbar, Reconsidering the Clinical Utility of Bias as a Mental Health 
Problem, 41 PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 97, 98 
(2004).  
45 Id.  
46 E.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (declining to require scien-
tific proof of harm to children potentially caused by reading sexually explicit 
magazines). Because obscenity is non-protected speech, however, the standards 
for scientific evidence are lower. Parent-to-child racist speech can be interpreted 
as a higher value speech because of the political message, and therefore may 
require evidence of harm to a child. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
47 Dunbar, supra note 44, at 98 (“For patients who evidence severe forms of bias, 
intergroup contact is predictably aversive. For these patients, out-group persons 
are often seen as threatening. For some clinically biased patients, the solution is 
avoidance. Other patients experience marked anxiety, and yet others express 
overt hostility. It is not surprising that these patients are interculturally incompe-
tent. Pathologically biased patients may engage in overtly hostile behaviors in 
benign intergroup situations.”). 
48 Raphael S. Ezekiel, An Ethnographer Looks at Neo-Nazi and Klan Groups: 
The Racist Mind Revisited, 46 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 51, 53 (2002). 
49 Id.   
50 See generally Susan Feldman, The Shadow of Difference: Sex, Race, and the 
Unconscious (Aug. 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, SUNY/Buffalo) (on 
file with Lockwood Memorial Library, SUNY/Buffalo). 
51 E.g., ALA. CODE. § 26-14-1(1) (“[Abuse] . . . can occur through nonacciden-
tal . . . mental injury.”); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.290 (“Mental injury means a 
serious injury to the child as evidenced by an observable and substantial impair-
ment in the child’s ability to function in a developmentally appropriate manner 
and the existence of that impairment is supported by the opinion of a qualified 
expert witness.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-201(2) (“'‘Abuse’ means . . . the inflic-
tion of or allowing another person to cause serious emotional damage as evi-
denced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal or untoward aggressive behav-
ior, and which emotional damage is diagnosed by a medical doctor or psycholo-
gist, and is caused by the acts or omissions of an individual having care, custody 
and control of a child.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166.05 (Supp. 2008) (“[S]erious 
ENDNOTES CONTINUED 
 
   70                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           THE MODERN AMERICAN 
 
emotional damage [is] evidenced by states of being or behavior, including, but 
not limited to, severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive 
behavior toward self or others.”); FLA. STAT. ANN § 39.01(43) (“‘Mental injury’ 
means an injury to the intellectual or psychological capacity of a child as evi-
denced by a discernible and substantial impairment in the ability to function 
within the normal range of performance and behavior.”); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 
1012 (“Impairment of emotional health and impairment of mental or emotional 
condition includes a state of substantially diminished psychological or intellec-
tual functioning in relation to, but not limited to, such factors as failure to thrive, 
control of aggressive or self-destructive impulses, ability to think and reason, 
acting out, or misbehavior, including incorrigibility, ungovernability, or habitual 
truancy; provided, however, that such impairment must be clearly attributable to 
the unwillingness or inability of the respondent to exercise a minimum degree of 
care toward the child.”). 
52 KIERAN O’HAGAN, EMOTIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 
33 (1993). 
53 Gerald H. Katzman, A Bioethical Analysis of a Form of Psychological Abuse: 
Teaching Hatred to Children, 44 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 143, 147 (2005). 
54 See, e.g., Martin H. Teicher, Wounds That Time Won’t Heal: The Neurobiol-
ogy of Child Abuse, 2 CEREBRUM 50 (2000) (summarizing research performed 
on humans and animals that suggest early psychological abuse causes irreversi-
ble changes in the brain).  
55 Steinberg, Brooks & Remtulla, supra note 40, at 980. 
56 Jo Goodey, Understanding Racism and Masculinity: Drawing on Research 
with Boys Aged Eight to Sixteen, 26 INT’L J. SOC. OF L. 393 (1998) (analyzing 
racist aggression in young males as a social construct of masculinity). 
57 Huntington, supra note 26 (cataloging child welfare rights and proposing a 
problem-solving based approach to child welfare). 
58 See e.g., GA. DEPT. OF HUM. RESOURCES, DIVISION OF FAM. & CHILD. SER-
VICES, http://dfcs.dhr.georgia.gov (last visited May 16, 2007) (providing parent 
education and referrals to counselors to families of abused children who remain 
in the home); N.Y. STATE, OFF. OF CHILD. & FAM. SERVICES, http://
www.ocfs.state.ny.us (last visited May 16, 2007) (providing parenting advice 
through home visitation to expectant mothers and new parents). 
59 Huntington, supra note 26, at 627. 
60 James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child 
Welfare and Education Laws as Denials of Equal Protection to Children of 
Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1321, 1353-54 (1996) (arguing that chil-
dren whose parents religiously object to vaccinations are denied protection from 
serious diseases). The most common statutory requirement is that parents have 
their children vaccinated before attending any school. Id. at 1356-57.  See also 
Walter Wadlington, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Medical Decision Mak-
ing For and By Children: Tensions Between Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 311 (1994). 
61 The downside to preventing teaching hate speech within the existing frame-
work is that doing so may have a disproportionate impact on minorities, single 
mothers, and divorced families. See e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED 
BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE, at vii (2002) (discussing systematic 
bias and overrepresentation of African-American children in the child-welfare 
system); Huntington, supra note 26, at 657 n.106 (summarizing the scholarly 
debate on the causes of overrepresentation of African-Americans in the child-
welfare system); Naomi Cahn, Race, Poverty, History, Adoption, and Child 
Abuse: Connections, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 461 (2002) (attributing the overrep-
resentation of African-American children in the child-welfare system to pov-
erty).  
62 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Ecogenerism: An Environmentalist Approach to 
Protecting Endangered Children, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 409, 423 (2005) 
[hereinafter Ecogenerism] (rejecting the traditional approach to child welfare 
policy arguing for an ecological approach to child welfare). 
63 E.g., Reimann v. Reimann, 39 N.Y.S.2d 485, 485 (1942) (denying custody to 
father for his connections to Nazism); McCorvey v. McCorvey, 916 So.2d 357, 
367 (2005) (ordering both parents to refrain from using racial slurs in the pres-
ence of the child).  
64 In Re Bianca W.F., 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1807 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 12, 
1999). 
65 Id. at *9. Importantly, though, the original custody decision was made based 
on physical abuse. Id. at 4. 
66 McCorvey, 916 So.2d at 367. 
67 E.g., Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restric-
tions, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631 (2006). 
68 Id. at 649. 
69 Perhaps little attention is paid because family law decisions often go unpub-
lished.  
70 The relationship between parent, child, and State is commonly illustrated as a 
triangle, with the State at the apex, and child and parent on opposing ends of the 
base. Woodhouse, Ecogenerism, supra note 62, at 422 (rejecting the triangle 
approach and arguing for an ecological approach to child welfare); Huntington, 
supra note 26, at 642 (rejecting the triangle approach). Other scholars have illus-
trated the relationship as an inverted triangle, with the child represented at the 
bottom point of the triangle and the parents and the State at the top two points, 
thus demonstrating the authority of both the State and parents over the child.  See 
Rosenbury, supra note 33. 
71 Rebecca M. Stahl, “Don’t Forget About Me”: Implementing Article 12 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 803, 816 (2007) (pointing out that the right of parents to raise their 
children without state interference is not only historical, but internationally rec-
ognized as well).   
72 Parnham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). 
73 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944). 
74 Id. at 173. 
75 The Supreme Court has also upheld statutes that restrict a minor’s right to an 
abortion by requiring parental consent or notification. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 
622 (1979) (finding parental consent statute unconstitutional, but noting that a 
State can require parental consent for an unmarried minor’s abortion if the stat-
ute provides for an adequate judicial bypass).  See also Planned Parenthood v. 
Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (upholding an abortion statute that required pa-
rental consent for minors, but provided a judicial bypass option); Ohio v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (upholding a statute that 
made it a crime to perform an abortion on a minor unless the physician person-
ally informed one of the parents). The Court has also upheld a statute that re-
quires a minor to provide parental notification, while striking down a different 
provision in the same statute that required an adult to provide spousal notifica-
tion. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  See also Katz, supra 
note 23. 
76 Amitai Etzioni, On Protecting Children from Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 
46 (2004) (quoting Michael S. Wald, Children’s Rights: A Framework for 
Analysis, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 274 (1979)). 
77 Every state except Missisippi requires parental consent to marry unless the 
parties are at least eighteen years old. E.g., CAL. FAMILY CODE §§ 302 (Supp. 
2007), GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-2, N.Y. DOM. REL. §14-2-7. 
78 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. §16-6-3 (sexual intercourse with someone under the age 
of sixteen is a crime), ARIZ. REV. STAT. §13-1405 (sexual intercourse with 
someone under the age of eighteen is a crime). 
79 Katz, supra note 23, at 1128-29.               
80 Id. 
81 James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the 
Doctrine of Parents’ Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1372-73 (1994) [hereinafter 
Parents’ Religion]. 
82 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and 
the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1114 (1992) (arguing that 
a child has become a “conduit for the parents’ religious expression, cultural 
identity, and class aspirations”); Dwyer, Parents’ Religion, supra note 81, at 
1372-73 (arguing that parents should not have a right to control the upbringing 
of their children). 
83 Parnham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (discussing the historical signifi-
cance of the family unit and broad parental authority).  See Dwyer, Parents’ 
Religion, supra note 81, at 1424 (criticizing the reliance on tradition as a justifi-
cation for parental primacy). 
84 But see Christine Ryan, Revisiting the Legal Standards that Govern Requests 
to Sterilize Profoundly Incompetent Children: In Light of the “Ashley Treat-
ment,” Is a New Standard Appropriate?, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 287, 299-301 
(2008) (asserting that even though parents have a fundamental right to raise their 
children, even this right has its limitations, mainly for the protection of the 
child). 
85 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).  
86 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The early cases were decided 
during the Lochner era, a period characterized by expansive protection of eco-
nomic liberties. Thus, the early cases were not decided purely on parental rights 
grounds; they were also decided on the grounds of economic liberty. The Court, 
however, has never repudiated the right of the parent to control the upbringing of 
her child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
87 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 396-97. 
90 Id. at 401.  
ENDNOTES CONTINUED 
 
Special - Fall 2008                                                                                                                                                                                 71  
 
91 “The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other 
languages as well as to those born with English on the tongue.” Id. 
92 Id.  
93 Id. 
94 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530 (1925). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
While there has been debate as to what the religion 
clauses protect, nearly all observers would agree that the First 
Amendment prohibits the federal government from establishing 
a national religion.1  Yet, from 1882 to 1932, the federal govern-
ment subsidized the conversion of Native Americans to Christi-
anity, while simultaneously banning Native American spiritual 
practices.2 
Moreover, courts have treated Native American relig-
ions differently from “mainstream”3 Judeo-Christian religions 
for much of this nation’s history.  Beginning with Johnson v. 
M’Intosh, the Supreme Court noted that the “character and relig-
ion” of the Native Americans stood in stark contrast to the 
“superior genius of Europe,” helping to justify European control 
of the land.4  In exchange, the Europeans gave the Native 
Americans civilization and Christianity, believing this to be 
“ample compensation.”5  M’Intosh’s view of the Native Ameri-
can religions as being somehow inferior to those of Western 
Europe thus informs the Court’s subsequent unbalanced treat-
ment of Native Americans in Free Exercise Clause jurispru-
dence. 
This article will discuss the extent to which the Free 
Exercise Clause creates rights to freely exercise religion for Na-
tive Americans in comparison with adherents of mainstream 
religions and the effects, if any, the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act (“RFRA”) has had on such rights.6  Section II of this 
article examines the law governing Native American land use, 
including the First Amendment, the American Indian Religious 
Freedom Act (“AIRFA”), and the RFRA.  Section III illustrates 
some key issues arising in Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence 
cases: (a) how central an asserted right must be for the courts to 
recognize that the right must be protected from government ac-
tion; (b) how substantial a burden on religion must be to be pro-
tected under RFRA; and (c) what constitutes a compelling gov-
ernment interest.  Section IV reviews Free Exercise Clause juris-
prudence in general, with an emphasis on Native American Free 
Exercise Clause jurisprudence, to illustrate the difference in ap-
plication of the clause to mainstream religions as opposed to 
Native American religions.  Section V analyzes and predicts the 
manner in which Native American religious freedoms are pro-
tected, positing that although the law has historically provided 
little protection for Native American religions, courts may now 
be more receptive to securing Native American religious free-
doms under RFRA. 
 
 
THE LAW GOVERNING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
 
The free exercise of religion in the United States is se-
cured first and foremost by the Bill of Rights.  The First Amend-
ment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof 
…”7 Taken together, the Establishment and Free Exercise 
clauses prohibit the government from establishing a state relig-
ion and prevent the government from unduly restricting the exer-
cise of religious freedoms. 
Congress has also passed statutes to effectuate the pur-
poses of the First Amendment with regard to religion.  The 
AIRFA protects Native Americans’ rights to “believe, express, 
and exercise” their traditional religions, “including but not lim-
ited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and 
the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional 
rites.”8  The AIRFA initially offered only weak protection, how-
ever, and Congress had to amend the law in response to a land-
mark Supreme Court case concerning religious use of peyote. 
In Employment Division v. Smith the Supreme Court 
upheld a statute barring the use of peyote even for religious rea-
sons. 9  The Court found that neutral, generally applicable laws 
could be applied to religious practices even when they substan-
tially burden the free exercise of religion and were not supported 
by a compelling government interest.  In response to Smith, 
Congress amended the AIRFA to allow the use of peyote in reli-
gious rituals10 and passed the RFRA.11 
The RFRA prohibits the government from substantially 
burdening the free exercise of religion unless it can show a com-
pelling interest, and accomplish its ends through the least restric-
tive means possible.12  Although the RFRA was found unconsti-
tutional as applied to the states,13 it has been found constitutional 
as applied to the federal government.14 
 
 
GOVERNING PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL  
APPLICATION OF THE RFRA 
 
To determine whether the RFRA protects a right the 
courts consider several key interests such as: (a) the central na-
ture of the asserted right; (b) whether the burden on religion is 
substantial; and (c) what constitutes a compelling government 
interest.  Courts sometimes analyze the centrality of an infringed 
practice in determining the constitutionality of the governmental 
action.  RFRA defines exercise of religion as “any exercise of 
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of 
religious belief.”15  Section IV of this article, addresses the ex-
tent to which a given religious practice must be central to trigger 
protection under the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA frameworks. 
The RFRA only protects religious practices that are 
substantially burdened by governmental action.16  Some of the 
approaches courts have taken to analyze the substantiality of the 
burden are: (a) making a case specific determination;17 (b) re-
quiring coercion of a religious adherent;18 (c) assuming suffi-
ciency of the asserted burden;19 and (d) requiring that an individ-
ual be prevented from engaging in religious conduct or having a 
religious experience.20 
Only compelling governmental interests can infringe 
the free exercise of religion.  The Supreme Court defines com-
pelling interests as interests of “the highest order and not other-
wise served.”21  Maintaining a uniform tax code,22 preserving 
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Native American culture,23 protecting bald and golden eagles,24 
and enforcing participation in the social security system25 are 
examples of compelling governmental interests. 
 
 
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
 
This section will compare how courts have analyzed 
Free Exercise claims in a number of different scenarios, high-
lighting the differences between the treatment received by ad-
herents of Native American and mainstream religions. 
 
GOVERNMENTAL BENEFITS 
 
In Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court considered 
the constitutionality of a South Carolina unemployment benefits 
scheme which exempted people from benefits if they were able 
to work but chose not to work.26  This scheme benefited Sunday 
worshippers while indirectly burdening the free exercise of re-
ligion of non-Sunday Sabbath-worshippers.  The Court, there-
fore, established a burden switching, or compelling burden 
test.27  For an action to be constitutional, the government must 
prove that it has a compelling interest in the regulation or action 
and that the means of achieving this interest are the least restric-
tive possible.28  Under this test, the Court noted that non-Sunday 
worshippers were forced to choose between taking the unem-
ployment benefits and observing their religion.29  The Court 
found such a choice repugnant under the Free Exercise Clause as 
an undue burden on religious freedom.30 
In Bowen v. Roy, the Court declined to apply the bur-
den switching test that it had used in Sherbert.31  Native Ameri-
can recipients of welfare benefits, on behalf of their minor child, 
objected to a government policy requiring the parents to submit 
the child’s social security number in order to receive benefits.  
The child’s father believed that the use of an arbitrary number as 
a means of identification contradicted his religious convictions, 
as it cut against an individual’s uniqueness.32  Though the Court 
recognized that the test applied in cases like Sherbert would 
seem to be applicable because an ostensibly neutral governmen-
tal policy was creating a burden on the free exercise of religious 
practice, it declined to do so. 
In Bowen, the court found a lesser burden upon a reli-
gious practice, and a higher governmental interest in enacting 
the regulation.33  The Court distinguished government regula-
tions that only “call[] for a choice between securing a govern-
mental benefit and adhering to a religious belief[]…from gov-
ernmental action or legislation that criminalizes religiously in-
spired activity or inescapably compels conduct that some find 
objectionable for religious reasons.”34  Moreover, the Court rea-
soned that the Sherbert ruling may be viewed "as a protection 
against unequal treatment rather than a grant of favored treat-
ment for the members of the religious sect."35  Therefore, while 
the Sherbert test was appropriate in cases involving unequal 
treatment,36 there was no need for a more stringent test in Bo-
wen. 
 
The Court appears to favor Judeo-Christian  
beliefs in determining whether or not to apply  
the Sherbert test. 
 
While the Court distinguished Bowen from Sherbert, 
both instances involved a religious adherent who had to choose 
between following his religion and receiving a government 
benefit.  The Bowen Court did not analyze the centrality of the 
infringed religious practice. It noted, however, that while the 
governmental interest was compelling, the religious practice was 
not substantially infringed.  In finding that the burden imposed 
on the Native American family was minor, the Court thus im-
plicitly regards that choosing to obey a Sabbath is more impor-
tant than a religious belief in an individual’s uniqueness. 
 
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATIONS THAT THREATEN THE EXIS-
TENCE OF A PARTICULAR RELIGION. 
 
The following cases illustrate the Court’s treatment of 
governmental practices that are neutral on their face, but indi-
rectly threaten the entire existence of religious practices. 
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, Wisconsin’s compulsory school-
ing law forced Amish parents to send their children to public 
school after the eighth grade violating core Amish religious be-
liefs.37  Although this law was a neutral government regulation, 
the Court applied the Sherbert test to find that Wisconsin’s law 
would debilitate the continuance of the Amish faith and there-
fore unduly burden the free exercise of religion. 38  The Court 
found that a regulation that is neutral in application may none-
theless “offend the constitutional requirement for governmental 
neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.”39  In 
Yoder, the neutral regulation ran afoul of the Free Exercise 
Clause because its neutral application would have the effect of 
debilitating the continuance of the Amish faith.  The Court thus 
expanded the scope of protection of the Free Exercise Clause. 
In Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Association, 
the government proposed the construction of a six-mile road 
cutting through a National Forest in northwestern California.40  
Though the Forest Service’s expert was against building the road 
because the area was viewed as indispensable41 to the religious 
practices of three Native American tribes, the Forest Service 
rejected that recommendation.42 
The tribes initially achieved some success in the lower 
courts.43  The district court acknowledged the centrality of the 
infringed right to their religious practice44 and issued an injunc-
tion.45  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the granting of the 
injunction, holding that the road construction did not further a 
compelling state interest and violated the tribes’ free-exercise 
rights.46 
The Supreme Court reversed, distinguishing Lyng from 
other cases where the indirect burden was found unconstitutional 
in that they involved governmental coercion, while concluding 
that Lyng did not.47  The Court said the First Amendment does 
not involve what individuals can extract from the government; 
rather it involves what the government is prohibited from doing 
to the individual.48  Even if the road would destroy the tribes’ 
religion, the Court reasoned that because the governmental ac-
tion did not “coerce” the tribes into violating their religious ten-
ets, it did not sufficiently burden their religion.49 
In rejecting the tribes’ claim, the Court also stressed 
that the government has the prerogative to decide what to do 
with its own land.50  It feared that recognizing the claim could 
give rise to religious servitudes on government property, thereby 
inhibiting the government’s ability to advance the public inter-
est.51 
 
The Free Exercise Clause did not protect Native 
Americans from a governmental action that 
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threatened a religious practice because of the 
government’s interest in managing its land. 
 
The Lyng Court seemed to be holding that ostensibly 
neutral laws that eliminate Native American religious practices 
are constitutional so long as they are not an outright ban on the 
practicing of a religion.  Both Yoder and Lyng involve govern-
ment policies that risked the destruction of a religion, yet only in 
Lyng was the government action found to be constitutional.52  
The difference in the outcome of these cases resulted from the 
fact that the proposed action in Lyng involved government 
land.53  Therefore, the Lyng case can be interpreted to mean that 
the First Amendment cannot be invoked to challenge the govern-
ment’s use of real property.54 
Indeed, this 
interpretation of Lyng 
was expressed when the 
RFRA was passed in 
November  1993 . 5 5  
RFRA calls for the appli-
cation of Free Exercise 
analysis from before 
Smith, including cases 
such as Lyng, which re-
fuse to extend judicial 
protection when govern-
ment action on federal 
land is at issue.56  Con-
gress was thus not at-
tempting to change the 
way the courts interpret cases that deal with governmental land 
management.  Yet, an express aim of RFRA was to create a right 
of action for individuals suffering infringement of their right to 
freely exercise their religious beliefs as a result of indirect, os-
tensibly neutral, government action.57  Therefore, RFRA creates 
a right of action for individuals privately owning land, but not 
when the federal government is managing federal land.  More-
over, since Native American religious practice often occurs on 
federal land, such practices will be subject to greater infringe-
ment than those who practice their religion on their own prop-
erty. 58 
In Yoder, a government policy that risked the destruc-
tion of a religion was found unconstitutional,59 yet in Lyng, a 
government action that posed an even greater risk of this same 
result was found constitutional.60  In Lyng, the centrality of the 
religious practice at issue was recognized by the district court 
and the substantiality of the burden was clear because experts 
believed the proposed action would damage an area viewed as 
indispensable to the religious practice of three Native American 
tribes.61  However, because the proposed action was to occur on 
governmental land, it was allowed.62 
 
 
RELIGIOUS OBJECTS AND OBSERVANCES 
 
Case law has been inconsistent in its treatment of gov-
ernment regulations affecting the use of objects that are used for 
religious observances, but whose use is also regulated by a fed-
eral regulatory scheme.  This inconsistency continues even after 
passage of the RFRA. 
In Employment Div. v. Smith, the Supreme Court held 
that neutral statutes are not unconstitutional by virtue of impos-
ing an undue burden on the free exercise of religion so long as 
the law is otherwise valid and within the government’s preroga-
tive to regulate.63  The Smith Court viewed accommodation of 
religious minorities as preferring one religion over another. This 
accommodation would create a constitutional right to ignore 
neutral laws of general applicability.64  Therefore, the Court de-
cided not to apply the compelling interest test that it had applied 
in cases such as Sherbert and Yoder.65  Rather, a rational basis 
for the regulation was sufficient to pass constitutional muster. 
In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do 
Vegetal, a small religious sect sought a preliminary injunction to 
prevent the federal government from enforcing a ban against 
using a hallucinogen regulated under the Controlled Substances 
Act.66  The district court granted the injunction, and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed.67 
The court applied the Sherbert test because the fed-
eral government was seeking to impose restrictions 
that burden religious practice.68  Under this test, the 
Government failed to show that it had a compelling 
interest in not allowing an exception to the Con-
trolled Substances Act.  Neither the evidence related 
to diversion of the drug away from its religious use, 
nor the evidence as to its adverse health effects was 
strong.69  The Supreme Court affirmed noting that 
RFRA expressly requires an individualized in-
quiry.70  The Court also noted that the Controlled 
Substances Act does make an exception to hallu-
cinogens such as peyote.71 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S. v. 
Hardman found that a governmental scheme aimed 
at restricting access to eagles’ feathers violates individuals’ Free 
Exercise rights because the regulatory scheme was not the least 
restrictive means possible to accomplish the government’s com-
pelling interest.72  The regulatory scheme required a permit from 
the federal government to collect eagles’ feathers.73  Only mem-
bers of federally-recognized tribes could apply for this permit.74 
As a preliminary matter, the circuit court found that 
because an eagle’s feather is sacred in many Native American 
religions, any scheme limiting access to feathers substantially 
burdened the free exercise of a religious belief.75  In addition, 
the court also found that there was a compelling governmental 
interest to combat spurious claims for eagles’ feathers and to 
protect Native American culture.76  However, the government 
never showed the nexus between preservation of this culture and 
selectively allowing application for permits based on member-
ship in federally-recognized tribes.77  The court found that testi-
mony in support of the notion that the prohibition would help to 
preserve Native American culture was equally indicative of a 
tendency to cause its destruction since the ineligibility of adher-
ents to apply for a permit could just as easily lead to poaching as 
too long a waitlist.78  As a result, the court found that the regula-
tion was not the least restrictive way to preserve Native Ameri-
can Culture. 79 
In United States v. Tawahongva, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Arizona found that a Native Ameri-
can’s freedom to exercise his religion was not substantially bur-
dened by the government’s requirement that an individual seek-
ing to acquire an eagle’s feather apply for a permit.80  The court 
admitted that the permit requirement substantially burdened the 
free exercise of Native American religion in other cases.  How-
ever, rather than making a particularized inquiry as to whether 
the means of achieving the asserted governmental interest was 
RFRA creates a right of action for 
individuals privately owning land, 
but not when the federal government 
is managing federal land.   
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the least restrictive possible, the Tawahongva court merely in-
quired as to whether the defendant’s burden was particularly 
burdensome.81  The defendant only objected to the requirement 
to apply for a permit from the Hopi tribal government, and did 
not object to the need to apply for a permit in general.  The court 
concluded that the burden was not substantial for him.82  Even if 
the burden was substantial, the court nevertheless determined 
that the government has a compelling interest in regulating ac-
cess to eagles’ feathers and the means used to accomplish it 
were the least restrictive possible. 
 
Judicial interpretation of RFRA 
with regard to the use of religious 
objects and religious observances 
in the face of governmental regu-
latory schemes remains inconsis-
tent. 
 
In Smith, the Court rejected using the balancing test 
from Sherbert and Yoder even though the regulation indirectly 
burdened religion.  The Court questioned neither the centrality 
of the practice, nor the substantiality of the burden.  Had the 
Court undertaken the Sherbert and Yoder analysis, it likely 
would have struck the government regulation for not being the 
least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling interest. 
Mainstream religions had for decades been protected 
from governmental infringement of religious practice via Sher-
bert and Yoder’s analytical framework.  Yet, the Court in Smith 
eschewed that analysis in consideration of a burden imposed 
upon a non-mainstream religion.  After passage of the RFRA, 
the O Centro Court overturned the governmental action in a case 
factually similar to Smith.  Thus, the RFRA can be understood to 
convey greater protection for the free exercise of religion than 
the Free Exercise Clause. 
While the Hardman and Tawahongva courts both as-
sumed that the infringed right was central enough to trigger an 
analysis under the Free Exercise clause, the two courts differed 
as to the substantiality of the burden imposed.  This difference is 
likely due to the Tawahongva court’s subjective inquiry on the 
substantiality of the burden for the defendant.  Therefore, the 
Tawahongva court rejected the defendant’s claim even while 
recognizing that the statute as generally applied substantially 
burdens the free exercise of religion.83 This subjective RFRA 
inquiry involved greater scrutiny of the defendant’s asserted 
injury than courts ordinarily undertake in Free Exercise cases. 
The RFRA protected non-mainstream religions use of 
controlled substances for religious purposes.  However, as in 
Tawahongva, Native American tribes are still unable to freely 
practice their religion as mainstream religions are. 
 
CONFLICTS BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL MANAGEMENT OF  
FEDERAL LAND AND RELIGIOUS PRACTICES. 
 
Cases involving land use have traditionally been de-
cided in favor of the government, and thus against the free exer-
cise of religion by Native Americans. 84  Though the RFRA did 
not appear to change this analysis, case law may be evaluating 
Native American Free Exercise land use claims similarly to 
mainstream religions. 
In Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority upheld the 
proposed governmental construction of the Tellico Dam on the 
Little Tennessee River.85  Cherokee Indians claimed the dam 
would flood their sacred homeland.86  The court found that, al-
though the complaint asserted an irreversible loss of Cherokee 
culture and history, these were not interests protected by the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.87 
The Cherokee Indians failed to demonstrate that wor-
ship at Little Tennessee Valley was (1) inseparable from their 
way of life; (2) the cornerstone of their religious observance; (3) 
or that it played a central role in their religious ceremonies and 
practices.88  The land at issue was, therefore, not the theological 
heart of their religion and thus the Free Exercise clause did not 
apply. 
In Badoni v. Higginson, the Navajo sought to order the 
government to lower a reservoir that partially flooded the Rain-
bow Bridge National Monument, a sacred site. 89  The tribe also 
tried to compel the government to issue regulations controlling 
tourist behavior at the monument; and to temporarily close the 
monument to the public, on notice, for religious ceremonies.90 
The court first noted that the government had a compel-
ling interest in maintaining the level of the reservoir because it 
supplied both water and electricity for the region.91  The court 
next stated that a governmental action must be coercive in order 
to potentially violate the Free Exercise Clause.92  Here, the gov-
ernment was not forcing the Native American groups to do any-
thing that was against their religion, nor depriving anyone of a 
governmental benefit for failure to take an action that was ab-
horrent to their religion.  Finally, because the plaintiffs were 
seeking to compel the government to prevent the public from 
accessing areas of religious significance, the court reasoned that 
taking such action would violate the Establishment Clause.93 
In Wilson v. Block, the Navajo and Hopi Indians sought 
to enjoin the clearing of fifty acres of forest to expand the Snow-
bowl ski resort in the Coconino National Forest in Northern Ari-
zona.94  However, they failed to show a substantial burden upon 
their religious practices.95  To show a substantial burden, unlike 
in Sequoyah, this court did not require that the religious practice 
be central to the religion.  Nonetheless, it required that the af-
fected religious practice could not be performed elsewhere.96 
The Wilson Court then considered whether the AIRFA 
protected the tribes from the proposed expansion.97  Based on 
the legislative record, the court found that AIRFA did not create 
any additional rights.  Rather, it merely required federal agencies 
to consider the impact of proposed regulations and actions upon 
Native Americans.98 
More recently, in a similar dispute the Ninth Circuit in 
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service overruled the Arizona Dis-
trict Court’s finding that the proposed expansion of the Snow-
bowl ski resort was constitutional under the First Amendment.99  
Contrary to the district court, the circuit court held that the pro-
posed action constituted a substantial burden on the free exercise 
of religion. Moreover, it also held that the government did not 
have a compelling interest in the expansion of the Snowbowl ski 
resort.100 
The owners of the ski resort and the government were 
seeking to expand the size of the resort and introduce artificial 
snow-making.101  Although artificial snow-making expanded the 
ski season, it also entailed the use of treated sewage effluent.102  
The circuit court found that the proposed use of sewage effluent 
would be a burden of the highest order upon the tribes’ right to 
freely exercise their religion.103  The court noted that a burden 
must prevent the plaintiff from “engaging in religious conduct or 
having a religious experience” in order to trigger RFRA analy-
sis.104   Here, the proposed expansion would severely burden the 
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religious exercise of the Hopi and Navajo because it polluted the 
most sacred place of those tribes. Since their religious practices 
require pure natural resources, use of the treated sewage effluent 
would prevent the Navajo from conducting some ceremonies 
and would undermine the Hopi’s entire system of belief.105 
The circuit court agreed with the district court in that 
the government in general has a compelling interest in managing 
public recreational land.  However, it argued that O Centro re-
quires a more particularized compelling interest analysis than 
the lower court employed.  Under that analysis, expanding the 
size and operating season of a ski resort that is located in the 
desert is not a compelling governmental interest. 
The government also argued that it had a compelling 
interest in developing snow-play areas for non-skiers. Without 
these areas, non-skiers were having accidents by playing close to 
the road. 106  The circuit court rejected this argument because 
nothing in the trial record indicated that these safety concerns 
had any relationship to expansion of the resort.107  The circuit 
court found that even if creation of a snow-play park was a com-
pelling interest, introducing artificial snow-making and expand-
ing the resort were not the least 
restrictive means of furthering 
such an interest.108 
The owners of the resort 
also argued that complying with 
the Establishment Clause was a 
compelling governmental inter-
est.109  Therefore, in furtherance 
of this interest, the government 
should not accommodate Native 
American religious practices.110  
However, the circuit court noted 
that the Supreme Court has re-
peatedly held that the Constitution 
requires accommodation, rather 
than mere tolerance, of all relig-
ions.111  The circuit court viewed refusal to allow the proposed 
expansion as a “permitted accommodation to avoid callous in-
difference.”112 
 
The post-RFRA Navajo Nation de-
cision interprets burdens upon the 
free exercise of religion more 
broadly than the pre-RFRA case-
law. 
 
These land use cases hinged on the definition of what 
was a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion.  For 
example, the Sequoyah Court did not view destruction of the 
Cherokee’s ancestral lands as a substantial interest protected by 
the First Amendment.113  Rather, to find a substantial burden it 
examined whether the infringed practice was (1) inseparable 
from a way of life; (2) the cornerstone of a religious observance; 
or (3) central to religious ceremonies and practices.114  Since the 
destruction of the Cherokee’s ancestral lands did not fall under 
any of these categories, the governmental action did not violate 
the Free Exercise Clause.  The Badoni Court analyzed the sub-
stantiality of an imposed burden via whether or not the act or 
regulation is coercive.115  Since the governmental act was not 
coercive, the Court did not find it in violation of the free exer-
cise of religion.  Also, the Wilson Court analyzed substantiality 
by asking whether a given religious practice could not be done 
elsewhere.116  Since the religious activity could be conducted 
elsewhere, the infringement did not violate the free exercise of 
religion. 
The Navajo Nation Court, however, defined a substan-
tial burden upon the free exercise of religion as actions prevent-
ing an individual from “engaging in religious conduct or having 
a religious experience.”117  This definition is broader than the 
definitions provided by the Sequoyah, Badoni, and Wilson 
courts.  A potential explanation for this more inclusive definition 
is that the Navajo Nation case occurred after passage of the 
RFRA. 
The Navajo Nation Court noted that the term ‘exercise 
of religion’ is defined more broadly under RFRA in distinguish-
ing cases that allowed governmental activities that gravely im-
pacted Native American religious practices.118  Before, the Free 
Exercise Clause analysis examined whether an action prohibited 
the free exercise of religion.  Under the RFRA analysis actions 
merely burdening the free exercise of religion may violate Free 
Exercise rights.119 
The circuit court differentiated the Lyng and Wilson 
decisions because of this greater protection 
provided by the RFRA and also on factual 
differences.120  These land use cases 
hinged on the definition of what was a sub-
stantial burden on the free exercise of re-
ligion.  Therefore, while RFRA does not 
change the method of determining when a 
substantial right is infringed, its interpreta-
tion in Navajo Nation marks a post-RFRA 
land use case that protected Native Ameri-
can religious practices. 
 
 
ANALYSIS AND PREDICTIONS 
 
This section will review federal court inter-
pretation of when religious practices are protected from govern-
ment actions or regulations; when governmental action substan-
tially infringes such a right; and what constitutes a compelling 
governmental interest.  Finally, it will predict the direction of 
federal court jurisprudence in light of the Navajo Nation deci-
sion. 
 
 
INTERPRETATION OF KEY ISSUES 
 
In Native American Free Exercise jurisprudence, courts 
have required a higher showing that a practice was substantially 
burdened than in cases involving mainstream religions.  In Free 
Exercise cases regarding mainstream religions, courts ordinarily 
decline any ability to measure the centrality of a religious prac-
tice.121  In many Native American Free Exercise cases, however, 
courts have required the Native American group to prove the 
centrality of the religious practice.  For example, for mainstream 
religions, it has sometimes been sufficient that a religious prac-
tice be in any way affected by a governmental act.122  Con-
versely, in Tawahongva, the court subjectively examined the 
claimant’s burden even when, in general, the act substantially 
burdened the free exercise of religion.123  Other courts have re-
quired that a given practice could not be done elsewhere.  Only 
when these high substantial burden requirements were satisfied 
would the courts be willing to apply the compelling interest test 
In Native American Free Exercise 
jurisprudence, courts have required 
a higher showing that a practice was 
substantially burdened than in cases 
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analysis.124 
However, even when this test is applied, courts are 
quicker to find both a compelling interest and that the govern-
ment engaged in the least restrictive means of accomplishing 
this interest in cases involving the government’s management of 
federal land.125  Such an approach negatively impacts Native 
American religious practice because Native American sacred 
sites are often located upon federal land. 
 
 
FREE EXERCISE AND THE RFRA GOING FORWARD 
 
Post-RFRA cases only addressing what the First 
Amendment prohibits the federal government from doing miss 
the point.  The RFRA increases the prohibitions on what the 
federal government can do through the requirement that the gov-
ernment pursue its aim by the least restrictive means possible.126  
Cases that fail to recognize that the RFRA protects a broader 
range of conduct are also misguided because RFRA’s expansive 
definition of ‘exercise of religion’ includes “any exercise of re-
ligion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of 
religious belief.”127 
The RFRA was amended in 2000 upon passage of the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(“RLUIPA”) of 2000 to change the understanding of the term 
‘exercise of religion.’128  While the RFRA previously relied on 
the Court’s understanding of the term as required by the First 
Amendment, RLUIPA expanded its meaning.129 
Finally, based on Navajo Nation’s different interpreta-
tion of the RFRA, courts may in the future analyze Native 
American Free Exercise cases in the same manner as the Free 
Exercise cases of mainstream religions.  Such an interpretation 
of the RFRA would provide greater protection of Native Ameri-
cans’ rights to freely practice their religion.  RFRA restored the 
method of analysis from before Smith130 when mainstream relig-
ions received more protection than Native American religions.131  
Therefore, the RFRA alone would not seem to increase protec-
tion for the free exercise of Native American religious practices 
in the land use context.132 
However, Navajo Nation used the RFRA framework 
with the RLUIPA definition of ‘free exercise of religion’ to pro-
tect the rights of Native Americans.  The Navajo Nation court 
seriously questioned the government’s asserted interest in ex-
panding a ski resort and protected sacred Native American land 
from destruction.  Also, contrary to previous cases, Navajo Na-
tion did not examine the individual’s ability to have this experi-
ence elsewhere or the coercive nature of the governmental ac-
tion.133 Rather, it analyzed whether the government had pre-
vented an individual from “engaging in religious conduct or 
having a religious experience.”  Therefore, if Navajo Nation 
indicates a change in the way courts will evaluate governmental 
burdens on Native American religious practices, then Native 
American religious practices may receive the same level of ac-
commodation as mainstream religious practices in the future. 
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T he human body enjoys a special place in the law. Many of our most basic rights as citizens, including the right to be free from unreasonable search and sei-zures, the right to be free from physical assaults by 
others, and the right to privacy, arise from the idea that we 
should be able to control what happens to our own bodies. This 
principle of the inviolable body is also the basis for preventing 
individuals from utilizing their body or body parts in the eco-
nomic marketplace and gives rise to legislation such as the pro-
hibition on the sale of organs, the invalidation of surrogacy con-
tracts, and the criminalization of prostitution. In the book, 
Whose Body Is It Anyway: Justice and the Integrity of the Per-
son, Cécile Fabre posits that the current legal system would be 
more just if we disavowed ourselves of this principle of the in-
violable body, or the idea that the body is legally special, and 
instead accepted a legal system in which we all have a right to 
each other’s bodies, including our own. She points out that, 
“justice requires conferring on the sick a right to the organs of 
the dead and, in some cases, the living; and…requires conferring 
on individuals a right to buy and sell organs, sex, and reproduc-
tive services.” 
 
Fabre admits at the outset of the book that because the prin-
ciples she advances may disturb our traditional doctrines and 
principle, she expects little popular support. However, despite 
my initial distress with an argument that asserts I should not 
have the right to decide what happens to my own body, I eventu-
ally found that the text raised interesting questions about the 
contradictions inherent in our legal system’s treatment of the 
physical body. As Fabre aptly notes, “our legal and political 
tradition is such that we have the right to deny others access to 
our person, even though doing so would harm those who need 
such access; however, we lack the right to use ourselves as we 
wish in order to raise income, even though we do not necessarily 
harm other by doing so...” After reading her book, I found my-
self agreeing with these inconsistencies under our legal system; 
while the law tells us that we have complete control over our 
physical persons, we are in reality legally barred from selling 
our organs or sexual services, even if doing so causes no harm to 
others and, in the case of organ sales, even helps those in great 
need. 
 
To advance her argument, Fabre relies on the fundamental 
soundness of the principle of distributive justice, which states 
that some redistribution of wealth or resources across society is 
necessary in order to achieve justice for all. She points to exam-
ples from western society, such as the prevalence of social pro-
grams like welfare and the redistribution of wealth through taxa-
tion, to illustrate that the principle of distributive justice is al-
ready generally accepted.  Fabre does not argue that it is neces-
sary to have a wholesale redistribution of resources in which 
every member of society is given resources in exactly equal 
amounts. Instead, she works from a framework that stipulates 
only that each individual has a right to the resources he or she 
requires in order to live a “minimally flourishing life,” and pur-
sue a “conception of the good.”  Fabre argues that the natural 
consequence of meeting these basic goals is allowing those in 
need, a right to the material resources, including the body, of 
other members of society. Without these resources, many people 
are unable to live a minimally flourishing life, or even any life at 
all. 
 
After asserting that the principles of distributive justice dic-
tate that members of society have a right to the bodies of others, 
Fabre then explains how the “redistribution” of bodily resources 
would be accomplished. In chapters 3 through 8, respectively, 
Fabre advocates for the creation of a mandatory civilian service, 
the confiscation of organs from both cadavers and living people, 
and the legalization of the sale of organs, prostitution, and surro-
gacy contracts. 
 
The arguments I found most compelling were those con-
tained within Fabre’s thesis as it relates to the confiscation of 
organs. Fabre attempts to convince the reader that many of the 
arguments in favor of absolute bodily autonomy are both mis-
guided and unjust. First, she claims that, compared to another 
individual’s right to live a minimally flourishing life, or in many 
cases to live at all, a right to absolute bodily integrity seems 
weak. Moreover, Fabre argues that the confiscation of organs 
does not deny bodily autonomy, but instead places on it a quali-
fication that the redistribution of organs should occur when indi-
viduals are impaired in their ability to lead a minimally flourish-
ing life.  She does allow those with true conscientious objections 
the option to refuse to give their organs to those in need; an ab-
solute requirement that would violate an individual’s conscience 
would also harm his or her ability to realize the “conception of 
the good.”  By allowing for these conscientious objections, 
Fabre addresses the only strong argument against instituting an 
organ confiscations system. Further, these allowances give her 
argument internal consistency because they reveal she is equally 
concerned that all members of society are able to live and pursue 
their own ideals.  
 
While I was tempted to agree with Fabre’s oral arguments 
in favor of an organ confiscation of the system.  I failed to find 
her chapter regarding the legalization of prostitution persuasive. 
Her defense of prostitution is especially relevant to current dis-
cussions in the feminist community, who questions power differ-
entials, gender equality and the commodification of women’s 
bodies in the marketplace. Fabre acknowledges these issues exist 
but ultimately argues that the legalization and regulation of the 
sex industry would shield women from the harm they might oth-
erwise face for supplying such services on the black market. 
Unlike the more persuasive moral arguments Fabre makes for 
practices such as organ confiscation, she never reaches a similar 
conclusion that the legalization of prostitution is moral or just in 
its own right.  Instead, Fabre concludes that the problem with 
prostitution is not the act of providing sexual services for money 
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admits that the vast majority of women would not choose to 
prostitute themselves if they had access to other economic op-
portunities. Thus, her position that an absolute right to prostitute 
oneself is required in the interest of justice, is not persuasive. 
 
In the end, Whose Body Is It Anyway? is best read as a phi-
losophical text, and not a practical guide to possible changes in 
the legal treatment of the body.  Although it sheds light onto 
contradictory aspects of both the application of distributive jus-
tice and the sacrosanct treatment of the human body in the legal 
system, it is neither an “endeavour in social policy,” nor a “party 
manifesto.”  Additionally, due to both Fabre’s writing style and 
the often dense and complicated philosophical ideas she relies 
on to make her arguments, the book is neither an easy nor a 
quick read, especially for anyone who does not have a back-
ground in philosophy. However, what is effective about her 
book is that it both provokes and engages the reader by challeng-
ing us to reexamine one of our most basic ideas - that our bodies 
should belong solely to ourselves. 
ENDNOTES 
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EXTENDING TITLE VII PROTECTION TO NON-GENDER-
CONFORMING MEN 
By  
Colleen Keating* 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits 
sex discrimination in employment,1 is generally seen as a meas-
ure intended to “remedy the economic deprivation of women” by 
placing them “on an equal footing with men” in the workplace.2  
While the overwhelming majority of sexual harassment com-
plaints filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion, the federal agency that enforces Title VII, are brought by 
women,3 men are also victims of sex discrimination in the work-
place—especially those who do not present themselves in the 
way their coworkers or employers believe a man should.  For 
example, men who wear lipstick and skirts refuse to conform to 
social demands about the way men “ought” to look. Quietness 
and passivity defy the stereotype that men are generally assertive 
and aggressive.  Men who have 
sexual relationships with other men 
challenge the heterosexist view that 
only male-female sexual relation-
ships are “natural.”  However, fed-
eral courts have been reluctant to 
extend the protections afforded  
women under Title VII to non-
gender-conforming men.   An 
overly narrow conception of sex 
discrimination blinds courts to the 
fact that these men are also victims 
of sex discrimination.  And in turn, 
the denial of protection for non-
gender-conforming men directly 
contributes to the continued subor-
dination of women. 
 Many scholars have argued that the plain language of 
Title VII and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute in 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins provides a sufficient framework 
for protecting men who experience discrimination as a result of 
failing to conform to gender norms.4  Although federal courts 
acknowledge that sex stereotyping is a form of sex discrimina-
tion,5 men who do not satisfy social expectations of masculinity 
have had difficulty succeeding on Title VII claims.  Courts often 
conflate effeminacy with homosexuality,6 viewing “feminine” 
behavior in men as a manifestation of homosexuality (that is, a 
marker for one’s status), rather than recognizing “homosexual” 
as a label that society places on men who engage in non-gender-
conforming conduct (namely, having sex and/or romantic rela-
tionships with other men).  Consequently, when faced with a sex 
discrimination claim asserted by an “effeminate” male plaintiff 
who is either gay or perceived to be so by his coworkers, courts 
typically rule against the plaintiff on the ground that Title VII 
does not protect people who are discriminated against on the 
basis of sexual orientation.     
  Courts have also rejected the majority of sex discrimi-
nation claims brought by transgender persons.7  Changing gen-
ders can be seen as the ultimate form of gender nonconformity.  
When an individual with biologically male genitals takes female 
hormones and/or undergoes gender reassignment surgery, she 
violates the social dictate that she should present herself as a 
person of the gender she was assigned at birth.   I. Bennett Ca-
pers, a professor of law at Hofstra Law School, suggests that gay 
men and lesbians, by their very existence, call into question the 
“complementarity” of the sexes and their respective accepted 
characteristics.8 Similarly, transgender people challenge soci-
ety’s dichotomous concept of gender; they undermine the notion 
that men and women are opposites of one another and that cer-
tain traits are naturally linked to a person’s biological sex.9  Ca-
pers contends that women will continue to face subordination in 
the workplace as long as the concept of a binary gender system 
exists.10  Accordingly, courts would best further Title VII’s pur-
pose by reading the statute as covering a “continuum of gen-
ders,”11 including gay, lesbian, and trans-
gender individuals.   
 This article surveys a number of 
cases and identifies three mechanisms 
employed by courts to deny non-gender-
conforming individuals’ Title VII claims.  
First, the majority of courts fail to distin-
guish between conduct and status.  Indi-
viduals who self-identify or are labeled as 
homosexual or transgender often lose Title 
VII claims because courts conflate this 
unprotected status with the individuals’ 
non-gender-conforming conduct.  A sec-
ond denial mechanism is closely related.  
In many cases involving homosexual or 
transgender plaintiffs, both sexual orienta-
tion/gender identity discrimination and sex discrimination are at 
work.  The existence of the former, which is not prohibited under 
current Title VII jurisprudence, often obscures the existence of 
the latter.  Finally, courts fail to recognize that sexual orientation 
and gender identity/expression discrimination are actually forms 
of sex discrimination.  Homosexual and transgender men and 
women refuse to conform to the gender roles that society as-
signs, on the basis of biological sex.12  This article argues that 
discrimination against non-gender-conforming individuals is sex 
discrimination grounded in sex stereotyping and heterosexist 
expectations.    
 
I. EARLY CASES 
 
 Holloway v. Arthur Andersen and Co.13 was one of the 
first Title VII cases brought by a transgender individual.  The 
plaintiff, Ramona Holloway, was born a biological male.  After 
starting female hormone treatments, Holloway informed her em-
ployer, Arthur Andersen, that she was preparing to undergo sex 
reassignment surgery.14  She began wearing lipstick and nail 
polish to work, as well as a feminine hairstyle, clothing, and jew-
elry.15  A few months later, after she requested that company 
records be changed to reflect her new female name, Holloway 
discrimination against non-gender-
conforming individuals is sex dis-
crimination grounded in sex stereo-
typing and heterosexist expectations.    
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was fired.16   
 Holloway’s supervisor explained in an affidavit that 
Holloway was terminated because her “dress, appearance, and 
manner . . . were such that it was very disruptive and embarrass-
ing to all concerned.”17  This evidence clearly indicated that 
Holloway was fired because her employer did not approve of her 
non-gender-conforming behavior.18  Nevertheless, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that Arthur Andersen had not violated Title 
VII by firing Holloway for initiating the process of sex transi-
tion.19  The judges stated: “Holloway has not claimed to have 
been treated discriminatorily because she is male or female, but 
rather because she is a transsexual who chose to change her sex . 
. .  A transsexual individual’s choice to undergo sex change sur-
gery does not bring that individual, nor transsexuals as a class, 
within the scope of Title VII.”20  The court further reasoned that 
the purpose of Title VII was “to remedy the economic depriva-
tion of women as a class” and that Congress had not “shown any 
intent other than to restrict the term ‘sex’ to its original mean-
ing.”21    
 Circuit Judge Alfred T. Goodwin dissented, interpret-
ing the plain language of the statute to protect Holloway.22  Al-
though Congress “probably never contemplated that Title VII 
would apply to transsexuals,” he argued, Holloway had a legiti-
mate sex discrimination claim.23 Judge Goodwin found that be-
cause Holloway was a female on the day she was fired, she was 
a member of the class that Congress intended Title VII to pro-
tect.24  He argued that the manner in which a plaintiff became a 
member of the protected class, whether via birth as a biological 
female or through gender reassignment surgery, should not mat-
ter for the purpose of a Title VII analysis.25   
 Even though Judge Goodwin would have allowed Hol-
loway to proceed with her Title VII claim, his analysis of the 
case fell short.  Because he stressed the fact that Holloway was a 
woman and therefore a member of “the disadvantaged class” 
that Congress intended Title VII to protect, it is doubtful that he 
would have similarly held in favor of a female-to-male trans-
gender plaintiff.  Moreover, Arthur Andersen did not discrimi-
nate against Holloway because she was a woman.  Holloway’s 
supervisor suggested that Holloway find a new job where her 
transgender identity would be unknown26—indicating that Hol-
loway’s femaleness was problematic only because her employer 
was aware that Holloway had been born a biological male and 
was uncomfortable with her presenting as a woman.   
 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a similar 
Title VII claim brought by a transgender plaintiff in Ulane v. 
Eastern Airlines.27  Karen Ulane, born a biological male, was a 
pilot for Eastern Airlines when she began taking female hor-
mones, developed breasts, and underwent sex reassignment sur-
gery.28  She was fired when she attempted to return to work after 
her surgery.29  After Ulane sued the airline on a Title VII theory, 
the district court reinstated her as a pilot with full seniority, back 
pay, and attorneys’ fees.  The Seventh Circuit overturned that 
ruling, holding that Title VII did not protect transgender people.  
The appellate court reasoned that “[a] prohibition against dis-
crimination based on an individual’s sex is not synonymous with 
a prohibition against discrimination based on an individual’s 
sexual identity disorder or discontent with the sex into which 
they were born.”30  The court maintained that if Congress had 
intended the statute to “apply to anything other than the tradi-
tional concept of sex,” then “surely the legislative history would 
have at least mentioned its intended broad coverage of homo-
sexuals, transvestites, or transsexuals.”31   
 Like Holloway, Ulane suffered discrimination because 
she did not conform to gender stereotypes.  At the time of these 
decisions, courts had not yet recognized that gender stereotyping 
is a form of sex discrimination.32  The courts’ analysis in Hollo-
way and Ulane was similar: The plaintiffs were discriminated 
against because they were transgender; their status, rather than 
their non-gender-conforming conduct, was the basis for the dis-
criminatory treatment.  The next step in the analysis was simple: 
Transgender individuals are not a protected class under Title 
VII, so the plaintiffs’ claims necessarily failed.  Under early 
Title VII jurisprudence, it would always be legal for employers 
to discriminate against transgender employees. 
 
 
II.THE COURTS’ DEVELOPING UNDERSTANDING OF SEX 
DISCRIMINATION 
 
 In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court 
broadened its concept of “sex discrimination,” holding that Title 
VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees 
who do not conform to sexual stereotypes.33  The plaintiff, Ann 
Hopkins, was the only woman among eighty-eight candidates up 
for partnership in Price Waterhouse’s Washington, D.C. office 
in 1982.34  Hopkins neither made partner nor was rejected; in-
stead, her candidacy was held over for reconsideration.35  When 
Hopkins was not nominated for partnership the following year, 
she sued the firm under Title VII. 
 The district court found compelling evidence that Price 
Waterhouse’s decision not to offer Hopkins partnership in the 
firm was directly tied to her sex.  The court noted that “none of 
the other partnership candidates at Price Waterhouse that year 
had a comparable record in terms of successfully securing major 
contracts for the [firm].”36  Partners and clients alike praised 
Hopkins’s work, calling her “extremely competent and intelli-
gent,” “strong and forthright, very productive, energetic, and 
creative.”37  Many Price Waterhouse partners, however, “reacted 
negatively to Hopkins’s personality because she was a 
woman.”38  One partner called her “macho,” while another felt 
that she “overcompensated for being a woman,” and a third said 
that she needed to take a class at “charm school.”39  Another 
male partner explained that if Hopkins wanted to improve her 
chances of making partner, she should “walk more femininely, 
talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, 
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”40 
 Based on this evidence, the district court concluded that 
“Price Waterhouse had unlawfully discriminated against Hop-
kins on the basis of sex by consciously giving credence and ef-
fect to partners’ comments that resulted from sex stereotyp-
ing.”41  The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s holding.  
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan declared: “We are 
beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by 
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associ-
ated with their group, for in forbidding employers to discrimi-
nate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended 
to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and 
women resulting from sex stereotypes.”42  The Court ruled that 
“gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions”43 and that 
“an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman 
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the 
basis of gender.”44   
 It logically follows from the Price Waterhouse decision 
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that an employer who discriminates against a male employee 
based on his refusal to conform to gender norms has violated 
Title VII.  Nevertheless, for years after Price Waterhouse, fed-
eral courts disagreed about whether the statute prohibits dis-
crimination against Ann Hopkins’s male counterpart: the effemi-
nate man.45  For male plaintiffs, a significant obstacle was the 
tendency of courts to conflate impermissible sex stereotyping 
with sexual orientation discrimination, which courts have repeat-
edly held is not prohibited by Title VII.46  Put differently, when 
considering a “feminine” male employee, courts generally as-
sumed that he faced discrimination because he was gay or per-
ceived to be so, rather than finding that the employer had penal-
ized the plaintiff for not conforming to male stereotypes. 
 For example, in Dillon v. Frank,47 plaintiff Ernest Dil-
lon’s coworkers verbally abused him, calling him a “fag” and 
taunting, “Dillon sucks dicks.”48  Graffiti at the work site de-
clared “Dillon sucks dicks” and “Dillon gives head.”49  After 
three years of harassment, Dillon quit his job and sued his for-
mer employer under Title VII.50  Dillon argued that his was a 
case of sex stereotyping, contending that he was 
harassed because he was not “macho” enough in his 
coworkers’ eyes.51  While the Sixth Circuit ac-
knowledged that the harassment Dillon suffered 
“was clearly sexual in nature,”52 the court held that 
Dillon was subjected to a hostile work environment 
because his coworkers believed he was gay; there-
fore, their actions constituted sexual orientation 
discrimination not prohibited by Title VII.53  The 
court found there was no evidence of sex stereotyp-
ing and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of 
Dillon’s lawsuit.54   
Dillon offers an example of how federal 
courts often treat male and female Title VII plain-
tiffs differently. In cases of male-on-female sexual 
harassment, courts tend to take an “I-know-it-when-
I-see it” approach.55 Had Dillon been a woman, he would have 
had a quintessentially actionable sex discrimination case, and the 
court almost certainly would have come out in his favor. But 
when it comes to male plaintiffs harassed by other men, courts 
set the bar much higher.56    
 Why did the Dillon court get it wrong?  First, the possi-
bility that the plaintiff was a victim of sexual orientation dis-
crimination, as suggested by the “fag” epithet, obscured the sex 
discrimination at work in the case.  No evidence existed in the 
record indicating why Dillon’s coworkers believed he was gay; 
presumably there was something about Dillon’s appearance or 
mannerisms, as he argued, that his coworkers believed was not 
“macho” or “masculine” enough.57  The court’s second error 
was its failure to distinguish between non-gender conforming 
conduct and homosexual orientation.  Dillon’s coworkers har-
assed him by referring to sexual acts that Dillon allegedly per-
formed with other men; the discrimination centered on Dillon’s 
perceived conduct.  The court, however, found that Dillon was 
discriminated against because of his perceived homosexual 
status.  This reasoning was problematic because even if Con-
gress amended Title VII to prohibit sexual orientation discrimi-
nation, effeminate men—both gay and straight—might remain 
unprotected.58  That is, while it would be impermissible to fire a 
gay man because of his homosexuality, it might be lawful to fire 
him for being a man who acts too much like a woman.    
 This case helps illustrate that discrimination against 
men who are gay, or perceived to be so, is a form of sex stereo-
typing. Discrimination against homosexual men is grounded in 
heterosexist expectations that “real” men should date and have 
sex with women and not other men.59  Dillon’s coworkers 
mocked him by suggesting that he took the submissive, stereo-
typically “female” role in fellatio.   Mary Ann Case, a professor 
of law at the University of Chicago Law School,  has suggested 
that the harassment of gay men for their receptive role in sexual 
activity is a form of discrimination against the feminine, since it 
is based on the assumption that “real men . . . always tak[e] the 
active/masculine role in bed and elsewhere.”60  Thus, the subor-
dination of both gay men and women is closely linked.   
 Courts may be more inclined to protect female victims 
of sex stereotyping, like Ann Hopkins, than effeminate men be-
cause “masculine” qualities in a woman are typically far less 
socially problematic than “feminine” behavior in a man.61  Fur-
thermore, male employees do not find themselves in a Hopkins-
like bind because characteristics typically labeled as feminine 
are not as valued in the workplace as those characteristics 
deemed masculine.  Consider, for instance, a 2004 incident in 
which California gover-
nor, Arnold Schwar-
zenegger, criticized his 
political opponents by 
calling them “girlie 
men.”62  Schwarzenegger 
did not mean to suggest 
that the lawmakers in 
question were homosex-
ual or effeminate; in-
stead, he was accusing 
them of being weak or 
ineffective.  A spokes-
person for the governor 
even explained that the 
term was “an effective 
way to convey wimpiness.”63  Schwarzenegger’s statement im-
plies that the only people who belong in positions of power are 
“real” men, who are physically strong, macho, and aggressive.64  
The underlying assumption is that women – and men who are 
too much like women – cannot perform effective work.  Case 
has argued that this “disfavoring of characteristics gendered 
feminine may work to the systematic detriment of women and 
thus should be analyzed as a form of sex discrimination.”65  In-
terpreting Title VII to protect men who “act like women” is thus 
absolutely crucial to ending discrimination against women in the 
workplace.  “If women [are] protected for being masculine but 
men [can] be penalized for being effeminate, this. . . would send 
a strong message of subordination to women, because it would 
mean that feminine qualities, which women are disproportion-
ately likely to display, may legitimately be devalued although 
masculine qualities may not.”66 
 In 1997, the Seventh Circuit became one of the first 
courts to recognize that discrimination against a man who does 
not satisfy social expectations of masculinity is sex discrimina-
tion.  The sixteen-year-old male plaintiff in Doe v. City of Belle-
ville67 was dubbed a “fag” and “queer” by his coworkers be-
cause he wore an earring.68  One coworker asked if the plaintiff 
was a boy or a girl, called the plaintiff his “bitch,” and repeat-
edly threatened to take him out into the woods and “get [him] up 
the ass.”69  He also grabbed the plaintiff’s testicles to “find out if 
[he was] a girl or a guy.”70   
 
Discrimination against homosexual 
men is grounded in stereotypes that 
“real” men should date and have sex 
with women and not other men. 
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Fearing that he would be sexually assaulted, Doe quit his job 
and sued his former employer for violating Title VII.   
 
The district court dismissed Doe’s complaint, holding 
that the plaintiff could not show that he was harassed on the ba-
sis of sex because his coworkers were also heterosexual men.71  
However, the Seventh Circuit rejected the notion that a straight 
male plaintiff could not be sexually harassed in violation of Title 
VII by another straight male.  The appellate court pointed out 
that if the plaintiff had been a woman and her breasts had been 
grabbed, most courts would accept this as prima facie evidence 
of sex discrimination.  The motivation for the harassment is be-
yond the point, the court said: “When a male employee’s testi-
cles are grabbed . . . the point is that he experiences that harass-
ment as a man, not just as a worker.”72  It further reasoned: 
 
“[i]f [the plaintiff] were a woman, no 
court would have any difficulty construing 
such abusive conduct as sexual harassment.  
And if the harassment were triggered by that 
woman’s decision to wear overalls and a flan-
nel shirt to work, for example – something her 
harassers might perceive to be masculine just 
as they apparently believed [the plaintiff’s] 
decision to wear an earring to be feminine – 
the court would have all the confirmation that 
it needed that the harassment indeed amounted 
to discrimination on the basis of sex.”73   
 
 The circuit courts remained divided over whether same-
sex harassment was actionable under Title VII until the Supreme 
Court answered in the affirmative in Oncale v. Sundowner Off-
shore Services, Inc.74  The plaintiff, Joseph Oncale, was part of 
an all-male crew on an offshore oil rig.75  He was apparently 
targeted for being slender, longhaired, and wearing an earring.76  
Oncale’s coworkers threatened to rape him, and one held Oncale 
down while another pushed a bar of soap into his anus.77 Oncale 
quit soon after the assault in the shower, scared that he would be 
raped on the job.78 
 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision that Oncale could not bring a Title VII claim 
against his (male) harassers.  Writing for the Court, Justice 
Scalia noted: “As some courts have observed, male-on-male 
sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the princi-
pal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII . 
. . But statutory provisions often go beyond the principal evil to 
cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provi-
sions of our law rather than the principle concerns of our legisla-
tors by which we are governed.”79   
 Justice Scalia emphasized, however, that not all sexual 
harassment violates Title VII.  A plaintiff “must always prove 
that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive 
sexual connotations, but actually constituted discrimination . . . 
because of . . . sex.”80  The Court held that when the harasser 
and the victim are of the opposite sex, there is a reasonable in-
ference that the harasser was acting ‘because of’ sex.81  A simi-
lar inference can be drawn when the harasser is homosexual and 
the victim is of the same sex.82  When such an inference is not 
available, however, a same-sex victim must offer evidence that 
the harasser either treated men and women differently, or was 
motivated by hostility to the presence of a particular sex in the 
workplace.83 
 Although Oncale acknowledged that men could sexu-
ally harass other men, the three evidentiary paths to a same-sex 
Title VII claim that the Court laid out did not represent a signifi-
cant broadening of the Court’s understanding of sex discrimina-
tion.  Justice Scalia failed to cut through the gender dichotomy 
and merely incorporated same-sex relations into the mix.84  No-
tably absent from his analysis was a discussion of male sex 
stereotyping or non-gender-conforming behavior.  In fact, the 
opinion did not mention Oncale’s appearance, which might have 
been insufficiently “masculine” for his coworkers and thus an 
impetus for the discrimination.  Justice Scalia did not even cite 
the Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse, which had been de-
cided only nine years earlier.  The concept of a man who wore 
lipstick or walked and talked in an overly “feminine” way does 
not seem to have crossed the Justices’ minds.   
 
III. THE COURTS’ CONTINUING FAILURE TO PROTECT 
NON-GENDER-CONFORMING MEN 
 
 Even after Price Waterhouse and Oncale, homosexual 
and transgender Title VII plaintiffs continued to face an uphill 
battle.  In theory, under the mixed motives doctrine, if the evi-
dence suggests that an employer’s decision was partly motivated 
by sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination (both of 
which are not prohibited by Title VII), a plaintiff is still pro-
tected by Title VII if he or she was also discriminated against for 
non-gender-conforming behavior.85  Yet in reality, in the major-
ity of cases where both sexual orientation discrimination and sex 
discrimination occur, the existence of the former blinds courts to 
the plaintiff’s cognizable Title VII claim.86   
 For example, in Bibby v. Coca-Cola,87 a coworker re-
peatedly called the male plaintiff a “sissy” and yelled, 
“everybody knows you take it up the ass.”88  The court granted 
summary judgment for the employer on the plaintiff’s Title VII 
action, finding that the plaintiff, who was gay, was harassed 
because of his sexual orientation and not because of sex (that is, 
his failure to adhere to gender norms).89  The court overlooked 
the fact that “sissy” is an insult reserved for boys and men who 
are not perceived as sufficiently masculine.90 A New York dis-
trict court similarly disposed of a gay male plaintiff’s sex dis-
crimination claims in Martin v. Department of Correctional Ser-
vices.91  The plaintiff’s coworkers left sexually explicit photos in 
his work area and drew sexually explicit graffiti on the restroom 
walls, yard booths, and the plaintiff’s time card and interoffice 
mail.92  They also harassed him with derogatory language, like 
“cocksucker” and “fucking faggot.”93  But because the court 
found no evidence that Martin acted in an effeminate manner,94 
it granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.95  It 
ruled that in order to ensure that plaintiffs do not bootstrap sex-
ual orientation claims under Title VII, “a plaintiff must demon-
strate that he does not, or at the very least is not perceived to, act 
masculine”96 in order to make out an actionable case of sex dis-
crimination.  
While not all gay men are effeminate, and not all 
straight men are “macho,” Martin illuminates the troubling ne-
cessity for a homosexual plaintiff to emphasize his “femininity” 
in his complaint in order to convince the court that sex discrimi-
nation, not sexual orientation discrimination, was the root of his 
harassment.  As one commentator has put it: “[E]ntitlement to 
Title VII protection ultimately depends on spurious factors such 
as whether the particular words and actions used by harassers 
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are sufficiently ‘sexual,’ whether the victim is an ‘effeminate’ or 
‘masculine’ homosexual, and whether the victim pleads his 
claim in language sanctioned by the courts that downplays or 
does not mention if the plaintiff is gay.”97  Under this jurispru-
dence, Title VII will protect the stereotypically effeminate gay 
man, but not the gay man who “acts straight,” or passes as 
stereotypically masculine.  This also presents a problem for the 
male plaintiff who is deemed to be too feminine by his cowork-
ers, but not quite feminine enough for the court to find that he 
was a victim of sex stereotyping.   
  Heterosexual men who are perceived as gay have also 
had difficulty establishing Title VII claims.  For example, in 
Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc.,98 coworkers called 
Michael Hamm, a straight male, a “faggot” and a “Girl Scout.”99  
There were rumors that Hamm had a relationship with another 
male employee, and coworkers often asked him whether he had 
a girlfriend and why he was not married.100  After Hamm com-
plained of sexual harassment, he was fired.  Hamm then sued his 
former employer under Title VII.  Concluding that the term 
“Girl Scout” was unrelated to gender, the court found that 
Hamm was not a victim of sex discrimination; rather, he was 
harassed because of his perceived homosexuality.   
 In this case, the gender nonconformity suggested by the 
term “Girl Scout” was hidden behind the “faggot” epithet.  
Hamm suggested to the court that “when a heterosexual male is 
harassed and the basis offered for the harassment is ‘perceived 
homosexuality,’ then it is likely and reasonable to infer that gen-
der stereotyping is present and is the real basis for the harass-
ment.”101  The court rejected this argument, insisting that “courts 
have never focused on the sexuality of the parties involved when 
determining whether sexual harassment occurred.”  Hamm of-
fers another example of how courts fail to distinguish conduct 
and status.  Ironically, the court defined Hamm’s heterosexual 
status as irrelevant and at the same time made his status as a 
perceived homosexual determinative.   
 Hamm also illustrates that discrimination based on sex-
ual orientation, or perceived homosexuality, is in itself a form of 
sex discrimination.  Social norms prescribe that men should be 
sexually attracted only to women, should date only women, and 
ultimately should marry women.  “It is essential to the mainte-
nance of heterosexism that these two genders are interpreted as . 
. . being ‘naturally’ attracted to one another.”102  Deviation from 
this pattern of normative behavior arouses suspicion.  Hamm’s 
coworkers discriminated against Hamm because he was unmar-
ried and may not have had a girlfriend.    This case is an exam-
ple of how courts have declined “to recognize that sanctions 
levied on individuals for behaving or presenting themselves in a 
fashion commonly associated with homosexual orientation or 
transgender status are themselves a function of community dis-
approval of the plaintiff’s refusal or failure to adhere to gen-
dered notions about appearance, attire, as well as sexual and 
nonsexual behavior.”103   
 In Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc.,104 the court held 
that an employer had not engaged in sex discrimination when it 
fired the male plaintiff for presenting himself as a woman out-
side of work.  In his off time, Peter Oiler, a truck driver for 
Winn-Dixie, occasionally adopted a female name, Donna, and 
wore makeup, skirts, nail polish, a bra, and silicone prostheses to 
enlarge his breasts.105  After the president of Winn-Dixie learned 
that Oiler sometimes appeared in public as Donna, Oiler was 
fired.106  At trial, Oiler’s supervisor testified that crossdressing 
was “unacceptable” in the area where Oiler worked, indicating 
there was “a large customer base there that have various beliefs, 
be it religion or a morality or family values or people that just 
don’t want to associate with that type of behavior . . .”107 
 Winn-Dixie contended that Oiler had not been termi-
nated for refusing to adhere to masculine stereotypes, but instead 
because he was a man who publicly pretended to be a woman.108  
The district court accepted this distinction and agreed that Oiler 
was not a victim of sex discrimination.  The court distinguished 
the case from Price Waterhouse, maintaining that “the plaintiff 
[in Price Waterhouse] may not have behaved as the partners 
thought a woman should behave, but she never pretended to be a 
man [n]or adopted a masculine persona.”109   
 Oiler is yet another example of the courts’ insistence on 
maintaining a gender dichotomy.  In Oiler’s own words: “[T]oo 
many people don't see the middle ground between black and 
white. And that's where people in my situation really are. People 
hadn't even heard the word transgender. There are a whole 
bunch of people in the middle.”110  So long as courts refuse to 
recognize that gender identity discrimination and sex discrimina-
tion are parts of the same whole, individuals like Oiler, who 
identify as male, but also want to express female parts of their 
identity, will remain vulnerable to discrimination in the work-
place. 
 
IV. RECENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE 
 
 There is some reason for optimism, however.  Several 
non-gender-conforming plaintiffs have recently succeeded on 
sex discrimination claims.  In Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant En-
terprises, Inc., plaintiff Antonio Sanchez alleged that he was 
verbally harassed for not adhering to social demands of mascu-
linity.111  Coworkers used feminine pronouns to refer to Sanchez 
and mocked him for walking and carrying his serving tray “like 
a woman.”112  The Ninth Circuit held that the evidence that other 
employees referred to Sanchez using female gender pronouns 
and taunted him for behaving like a woman amounted to action-
able gender stereotyping.    
  In Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., Medina Rene, an 
openly gay man, worked as part of an all-male butler staff.113  
Rene was constantly harassed by his coworkers, who called him 
“sweetheart,” “muñeca,” and “fucking female whore.”114  They 
told crude jokes, gave him sexually oriented ‘gifts,’ and forced 
him to look at pornography.115  Rene was also repeatedly sexu-
ally assaulted; his coworkers touched him “like they would to a 
woman,” grabbed his crotch, and poked their fingers in his 
anus.116 
 The district court dismissed Rene’s Title VII suit, find-
ing that Rene was targeted because he was gay,117 but the Ninth 
Circuit reversed.  The appellate court found that since the as-
saults targeted sexual body parts, Rene had been harassed 
“because . . . of sex,”118 and whatever else may have motivated 
the attacks was of no legal consequence.  The court cited On-
cale, noting that the plaintiff “did not need to show that he was 
treated worse than members of the opposite sex.  It was enough 
to show that he suffered discrimination in comparison to other 
men.”119  However, the court’s decision in favor of Rene relied 
heavily on the severity of the offensive sexual contact; had Rene 
not been sexually assaulted, or had the touching been less egre-
gious, the court may not have ruled in his favor.120   
Although the majority ignored the fact that Rene’s co-
workers called Rene “sweetheart,” “muñeca,” and “fucking fe-
male whore,” and missed the logical conclusion that Rene was 
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targeted because his coworkers did not find him to be masculine 
enough, three concurring judges found that this was a case of 
actionable gender stereotyping.121  Circuit Judge Harry Preger-
son pointed to the evidence that Rene’s coworkers touched him 
and spoke to him “like a woman.”122  “There would be no reason 
for Rene’s coworkers to whistle at Rene ‘like a woman,’ unless 
they perceived him to be not enough like a man and too much 
like a woman,” Pregerson wrote.123  “This is gender stereotyp-
ing, and that is what Rene meant when he said he was discrimi-
nated against because he was openly gay.”124  Thus, some judges 
are beginning to understand that men who are harassed for being 
gay are targeted because they do not conform to their coworkers' 
expectations of what a ‘real man’ is like, and that this is sex dis-
crimination. 
 In two recent cases, the Sixth Circuit concluded that 
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination against individu-
als who do not present themselves as members of the gender 
they were assigned on the basis of biological sex.  In Smith v. 
City of Salem,125 plaintiff Jimmie Smith was a lieutenant in the 
City Fire Department.  When Smith started “expressing a more 
feminine appearance” at work, his coworkers commented on 
Smith’s appearance and told him that he was not acting 
“masculine enough.”126  After Smith informed his supervisor 
that he intended to transition into living as a woman, the depart-
ment planned to fire Smith.127 
 The district court dismissed Smith’s sex discrimination 
claim, ruling that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination 
against transgender people.128  The Sixth Circuit reversed, rea-
soning that: 
 
“[a]fter Price Waterhouse, an employer who 
discriminates against women because, for in-
stance, they do not wear dresses or makeup is 
engaging in sex discrimination because the 
discrimination would not occur but for the 
victim’s sex.  It follows that employers who 
discriminate against men because they do 
wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act 
femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimi-
nation, because the discrimination 
would not occur but for the victim’s 
sex.”129 
 
Smith alleged that his conduct and manner-
isms did not conform to his employers’ and 
coworkers’ ideas of how a man should look 
and behave.130  The court agreed that if this 
were the basis for his termination, Smith had 
an actionable sex discrimination claim: 
“Discrimination against a plaintiff who is a 
transsexual – and therefore fails to act and/or 
identify with his or her gender – is no differ-
ent from the discrimination directed against 
Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse, who, in 
sex-stereotypical terms, did not act like a 
woman.  Sex stereotyping based on a person’s non-gender con-
forming behavior is impermissible discrimination, irrespective 
of the cause of that behavior; a label, such as ‘transsexual,’ is 
not fatal to a sex discrimination claim . . . ”131 
 In Barnes v. City of Cincinnati,132 the plaintiff, Philecea 
Barnes, had been an officer in the Cincinnati Police Department 
for seventeen years.  Barnes presented himself as a man while 
on-duty, and as a woman while off-duty.  He had a French mani-
cure, arched eyebrows, and occasionally came to work wearing 
makeup.133  After Barnes was promoted to sergeant,134 he was 
the only sergeant subjected to extra supervision during the pro-
bationary period.135  Rumors circulated through the police de-
partment that Barnes was either homosexual or bisexual.136  One 
of Barnes’ supervisors told him that he did not appear to be 
“masculine” and needed to stop wearing makeup.137  Another 
supervisor told Barnes that he was going to fail probation be-
cause he was not “acting masculine enough.”138  Although his 
scores were above the minimum for passing, and even higher 
than at least one other sergeant who passed the probationary 
period, Barnes failed.139  According to several other officers, 
Barnes lacked “command presence” and did not have the respect 
of his subordinates.140  Barnes was the only person to fail proba-
tion between 1993 and 2000.141 
 At trial, Barnes successfully claimed that his demotion 
from sergeant violated Title VII, and the jury found in his fa-
vor.142  Barnes argued that he was discriminated against because 
he failed to conform to sex stereotypes.143  The Sixth Circuit 
upheld the judgment on appeal, holding that Barnes had pro-
duced evidence sufficient to support his claim of sex discrimina-
tion.  The court relied on the comments made by his superior 
officers and noted that Barnes was singled out for intense scru-
tiny.  It also found that Barnes’s “ambiguous sexuality” and his 
practice of dressing as a woman outside of work were well-
known within the CPD.144   
 One of the most recent cases involving a transgender 
plaintiff was Schroer v. Billington.145  Diane Schroer was born a 
biological male.  Before she legally changed her name or began 
presenting herself as a woman, she applied for job at the Library 
of Congress.  She interviewed as “David,” her legal name at the 
time, and wore traditional male clothing.  After she was hired, 
Schroer told the interviewer that she was transgender, would be 
transitioning from male to female, and would begin work as 
Diane.  The next day, Schroer was informed that she was “not a 
good fit,” and the job offer was retracted.  Schroer then brought 
a Title VII suit against the Library of Congress.146 
 The court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Schroer, finding that she was a 
victim of sex discrimination.  
District Judge James Robertson 
observed that the Library may 
have perceived Schroer as “an 
insufficiently masculine man, 
an insufficiently feminine 
woman, or an inherently non-
gender-conforming individual” 
and that each of the three 
amounted to impermissible sex 
stereotyping.147  The court also 
agreed with Schroer’s argument 
that “because gender identity is 
a component of sex, discrimina-
tion on the basis of gender iden-
tity is sex discrimination.”148  It determined that the Library had 
violated Title VII’s plain language prohibiting discrimination 
“because of  . . . sex” when it revoked its offer upon learning 
that Schroer, a biological male, intended to become “legally, 
culturally, and physically, a woman named Diane.”149  The court 
noted, critically, that other courts “have allowed their focus on 
the label ‘transsexual’ to blind them to the statutory language 
Sex stereotyping based on a person’s 
non-gender conforming behavior is 
impermissible discrimination, irre-
spective of the cause of that behav-
ior; a label, such as ‘transsexual,’ is 
not fatal to a sex discrimination 
claim . . . ” 
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itself.”150   
 The Schroer decision indicates that federal courts are 
beginning to acknowledge that discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, gender identity, and gender expression are all forms 
of sex discrimination.  Individuals like Peter Oiler, Diane 
Schroer, and Medina Rene experienced discrimination because 
they did not conform to their employers’ expectations of mascu-
linity.  Demanding that a person behave or present himself or 
herself in a certain way at work because of the gender that soci-
ety assigned to that person based on his or her genitals is sex 
discrimination.  The Supreme Court has held already that sex 
stereotyping violates Title VII; breaking down the socially-
constructed gender dichotomy may go past the Court’s analysis 
in Price Waterhouse, but it is the logical next step.  Moreover, 
analyzing Title VII claims would be far easier for courts if they 
stopped trying to maintain a gender divide that has become in-
creasingly non-credible.151   
 
V. TITLE VII AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
 
 The remaining question is whether a broadened concep-
tion of sex discrimination conflicts with congressional intent.  
Many courts have refused to extend Title VII’s protections to 
homosexual or transsexual plaintiffs on the grounds that doing 
so would contravene the purpose of Title VII.  For instance, in 
Ulane, the Seventh Circuit declared, “[t]he total lack of legisla-
tive history supporting the sex amendment coupled with the cir-
cumstances of the amendment’s adoption clearly indicates that 
Congress never considered nor intended this 1964 legislation to 
apply to anything other than the traditional concept of sex.  Had 
Congress intended more, surely the legislative history would 
have at least mentioned its intended broad coverage of homo-
sexuals, transvestites, or transsexuals.”152   
 Courts and commentators who express this view ignore 
the fact that the Supreme Court left the legislative history of 
Title VII behind with Price Waterhouse.  And in Oncale, where 
the Court acknowledged that same-sex harassment is actionable 
under Title VII, Justice Scalia – a strict textualist153 and one of 
the most conservative Justices – wrote: “As some courts have 
observed, male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was 
assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with 
when it enacted Title VII.  But statutory provisions often go be-
yond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, 
and it is ultimately the provisions of our law rather than the prin-
cipal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”154  
In light of courts’ gradually broadening interpretation of Title 
VII, their refusal to extend the statute’s protections to trans-
gender and homosexual persons based on legislative history 
seems disingenuous. The court in Schroer v. Billington 
agreed, stating, “[t]he decisions holding that Title VII only pro-
hibits discrimination against men because they are men, and 
discrimination against women because they are women, repre-
sent an elevation of ‘judge-supported legislative intent over clear 
statutory text.’”155  
Some commentators who oppose an expanded reading 
of Title VII have pointed out that Congress has rejected propos-
als to amend Title VII to prohibit sexual orientation and gender 
identity discrimination.156  They argue that this shows that Con-
gress did not intend the statute to protect homosexual and trans-
gender people.  However, the Schroer Court expressly rejected 
such an argument, stating that the Supreme Court has cautioned 
against using legislative history in this way:  
 
Subsequent legislative history is a 
hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an 
earlier Congress.  It is a particularly dangerous 
ground on which to rest an interpretation of a 
prior statute when it concerns, as it does here, 
a proposal that does not become law.  
 Congressional inaction lacks persuasive sig-
nificance because several equally tenable in-
ferences may be drawn from such inaction, 
including the inference that the existing legis-
lation already incorporated the offered 
change.157 
 
The Schroer Court suggested that Congress may have rejected 
the passage of bills that would amend Title VII to expressly pro-
hibit gender identity discrimination because the statute already 
forbids it.  Thus, the legislative “non-history” of Title VII may 
demonstrate that “some Members of Congress believe that the 
Ulane court and others have interpreted ‘sex’ in an unduly nar-
row manner . . . and that the statute requires, not amendment, but 
only correct interpretation.”158 Joel Friedman, a professor of law 
at Tulane Law School, has argued that interpreting discrimina-
tion on the basis of “sex” to encompass sexual orientation and 
gender identity discrimination would not circumvent congres-
sional intent.159  He points out that Congress often paints “in 
broad remedial strokes,” leaving the work of interpretation up to 
the courts.160   
 Moreover, the courts’ narrow interpretation of Title VII 
frustrates the statute’s broad remedial purpose.161  By refusing to 
protect gay men, lesbians, bisexual, and transgender people who 
face discrimination because they do not conform to a binary 
gender system, “courts perpetuate the very subordination that 
Title VII was designed to eliminate.”162  Courts’ insistence on 
maintaining a strict gender dichotomy reinforces the notion that 
women and men “are” and “should be” a certain way.  If em-
ployers are allowed to demand that men not act “like women,” 
this sends a message to all people that being “feminine” is not a 
very good way to be – reinforcing patriarchy in the workplace 
and society as a whole.  This result is antithetical to the statute’s 
goal of “plac[ing] women on equal footing with men.”163 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 “[T]he world will not be safe for women in frilly pink 
dresses . . . unless and until it is made safe for men in dresses as 
well.”164  The refusal of courts to recognize gender nonconform-
ity discrimination as sex discrimination legitimizes social de-
valuation of the feminine.  Instead of breaking down barriers in 
the workplace, as Title VII was intended to do, courts are actu-
ally reinforcing stereotypes about men and women when they 
allow employers to discriminate against non-gender-conforming 
men.  In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court declared that 
“gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions.”165  To 
give proper effect to Title VII, courts must recognize sexual 
orientation, gender identity, and gender expression discrimina-
tion as sex discrimination and interpret the statute so as to pro-
tect individuals no matter where they fall along the gender con-
tinuum.   
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S. 3406 “ADA Amendments Act of 2008” 
Introduced by Senator Thomas Harkin (D -IA) 
 
This Act amends the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”) of 1990 to make it more inclusive by redefining the 
term disability, and defining the phrases “major life activities” 
and “being regarded as having such an impairment.”  It broadly 
construes disability as an impairment that substantially limits 
one major life activity, is episodic, or is in remission if it would 
substantially limit a major life activity when active. Whether an 
impairment “substantially limits a major life activity” will be 
determined without regard to how individuals function with 
mitigating measures, such as medications or hearing aids.  Fur-
thermore, this Act prohibits employment discrimination against 
individuals on the basis of their disability and only allows quali-
fication standards, tests, or other selection criteria for employ-
ment that are related to the position and is consistent with the 
needs of the company. 
In introducing this legislation, Congress intended to restore 
the original goal of the ADA, which has been hampered due to 
U.S. Supreme Court cases Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.1 and 
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc.  v. Williams,2 both 
of which have narrowed the scope of protection for persons with 
disabilities. By reestablishing the original intent of the ADA, the 
amendments should fulfill its goal of promoting equal opportu-
nity, economic independence, and full participation in American 
society, particularly in employment.3 
Senator Thomas Harkin from Iowa introduced this Act in 
July 2008 with 77 co-sponsors.  In September 2008, the Senate 
and the House passed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, and it 
was signed into law by the President on September 25, 2008. 
 
H.R. 5950 “Immigrant Detainee Basic Medical 
Care Act of 2008” 
Introduced by Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) 
 
This Act requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
establish procedures for providing mental and medical health 
care to all immigrant detainees in the custody of the Department 
of Homeland Security.  These procedures must meet all of the 
detainees’ various medical needs including primary care, emer-
gency care, chronic care, prenatal care, dental care, eye care, 
mental health care, medical dietary needs, and other specialized 
care.  The Act also sets forth an administrative appeals process 
for denials of heath care to ensure that the Secretary explains the 
reasons for the denial and to allow the onsite medical provider 
and detainee to appeal a denial or failure to provide health care. 
Supporters of the bill have described it as long overdue 
given the many deaths of immigrants in detention facilities, and 
the many other detainees who were not provided proper care 
while in custody. In the past ten years, the use of detention fa-
cilities for holding undocumented immigrants has skyrocketed 
from a daily immigration detention capacity of 8,279 in 1996 to 
a daily average of 33,000 detainees in 2007.4  Instead of provid-
ing better health care, officials have been slow in reacting and 
defensive about criticisms of their inadequate services. Yet, it is 
hard to ignore the eighty-three immigrants who died in the last 
five years and the many others who have suffered because a 
loved one was denied basic care.5 
Representative Zoe Lofgren from California introduced the 
Immigrant Detainee Basic Medical Care Act of 2008 with 
twenty-two co-sponsors. 
 
S. 1315 Title IV “Veteran’s Benefits Enhancement 
Act of 2007 Filipino WW2 Veteran’s Matters” 
Introduced by Senator Daniel Akaka (D-HI) 
 
Title IV of this Act honors Filipino and Filipino-American 
World War II veterans by qualifying them for veteran’s benefits 
through the United States Department of Veterans Affairs. This 
Act also entitles children of Filipino and Filipino-American vet-
erans to the same educational assistance as children of other 
veterans.  In 1941, when President Franklin Roosevelt con-
scripted Filipino men and boys into the U.S. Army, he promised 
them full U.S. veteran benefits.  After the war ended however, 
U.S. Congress went back on the promise, thereby disqualifying 
many Filipino veterans from benefits that were promised to 
them.6  In an effort to rectify the situation, this Act will reward 
more than 18,000 Filipinos for their service to the United States 
during World War II, through benefits and other financial 
awards.7 
Senator Daniel Akaka from Hawaii introduced this Act in 
May 2007 and it has passed both in the Senate and the House. 
 
H.R. 3686 “To Prohibit Employment Discrimina-
tion Based on Gender Identity” 
Introduced by Representative Barney Frank (D-
MA) 
 
This Act purports to eliminate employment discrimination 
on the basis of actual or perceived gender identity and allows 
individuals to bring disparate treatment claims to remedy dis-
crimination. Under this Act, employers cannot refuse to hire, 
discharge, or discriminate against an individual with respect to 
benefits and conditions of employment because of their actual or 
perceived gender identity. The Act applies to employers’ en-
forcements of rules and policies, sexual harassment, access to 
facilities that are consistent with the employee’s gender identity, 
construction of new or additional facilities, and dress and 
grooming standards. It authorizes the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, the Librarian of Congress, the Attorney 
General, and United States courts the same enforcement powers 
as they have under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Govern-
ment Employees Act of 1991, and other specified laws. 
Advocates state that employees risk being discriminatorily 
dismissed regardless of their qualifications or prior history when 
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 disclosing their transgender status or when attempting to transi-
tion while working.8 Though many states and employers have 
adopted laws and policies banning workplace discrimination 
based on gender identity, these laws are inadequate to remedy 
discrimination in jurisdictions without protections for workers 
who are fired or harassed because of their gender identity.9  Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act also does not provide a sufficient 
remedy for transgender workers.  Although many civil rights 
advocates support the view that discrimination against someone 
for changing their sex is sex discrimination qualifying for Title 
VII protection, most courts have rejected that view.10  Therefore, 
H.R. 3686 seeks to remedy these shortcomings in the law 
through finally legislating against employment discrimination 
based on gender identity.   
Representative Barney Frank from Massachusetts intro-
duced this Act in September 2007 and it has yet to be scheduled 
for debate or a vote in the House and the Senate. 
 
S. 3245 “Justice Integrity Act of 2008”  
Introduced by Senator Joe Biden (D-DE) 
 
The purpose of this Act is to address racial and ethnic dis-
parities in the criminal process, including subconscious bias  
 
 
that influences decisions to criminalize persons based on race.  
The Act creates a pilot program in ten United States Districts to 
promote fairness in the criminal justice system.  Under this Act, 
a United States attorney is designated to each District to imple-
ment a pilot program with an advisory group of judges, prosecu-
tors, defense attorneys and other members of the criminal justice 
system. Each group would collect data on the race and ethnicity 
of defendants in each stage of the criminal justice process to 
determine the cause of the racial disparity.  Essentially, this Act 
requires United States attorneys to oversee the criminal justice 
system in an attempt to reduce the racial and ethnic disparities 
that pervade the system. 
 Studies and reports show that extreme racial disparities 
in all processes of the criminal justice system exist, including 
arrests, charges, plea bargains, jury selection, convictions, and 
sentencing.11  In prisons, racial minorities comprise two-thirds 
of persons convicted by state and federal courts.12  Such inequal-
ity has decreased public trust in the criminal justice system. Ac-
cording to Senator Joe Biden, who introduced the Act, the Jus-
tice Integrity Act will ensure equal protection of the laws by 
addressing the subtle forms of racism that continue to plague the 
system. 
Senator Joe Biden from Delaware introduced the Justice 
Integrity Act of 2008 in July 2008 with five co-sponsors. 
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restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central 
importance to most people’s daily lives”). 
3 ACLU Praises House Passage of ADA Amendments Act of 
2008 (Sept. 17, 2008), http://www.aclu.org/ disability /
gen/36823prs20080917/html. 
4 Problems with Immigration Detainee Medical Care: Hearing 
on the Detainee Basic Medical Care Act of 2008 Before the 
Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. & 
Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008) 
(testimony of Mary M. McCarthy, Executive Director, National 
Immigrant Justice Center). 
5 Id. 
6 See William Mann, House Passes Bill to Reward Filipino 
WWII Vets, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 23, 2008 (describing that 
Congress reversed President Roosevelt’s promise to provide full 
benefits through the Recissions Acts of 1946). 
7 Id. 
8 An Examination of Discrimination Against Transgender 
Americans in the Workplace: Hearing on H.R. 3686 Before the 
Subcomm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions of the H. 
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 110th Cong. 4 (2008) (statement of 
Shannon P. Minter, Legal Director, National Center for Lesbian 
Rights). 
9 Id. at 5. 
10 Id.  
11 Sen. Joe Biden Introduces Justice Integrity Act, Establishes 
Program to Study Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice 
System, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, July 10, 2008, http://
www.sentencingproject.org/NewsDetails. aspx?NewsID=659. 
12 Id.  
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